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ABSTRACT
This PhD thesis in Spatial Planning argues for the 
importance of understanding the approaches to 
knowledge and rationalities embedded in spati-
ally relevant decision-making. It emphasises the 
WMKRM½GERGI SJ WIIMRK PE[ EW ER IQTMVMGEP SFNIGX
of study for planning and environmental manage-
ment. The Swedish development of wind power 
and 3G mobile infrastructures are used as cases 
to study these issues of principal interest. It is a 
compilation thesis consisting of a comprehensive 
MRXVSHYGXSV]JVEQI[SVOERH½ZIEVXMGPIWSVGLET-
ters that have also been published elsewhere. The 
study is based on three main perspectives: Level 
of decision-making, legitimacy of different forms of 
knowledge involved in the process, and the socio-
legal tension between formal law and its practical 
consequences.
The thesis deals with problems stemming from 
the multi-level tensions in the planning and imple-
mentation that exist between the national, the re-
gional and the local authorities. The legal context 
is analysed from the sociolegal perspective, in par-
XMGYPEVLS[XLINYVMHM½GEXMSRSJWMXMRKERHTIVQMX
GSR¾MGXWHIXIVQMRIW[LEXX]TISJORS[PIHKIXLEX
can legitimately affect the decision-making and 
thereby set conditions for public participation. 
Finally, the thesis elaborates on the largely coun-
terproductive results of the strong emphasis on 
±IJ½GMIRG]²MRXLIVIZMWMSRSJTPERRMRKERHTIVQMX
processes for wind power and 3G-infrastructure, 
and what can be learnt from the experiences of 
XLIEXXIQTXWEXMRGVIEWMRKIJ½GMIRG]
A combination of methods has been employed 
in the studies, and the data comes from a range of 
sources such as a large set of mast building per-
mits, a sample of wind permit cases, as well as ap-
pealed permit cases. In addition, interviews have 
FIIRGSRHYGXIH[MXLNYHKIWJVSQVIPIZERXGSYVXW
MRGPYHMRK VIKMSREP LERHPMRK SJ½GIVW [LS EWWIWW
wind turbine applications. Legal documents such 
as preparatory work and licence conditions have 
also been analysed. The results show that there is 
a legal-rhetorical adaptation to the expert-based 
decision-making in court when permits are ap-
pealed. Further, the administrative levels interact 
poorly in the overall implementation. The national 
decisions, irrespective of the normative viewpoint 
of who should control the landscape planning, 
could be better informed of the preconditions at 
E PSGEP PIZIP XLEX JEGXYEPP]HI½RIXLISYXGSQISJ
the implementation. 
The author, Stefan Larsson, holds a PhD in Socio-
logy of Law, an LLM and is a sociolegal researcher 
who generally studies issues in the intersection of 
conceptual, sociolegal and technological change. 
The thesis has been supervised by Professor Lars 
Emmelin, The Swedish School of Planning, BTH, 
and co-supervised by Professor Karsten Åström, 
the Department of Sociology of Law, Lund Univer-
sity. The thesis is the result of research within the 
programme Tools for environmental assessment 
in strategic decision-making, MiSt, funded by The 
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Centre for Work, Technology and Social Change at 
Lund University. 
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Foreword
As the history of creativity teaches us (although the laws that regulate it may not), no 
achievement is a wholly individual feat. Therefore, it is most important that I begin by 
acknowledging and expressing my gratitude to the persons that have contributed to the 
research projects, the conceptual work and the writing process in general that has led to this 
PhD thesis in spatial planning. 
The two absolutely most important persons to contribute to the process of completing 
this thesis beside myself are Professor Lars Emmelin and my dear Anna Ingloff, mother of our 
two sons, Elis and Otis. Following the licentiate thesis (on 3G), Lars helped me keep the door 
open for the completion of a PhD in spatial planning through collaborative work on the wind 
power study, even if I strayed somewhat for a while with my PhD thesis in sociology of law 
towards a completely unrelated topic (copyright in a digital context). His drive, brilliance and 
commitment as a supervisor, co-writer and commentator have been absolutely imperative for 
this thesis to be completed. And thank you, Anna, for all the support. Since the first thesis was 
dedicated to Elis, this second quite naturally has to be dedicated to Otis.
In addition, I would like to extend my thanks to Professor Karsten Åström for his co-
supervision; to Sandra Vindelstam and Ted Kransby who assisted in the project on wind 
power; to Mattias Orre for proofreading and Magnus Gudmundsson for copy-editing; to 
Eric Markus and my other colleagues at the Department for Spatial Planning at BTH; to 
Susan Wnukowska-Mtonga for help with literature on wind power; and to those who have 
contributed in the earlier studies on 3G, such as Ingmarie Söderblom, Lovisa Bjarting and 
Lars Nilsson. 
Also, I am grateful to the Centre for Work, Technology and Social Change at Lund 
University, especially Dr Måns Svensson, who have made it possible for me to conduct this 
work. Naturvårdsverket has funded much of the studies, and thanks also to the Department of 
Sociology of Law at Lund University and to all my friendly colleagues there. An especially 
useful contribution to this text has been made by Dr Andreaz Strömgren, who skilfully took on 
the task of acting as commentator at the final seminar in May 2014. Anyone present that day 
can see that his comments have made a significant impact on the thesis.
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1. Framework
At a well-attended symposium on wind power and noise pollution arranged by The Sound 
Environment Centre in Lund, Sweden, at the end of March 2011, there was much talk – not 
unexpectedly – of noise levels. We were informed of how noise from wind turbines is measured, 
how one plots a noise average, and the “equivalent noise level” that becomes endowed with 
legal consequences by demarcating how close to residential areas turbines may be built. We 
further learned about the health, or rather, ill-health hazards, of wind power noise pollution, of 
low frequency noise, and of the precarious situation of a musician and studio-owner in which 
a nearby wind power establishment arguably had completely destroyed any possibility of 
running recording activities at a farmyard functioning as both studio and for outdoor concerts. 
A fairly prominent scientific tone was apparent in the following panel discussion in which 
medical effects, as well as research reports on noise pollution, were debated. Simultaneously, 
and this approaches the heart of the matter in my view, many participants were driven rather by 
social and private interests. Some lived near wind turbines and seemingly attested to worried 
concerns, mild bemusement, as well as unabashed anger. This private and social approach, 
from my perspective, is expressed in the common, scientific onset that many people adopt. 
The following method, then, is to locate reports on the hazards of noise pollution in order to 
influence the process at the local level, in other words, to avoid wind power in close proximity 
to one’s residence. This approach is logical, but it bears witness to a technocratic view of law, 
a calculating rationality, supported by what has been called an environmentalist paradigm 
(Emmelin & Lerman, 2006). A specific type of knowledge is focused. But it also testifies to an 
absence of the other side of the playing field, that law may function differently and according 
to a more communicative logic or rationality. This example allows us to pinpoint an essential 
wrestling match relevant for infrastructural developments with local and spatial dispersion, 
as well as within regulated planning and development of land and environment. Without 
understanding the legal logic and how infrastructure planning is caught in a “struggle between 
daring and deliberating” (cf. Larsson, 2008a), we are likely to miss something crucial in the 
understanding of and how to change the results of national infrastructural development. Does 
this concern fundamental characteristics of a legally certain system where the possibilities to 
lodge complaints are an important component? Or is it about the opposite: an ill-conceived 
system with parallel reviews in which the possibilities to protract are unreasonably broad? In a 
pilot study on a legal revision in Swedish wind power regulation (Larsson, 2009), I showed that 
the basis, i.e., empirical judicial review, problematically enough, is often anecdotal rather than 
systemic, once the conclusions are drawn (Larsson, 2009). Swedish wind power development 
– just as is the case with the third generation cellular phone system infrastructure – is regulated 
primarily through two legislations with different histories and, in part, different purposes, 
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i.e., The Planning and Building Act (PBA) and The Environmental Code (EC). These two 
also have different rationalities, which is an important aspect of my analysis and discussion. 
During 2009, the permit process for wind power in Sweden was adapted from previous 
requirements that plans and permission be in accordance with both legislations to mainly 
being affected by the environmental review carried out by the county council and regulated by 
the EC. The processes of PBA are municipal, while environmental issues fall under the county 
council or the Environmental Court. In Sweden, there is generally a strong, local dominance 
within the spatial planning system. The result of a national development agenda that entails 
consequences for land government will therefore depend on its implementation at the local 
level, of which wind power expansion constitutes a clear example.
Wind power and telecommunications infrastructure and their contexts are complex. They 
embody technical questions, concern the environment and landscape appearance, are visibly 
salient, and affect people from aesthetic as well as from psychological and physical perspectives, 
and in the case of wind turbines they also create noise and flickering. The construction and 
development is regulated by several laws of which the previously mentioned PBA and EC 
are the most central. It is administered locally and regionally in municipalities and counties 
and is governed and initiated nationally. It is dependent on entrepreneurs and venture capital. 
Wind power is for many people an appreciated form of energy, and telecommunications a 
fundamental form of communication, but the turbines and antennas are unpopular neighbours. 
In addition, wind power is dependent on electricity certificates and tax credits in order to 
expand, and it takes advantage of a renewable energy resource but is simultaneously fairly 
expensive to manufacture and transport. In other words, the overall knowledge of the issue is 
not very coherent. Opinions diverge on which knowledge is the most valid, of what is true or 
false. Positioned against this is also another body of knowledge with different characteristics 
that has to do with who ought to decide over what. In short, the combined cases of wind and 
3G development can display and reveal many of the challenges that come with this particular 
type of infrastructure development from a legal and spatial planning perspective. 
1.1 RESEARCH INTEREST
When envisioning wind power implementation and infrastructure development for mobile 
telephony, it is likely that one pictures a wind turbine and a base station and the mast or structure 
that the antennas are mounted on. This is of course understandable and correct to the extent that 
the turbines and the antennas are the physical manifestation of two forms of infrastructures: 
One concerns energy and one concerns telecommunications. This image, however, as with all 
images, can only metaphorically represent the series of abstract and systematic phenomena 
that governs and regulates the turbines and the antennas. And they can only metaphorically 
account for the multitude of persons, in the shape of planners, experts, investors, companies 
and concerned citizens engaged in the process leading up to their construction. The point is 
that even if we visibly see turbines and antennas, they are affected by a legal regulation that 
we cannot really envision, at least not in the same sense, but which still need to be studied 
and understood scientifically. And they are the outcome of a societally constructed system of 
spatial planning and environmental concerns that set boundaries and balance interests. For 
example, there is reasonably a great difference between the very local issue of constructing 
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turbines or antennas in the neighbourhood and the corresponding national policymaking 
concerning the infrastructures of renewable energy and telecommunications.
A common denominator for the Swedish 3G rollout and Swedish wind power development 
lies in the meeting point between new technology and legislation and in the dilemma of national 
policy that is dependent on local implementation. Both 3G and the expansion of wind power 
suggest that in addition to a technical side, there is also a need to understand institutional 
innovation processes, as well as socio-legal aspects of the practical side of law. This thesis 
focuses legally structured decision-making of relevance for spatial planning. The perspective 
is largely empirical, although it includes socio-legal and planning theory, which means that 
it both measures the impact of law and legal change in the field as well as problematises the 
role of law as an instrument for control and governance in spatial planning. On the one side, 
it is important to acknowledge that law to a great degree is important and relevant for spatial 
planning, and on the other hand it is important to know that law as a governmental instrument 
has a number of features, including weaknesses which, for example, can be measured by the 
outcomes of implementation. Simply put, as we shall see in the case of wind power permit 
handling, a law that is assumed to entail efficiency does not necessarily lead to an efficient 
practice. There is an entire field of literature on what Nelken has termed as the difference 
between “law’s promise and achievement” (Nelken 2007; see also, 1981). 
A key challenge in nationwide infrastructure development seems to concern how to 
assess the boundaries and capabilities of the developments at the national level in terms of an 
aggregated outcome of the piecemeal construction of the infrastructure at the local level. In 
the case of the 3G mobile telephony network, it was largely constructed and permitted mast 
by mast, yet the threshold values for the extent of national coverage that was to be reached 
within a given time limit were by no means related to the capabilities of the local planning 
and building permit processes. In the case of wind power development, the expansion and 
development of wind power in Sweden is largely constructed and permitted turbine by turbine, 
or group by group, but the national goals for renewable energy are not weighted against this 
local decision-making. 
There is much research on wind power conducted from a number of angles. Of interest 
here, for example, is research on the political decision-making and management process of 
wind power, as shown in Carlman’s (1990) analysis of Swedish trends from 1973 to 1990. 
Much research has been carried out on participatory aspects of wind power (Lange and Hehl-
Lange, 2005; Klintman & Waldo, 2008), local opposition (Devine-Wright, 2005; Petrova, 
2013; Wolsink, 2000), including comparative studies in which the Danish context is claimed to 
have the advantage of local partnership, which is a key to the involvement of the public and for 
support for wind power (cf. Ryland, 2010). Several studies argue that the success and failure 
stories of support policies, however, cannot easily be transferred across country borders, due 
to the complexity of each context (Pettersson et al., 2010; Söderholm and Pettersson, 2011). 
The issue of wind turbine siting has been extensively documented as problematic for 
land use planning (Ellis et al., 2010). The importance of assessing the local decision-making 
process is also emphasised in a study on local involvement in wind power development in 
North Rhine-Westphalia (Breukers, 2010). The argument is that local decision-making plays 
such an important role in defining the rate of success of the implementation of wind power 
(with references to, for example, Wolsink, 1996; 2000). Breukers states that “[t]he outcomes 
of all such local decision-making processes eventually make up the aggregated installed 
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capacity at the national or state level. Therefore, for our understanding of implementation 
achievements, it is important to address such local decision-making as well” (Breukers, 2010, 
p. 38). This is a common challenge in infrastructure development, and also relevant in both 
the Swedish 3G and wind power developments. There have been debates on infrasound and 
health effects of wind power, but the debate on health effects was far stronger in the 3G case 
– especially with regards to electromagnetic radiation (Allmendinger, 2007; Burgess, 2004; 
Drake, 2006; 2011; Kristiansen et al., 2009; Larsson, 2008a; 2014; Soneryd, 2007). The latter 
is especially interesting in terms of the representation of knowledge in the legal system. 
Aspects of efficiency expressed as rapid speed are a common call in infrastructure 
developments of these sorts. For example, the UK Renewable Energy Strategy 2009 promised 
“swifter delivery” for wind power development (p. 14) through better planning, and stressed 
that the system must be speeded up and made more predictable, yet must continue to protect 
the environment and heritage while also responding to community concerns (McKay, 2014, 
p. 4). It was emphasised in the Swedish 3G development in which the municipalities were 
blamed for delays (Larsson, 2008a; 2008b), and it is constantly emphasised in Swedish wind 
power planning, and constitutes a key reason for the legal revisions that came into force in 
2009 (dir. 2007:184, Larsson, 2009b; Prop. 2008/09: 146; SOU 2008:86). 
The project
This is a PhD thesis in Spatial Planning1 that studies the development of wind power and 
3G mobile infrastructures in Sweden. The thesis deals with three main perspectives in law 
and spatial planning relating to 1.) Levels, in terms of the local, regional and the national 
levels analysed through concepts of tiering and multi-level governance; 2.) Knowledge, 
in terms of the tension between knowledge-types in decision-making, as in the difference 
between expert and lay knowledge; and 3.) Law, specifically from a socio-legal perspective on 
implementation issues and measurable outcomes of law, which can be conceptualised as the 
difference between the formal and the practice. All of these three perspectives are traced in 
the planning and governance literature, as well as in the socio-legal traditions of sociology of 
law. The two cases studied from these perspectives are the Swedish development of the third 
generation of mobile telephony and the development of wind power. 
Lars Emmelin initiated the study on the Swedish 3G infrastructure development that 
has been conducted for this thesis within the MiSt programme funded by Naturvårdsverket. 
Initial findings have been reported in Emmelin & Söderblom (2002), which were discussed 
further in Emmelin and Lerman (2004). The most thorough analysis and presentation of data 
in this study on 3G development can be found in the licentiate thesis Between Daring and 
Deliberating – 3G as a Sustainability Issue in Swedish Spatial Planning (Larsson, 2008a), 
which has been followed up by articles included in this compilation thesis (Larsson, 2008b; 
2013; 2014). Shortly after the licentiate thesis was published, we continued with the project 
on wind power development, which was initially reported as a pilot study in Larsson (2009; 
cf. Larsson, 2011). In this pilot study, the new regulation amendments that concerned moving 
from a double review to an environmental permit review process had not yet come into 
1 There have been a number of licentiate theses in spatial planning at Blekinge Institute of Technology 
(Ankre, 2007; Bjarnadóttír, 2008; Larsson, 2008; Vuorio, 2003) and a few doctorate theses (Maduri-
era, 2014; Persson, 2011; Petersson Forsberg, 2012) in spatial planning at BTH. Theoretically, they 
display a rather diverse picture.
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force, but were under preparation.2 My study was based in the groundwork carried out by the 
Environmental Process Investigation in preparation for the amendment, as well as in a number 
of interviews with key persons in the field. The collection of permit processes for wind power 
turbines for this research project began briefly thereafter, and resulted in the two articles 
below (Larsson & Emmelin, forthcoming; Larsson et al., 2014). This thesis collects both the 
case of the 3G development in Sweden and the very much ongoing wind power development 
in order to draw conclusions at a more general and comprehensive level relating to law, spatial 
planning and the national development of infrastructure through local and spatial dispersion. 
1.2 PURPOSE & RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As emphasised in the introduction, law plays a significant role in planning and environmental 
management. Empirical studies in law, however, teach us that the actual outcome of laws and 
formal statutes are not necessarily what they were intended to be. This discrepancy, I here 
argue and thereafter will demonstrate, is of fundamental importance to spatial planning, not 
least for large-scale implementations of telecommunications infrastructure and wind power 
development. This sociolegal or non-dogmatically legal focus is also main purpose for this 
thesis in spatial planning:
 
• To analyse and discuss the role of law in planning and environmental management 
from the three perspectives introduced above: Level of decision-making, 
legitimacy of different forms of knowledge in the process and the sociolegal 
tension between “law’s promise versus achievement.” 
This will also provide for some normative reflections on possible improvements in legislation 
and legal practice from the three perspectives in the concluding parts of the thesis. The 
Swedish wind power development and the roll-out of the 3G mobile infrastructure serve as 
case studies for this purpose. The purpose is operationalised into the following, more direct, 
research questions: 
1. What is the role and the practical implications of law for the tiering of the national 
to the local level in the planning and implementation of the cases studied?
2. How does juridification of siting and permit conflicts determine what type of 
knowledge that can legitimately affect the decision-making and thereby set 
conditions for participation?
3. What are the results of the strong emphasis on “efficiency” in the planning and 
permit processes for wind power and 3G-infrastructure, and what can be learnt 
from the experiences of the attempts at increasing efficiency?
2 The report was funded by the research program “Miljöstrategiska verktyg”, MiSt, which is an in-
terdisciplinary research program funded by The Environmental Protection Agency and headed by 
Professor Lars Emmelin. Lars is to be thanked for much of the considerations in the report and of 
this account. The report can be found here: http://www.sea-mist.se/tks/mist.nsf/sidor/problematise-
ring-av-vindkraftens-regelverk 
16     |     Stefan Larsson
Each of the three questions represent perspectives and challenges that are proven to be relevant 
in planning and socio-legal literature, which I further elaborate on in the following theoretical 
section as well as in the five articles below. The two Swedish cases have not received much 
attention from these perspectives. One motif for the thesis is to add to the knowledge of the 
role of law in spatial planning and to emphasise the need and usefulness of an empirical 
and reflective approach to studies of law. In line with this, a further motivation can also be 
established when reflecting on the role of the state in the planning of land-use, environmental 
concerns and the planning of the landscape. This motivation is to seek more productive 
engagements between experts, decision-makers of all sorts and the general public (cf. Healey, 
2007).
Material and methods
In order to answer the research questions, a number of sources have been used which I 
outline more extensively and discuss below in chapter 3. The most important materials are 
the following: 
• Permit database: Within the project that this thesis is an outcome of, we collected 
a regional (Blekinge) sample of approximately 250 building permits for 3G 
masts in order to study the frequencies of, and reasons for, appeals and other 
aspects (for example fears of electromagnetic radiation).
• Questionnaires: The data in the regional 3G sample was contrasted to national 
questionnaires conducted in all Swedish municipalities by the authority 
responsible for the 3G roll-out, the Post and Telecommunications Agency (PTA). 
The PTA also issued a number of reports that proved useful in tracing the roll-
out and the operators’ actions or lack thereof. 
• Permits and appealed cases: We collected a sample of approximately 30 wind 
permit cases in the region of Skåne/Scania, as well as 22 appealed cases to both 
the Land and Environment Court (LEC) and the Land and Environment Court of 
Appeal (LECA), which is the ‘supreme court’ for such cases. These cases reveal 
the grounds that individuals appeal on, what type of arguments are put forward 
and how judiciary interpretations are made concerning wind power matters. 
• Interviews: We have conducted interviews with judges from LEC and LECA, 
as well as regional handling officers who assess wind turbine applications, and 
the wind power coordinator appointed by the government in order to facilitate 
the development in southern Sweden. Qualitatively, these give depth and 
understanding to some of the key questions. 
• Legal documents: We have used legal documents such as preparatory work on 
the revision of how wind power is assessed and how the permits for the turbines 
are deliberated, in which an important legal revision was made in 2009. Legal 
revisions were also an important guiding mechanism in the 3G development, as 
were the laws controlling the PTA and the operators, and the utility easement 
that was introduced during the roll-out. 
 Law and Spatial Planning     |     17
This means that a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods have been employed in 
order to answer the research questions. The different methods can, naturally, answer different 
questions. For example, in the Blekinge sample of 3G mast permit appeals, the actual number 
of appeals could be analysed in a reliable manner, whereas the more qualitative aspect of how 
the concerned parties understood or reflected upon the process, their argumentation before 
and after the juridification of the process or how the judges understood the process, etc, could 
not be convincingly seen. These types of questions are more of a qualitative character, as 
revealed by the interviews and the analysis of appeal judgments in the wind case. 
On generalisation of  results
In order to judge to what extent the study of these cases is of a more general interest, I need 
to elaborate the infrastructural terminology somewhat. The common infrastructure planning 
tends to deal with transport sectors (such as railway, urban transport, ports, airports), public 
works (such as roads, dams, canals) and public utilities (such as power grids, sanitation 
sewerage, piped gas and telecommunications) (Parkin & Sharma, 1999; on mega-projects, 
which often include transport infrastructure, see Priemus et al., eds., 2008). Although this 
emphasis on physical infrastructure may include wind power and 3G masts as a system, 
the latter cases do not constitute infrastructure as far as entailing a fixed pattern of a joined 
structure that is generally planned at a national level, with local authorities as referral entities 
that are heard from but not part of the decision-making. Further, when it comes to funding, 
“debt is almost always involved in the development and operation of infrastructure – public 
or private” (Parkin & Sharma, 1999, p. 5). Who should own and operate may be a political 
debate, depending on preferences within a state, and the cases of wind power and 3G in 
Sweden display an emphasis on privately invested, owned and operated infrastructure, that at 
the same time is publicly subsidised. This is in many contexts not the case when it comes to 
infrastructures such as railway, roads, urban transport etc. 
Telecommunications and energy are two of the most important societal demands of 
our time. The possible benefits of this study could be judged against the larger question of 
how to achieve functioning planning, policy-work and implementation of telecommunications 
infrastructure and renewable energy usage. When it comes to the possible generalisation of 
the results the cases are undoubtedly Swedish, following from national policy-decisions in 
Sweden, and the outcomes bear characteristics that are likely to be of some specificity with 
regards to Swedish regulation. That being said, the cases represent a number of challenges of 
more general relevance. For example: 
• The top-down aspect: Development of telecommunications infrastructure 
needs to be a centralised decision, preferably containing standards that make 
it possible to connect to the initiatives of other states or governmental entities. 
The 3G roll-out was the result of a coordinated decision at the EU level, albeit 
with national variations, and the characteristics of this type of infrastructure are 
similar across the entire EU and beyond, whenever mobile telecommunications 
are planned and implemented. On a similar note, the political steering of the 
use of energy sources is to a great extent conducted at a central, national or 
supranational level. 
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• The bottom-up aspect: Given that this particular type of infrastructure (further 
elaborated upon in chapter 3) is dependent on thousands of local level-decisions, 
how does one assess and balance the decision-making between the systemic 
level and the local, where the actual physical antennas are to be constructed?
• The law fundament: All levels of the administrative decision-making and permit 
giving are highly regulated by law. Therefore, how law functions, the empirical 
perspective versus the formal, the consolidation with the planning profession 
etc., is of key relevance and of broad interest and seems neglected or overlooked 
in much of the planning literature when it comes to the socio-legal perspective 
as opposed to the legal-dogmatic. 
• The “efficiency problem”: In both cases “efficiency” in implementation has been 
stressed at the national policy-level. Local decision-making has in both cases 
been regarded as too slow, which relates to the top-down challenges mentioned 
above. This is a prevalent international theme in many forms of planning. 
• Both cases deal with the balance between planning and environmental concerns 
seen in other contexts, and also connect to a duality in Swedish law, which also 
exists at e.g. the EU level where environmental regulation is frequent while 
planning being under subsidiarity is less prominent creating an imbalance. 
As emphasised in the introduction as well as in the aims of this thesis, to a large extent 
the legal settings and their implications are the focus here. For example, when it comes to 
public participation, it is the legal appeals rather than the public consultations that we see 
here. Theoretically, it is the planning discipline that serves as a guide, complemented by how 
sociology of law conceptualises law from a generally empirical perspective, which differs from 
a stricter, dogmatic perspective. The outcomes are measurable, and in this case the outcomes 
of planning and environmental law, in combination with national policy, are focused. 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THESIS
This is a compilation thesis, which in this case means that it consists of five articles or chapters 
that have been published, accepted for publication or submitted to an international peer-
reviewed journal. These are briefly presented here and consistently referred to in the analysis 
and can be found in full length in the last section of the thesis. In addition to the articles, 
the thesis consists of an extensive introductory framework that addresses the purpose of the 
comprehensive study as chapter one, the theoretical framework tying the articles together as 
chapter two, and reflections on and presentation of the methods used for the conducted studies 
as chapter three. In the fourth and fifth chapters, the cases of wind power and 3G are presented 
more thoroughly, including literature reviews. Finally, the cases are comprehensively analysed 
in chapter six which includes all of the studies conducted prior to the articles, and answers 
the research questions posed above and discusses them in relation to the purpose of the thesis. 
These are more widely discussed in chapter seven, after which the brief conclusions are 
collected in chapter eight.
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1.4 DELIMITATIONS
In an often cited article, Wildavsky (1973) elaborated upon the loose boundaries of planning, 
and claimed that, “if planning is everything, maybe it’s nothing.” Planners, Wildavsky claimed, 
were easy targets for a number of deficiencies in their profession; either they had been paying 
too little attention to the political sector or they had been listening too much; either they were 
too focused on one project or too focused on the broader economical questions etc. This is 
relevant also for an interdisciplinary oriented thesis such as this. Although the thesis may 
focus the empirical sides of legal relevancy for spatial planning of infrastructures as a result 
of my background as a PhD in sociology of law and as a lawyer, there are a number of aspects 
that are either not acknowledged at all or only briefly touched upon. 
For example, one could easily imagine expanding the scope of the conducted studies 
beyond the Swedish jurisdiction. Both the 3G development as well as the more contemporary 
wind power expansion display interesting parallels to the Swedish developments. The aim 
here, however, has been to conduct an in depth study of these particular cases within a 
Swedish jurisdiction and administrative setting, which complexity and comprehensiveness 
has demanded such a strong focus. Arguably, studies of planning and legislation must be 
conducted within a context that is thoroughly understood. Overly shallow comparisons risk 
missing the underlying mechanisms that actually explain the events and courses of action that 
the researcher seeks to understand. However, literature on other cases within an international 
context has been used for comparison and expanded understanding. A number of references to 
studies that have already been conducted, particularly in the UK and Germany, are nonetheless 
made. 
Some readers may expect more detail of an explicit legal analysis than can be found in 
this study. The focus of this study, however, has been more generally to assess the balance 
between legal corpuses, and to seek for more of the principal challenges relating to the 
Swedish planning system and its administrative levels and purpose and less of the meticulous 
and sometimes narrow-sighted aspects of the particular materials and existing law. Some 
detailed aspects are, of course, brought to the fore, especially those relating to complexities 
and contradictive challenges, as discussed in Article V below, or the role of the Swedish Post 
and Telecommunications Agency (PTA) in managing the licence conditions and licensee 
operators in 3G development, or some of the most important changes in the 2009 revision of 
wind power assessment, as studied in Article III and IV. 
Much literature deals with the benefits of infrastructure, often from a perspective of 
“managing the commons” and a theoretical foundation based in economics that analyses 
externalities and spill over effects (such as Frischmann, 2012). This is not such a study. In 
fact, one should be careful with categorising this study as an “infrastructure study” due to its 
socio-legal focus and, more importantly, the different preconditions of the infrastructure cases 
studied here in comparison to much of the traditional infrastructure research, as pointed out 
above. However, this is not to say that such studies cannot provide insights for this study as 
well (cf. Larsson, 2013c). 
There are also stricter technical aspects of communication technology as well as wind 
measurements and wind turbines that are not focused here. In line with this, the economical 
perspective is perhaps particularly interesting in the wind power case, for one due to it being 
subsidised; however, these economical sides to the dilemmas are far from fully developed in 
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this thesis, which instead concentrates on the legal and extra-legal practices that could be seen. 
Further, there is an urban bias in much planning literature (Fishman, 2012; Jacobs, 1961), 
which for obvious empirical reasons is not the case with wind power and since it is the mast 
infrastructure rather than the siting of antennas in the urban environment for 3G that are being 
studied. 
1.5 PLANNING, LAW & SOCIETY
The concept of “spatial planning”, as we shall see, is used somewhat differently in the 
academic literature, and has collected rather disparate theoretical elements over the years. 
For example, as commented by Haughton et al. (2010, p. 1) in The New Spatial Planning, 
the term is used as a “conceptual apparatus”, a “broad discourse about a particular moment 
in the history of planning thought and practice”, and a “still evolving set of understandings 
about what constitutes ‘good planning.’” Haughton et al. (2010, p. 5) argue for at least four 
key aspects that tend to be a component in the majority of versions of spatial planning: 1.) An 
emphasis on long-term strategic thinking and future visions in the shape of spatial strategies; 
2.) A view of government officials as one of several policy tools for bringing coherence to 
increasingly fragmented systems of governance. This includes an expansion from the land-
use orientation to include issues such as promoting economic development, environmental 
protection and social sustainability; 3.) A binding to the belief that planning has a central role 
in moving society towards sustainable development; 4.) An emphasis on inclusivity (in the 
new spatial planning). I will expand further on the theoretical underpinnings of planning in 
the theoretical chapter below, where I let it serve this thesis as a theoretical model to aid and 
structure the analysis of data and material. A few initial observations, however, may be shared 
in this introductory section. 
In the planning literature, the role of law and legal framework tends not to be emphasised 
as a particular area of interest to study or analyse. The focus tends to concentrate instead on 
the rationalities behind the decision-making processes of relevance for planning and planners, 
as expressed in Allmendinger’s Planning Theory (2009), with a background in which Faludi 
(in his Planning Theory) has described planning as “the application of scientific method to 
policy making” (1973b, p. 1; cf. 1987). The history of planning theory has developed from 
the “blueprint planning” of Howard and Geddes (Hall 1992) in the late nineteenth century 
(Faludi (1973a, p. 131), to the “disjointed incrementalist” approach dealing with information 
deficits and complexity, as in Lindblom’s The Science of ‘Muddling Through’ (1959), i.e., the 
“mixed scanning” approach (Etzioni, 1968). The challenges of pluralism and “advocacy” were 
emphasised by Davidoff (1965), and in the very much debated, researched and discussed issue 
of participation and deliberation, as voiced early by Arnstein (1969) and the famous “ladder 
of participation” (cf. Healey, 1992). For an overview of the development of participation in 
planning, see Lane (2005).
A common area of analysis is found in the often broader terminology of “policy 
analysis”, as in Fischer and Forester’s (eds., 1993) The Argumentative Turn in Policy 
Analysis and Planning or Hajer and Wagenaar’s (eds., 2003) Deliberative Policy Analysis. 
Understanding Governance in the Network Society. In the policy perspective planning tends to 
be the transformation of policy into spatial action with less attention to the bounding aspects 
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of the planning legislation as a subsystem of the general legal system and context of a given 
jurisdiction.
There is, in turn, a more explicitly legal focus in a number of volumes regarding “planning 
law” (cf. Blackhall, 2006; Moore and Purdue, 2012). These tend to be rather descriptive of the 
various, legally outlined planning instruments, such as permit applications, notifications, the 
appeal process, the ombudsman, the plans and the zoning. And, of course, law is very much 
a present and wholly important steering and control function for planning and its boundaries 
(for example, expressed in Bjarnadóttír, 2008; Larsson, 2008a). From a more socio-legal 
perspective, sometimes expressed in the terminology of law & society which tends to be the 
US strand or sociology of law which tends to be more common in Europe, the spatial planning 
with regards not the least to environmental concerns has been a topic of interest. For example, 
on a Swedish note, the founder of what has become the Sociology of Law Department at Lund 
University, Per Stjernquist, had a clear focus on forest research from a socio-legal perspective 
(cf. Stjernquist, 1973). This is also seen in subsequent research (Appelstrand, 2007; Henecke, 
2006; Konzen, 2013; Mukthar-Landgren, 2012; Schlyter & Stjernquist, 2010; Steneroth 
Sillén & Stjernquist, 1980; Wickenberg, 1999). Given the sociological influences on the 
socio-legal approach in sociology of law, it is clearly compatible with a number of theoretical 
approaches also found within planning research that, for example, deal with aspects of power 
(as in Flyvbjerg, 2002), narratives/rhetoric (Kaplan, 1993; Throgmorton, 1996; see Sharp and 
Richardson, 2001, on variations of discourse analysis) and a number of empirical approaches 
to policy critique. Theoretically, there is a common sociological background to much of 
the theoretical underpinnings, particularly when we speak of power and discourses in ways 
that relate to Foucault, or the communicative action terminology of Habermas or perhaps 
theorisation stemming from versions of rationality and from the bureaucratic coordination of 
activities in Max Weber’s sense. 
When it comes to defining spatial planning, it is easy to rather quickly reach a point where 
you have the practice on one side – there are professionals employed to conduct urban and 
other planning in municipalities, large scale infrastructure projects require a set of planning 
skills that includes both satisfying legal requirements as well as managing the project at large 
– and theory on the other. This division between practice and theory is not necessarily a 
problem – at least not to the extent that the theorists continue to have interest in the practice. 
It is arguably quite common for a profession to be overly caught up in everyday practices 
to comprehend or reflect upon the more principal or comprehensive consequences of this 
practice. This relationship can, for example, be seen in the profession of lawyers and judges 
and the practices of law in relation to the more empirical and socio-legal conceptualisation of 
legal practices in society that is studied within the discipline of sociology of law. It is the other 
perspective that may be less fruitful, that is, when theory loses interest in practice – when 
planning theory fails to explain, comprehend or address what is going on in practice. 
Planning law
Planning law is an important instrument for ensuring an overall balance of land use interest 
(cf. Tegner Anker et al, 2009). Often, the reconciliation between conflicting but legitimate 
interests constitutes the task of importance. At what level in the administrative system the 
emphasis is applied varies between jurisdictions. This very issue is of clear relevance in the 
Swedish setting, a fact that is particularly salient in the case of wind power, further elaborated 
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upon below. The Scandinavian legal system, to begin with, is often referred to as belonging 
in the civil law tradition, despite the fact that the codes tend not to be as comprehensive as in 
France and Germany (Basse & Dahlberg-Larsen, 2009). If we specifically compare planning 
regulation within a Scandinavian context, we see that the Danish system strengthened the local 
wind power planning in terms of the designation of wind power areas in 2007. In contrast, the 
Norwegian system strengthened the regional (county) planning for the planning and location 
of wind farms in guidelines adopted in 2007 (Tegner Anker, et al., 2009, chapter 6 & p. 
302). An international convention of interest worth mentioning is the European Landscape 
Convention (ELC), the reason being its focus on public interest and the public’s role in the 
cultural, ecological, environmental and social fields. The novelty here lies in the emphasis 
on the “perception” of the landscape, which has been studied, for example, in relation to 
wind power development (Oles and Hammarlund, 2011). This is of clear relevance for the 
tension between the two “paradigms” in spatial planning and environmental management that 
is developed further below.
Environmental protection law
When developing physical infrastructures, a central issue of relevance is how to deal with and 
control negative effects on the landscape and the environment. Nature protection may to some 
extent be safeguarded by measures in the spatial planning governed by planning law, but the 
somewhat different focus that environmental protection has in relation to land use planning 
has led to a legal development where two, strong legislative bodies in a sense compete or 
create a tension. This tension and constant negotiation between the planning law side and the 
environmental protective law side is very much present in the Swedish case, and explicitly 
demonstrated by both cases studied in this thesis. Here, the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) and the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) that have been developed in order 
to provide a better basis for decision-making should also be mentioned. This is, for example, 
reflected in the Espoo Convention,3 the Aarhus Convention4 and the EIA (85/337/EEC) and 
SEA (2001/42/EC) Directives. 
In the 3G case, the aspect of most interest from an environmental protection perspective 
was the electromagnetic radiation and how fears of it were handled. The first article below 
displays how the issue of radiation was central to the appeals brought against building permits, 
which represents the planning law side, and Article V below shows the intuitively challenging 
fact that environmental regulation handled the radiation issue differently than did planning 
law. How the concerns or fear expressed by concerned parties, for example property owners 
and residents living in close proximity to a planned construction, were managed is of interest 
also in the case of wind power development in Sweden, perhaps particularly in relation to 
noise and health issues, which I address in Article III below. 
3 The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. It has been rat-
L¿HGE\WKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQIRUH[DPSOH
4 7KH81(&(&RQYHQWLRQRQ$FFHVV WR ,QIRUPDWLRQ3XEOLF3DUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ'HFLVLRQPDNLQJDQG
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.
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1.6 PUBLIC INTEREST
To a large extent, spatial planning and the regulatory framework surrounding it deals with 
the balance of public and private interests. Although this has not been central to the scope of 
this thesis, this topic has been proven to be of relevance along the way, as emphasised by the 
important second chapter in the PBA (2010:900), the interviewed expert judges in the wind 
power study, as well as in relevant literature (Henecke, 2006; Klosterman, 2003; Petersson 
Forsberg, 2012). As mentioned, the balance of public and private interests is an important 
task for spatial planning (Klosterman, 2003), and is thus specifically addressed in the second 
chapter of the Swedish Planning and Building Act (2010:900). There is a quite comprehensive 
theoretical debate on “the public interest”, accounted for by Petersson Forsberg (2012, pp. 57-
64; cf. Henecke, 2006, Strömgren, 2007). In some cases, it means that a few are affected by 
the implementation of an infrastructure to benefit the many, a fact very much relevant to both 
3G and wind power development. 
This can lead to a challenge borne from how to define “public interest.” In my former 
licentiate thesis study published in 2008, I concluded that the 3G development is an example 
of when the “strong public interest” (wording from Skåne and Blekinge Court of Appeal, 24 
Oct, 2006, p. 7) is in line with operator interests. The amendments in the Utility Easement 
Act of 1 August 2004, I argued, could be seen as an example of how the government teams 
up with private interests vis-à-vis operators attempting to fulfil coverage conditions for an 
activity that is aimed at benefiting the interests of property rights and land owners that happen 
to be in strategically important locations for the operator roll out. This occurs under the 
dichotomies of private versus public interests, but it is a fact that part of the public interest in 
this case includes operator interests. This is a challenge that is likely to be reflected in most 
infrastructural developments, since there will always be some negative impact on a minority 
of property owners which needs to be justified from the perspective of the public interest in 
developments that generally are carried out by corporate contractors or initiatives, as in wind 
power development. This is where the core challenge can be found. In the thesis from 2008 I 
stated: 
Infrastructure development in the name of public interest is a strong armament 
for any developer that gets to carry it. It therefore accentuates the importance of 
taking well-assessed decisions on what infrastructure are to be developed where, 
and by whom. As private interests take part in the developing function, the “public 
interest”-armament has to be evaluated, some legislation runs the risk of adding 
strength and power in an unjust way to one of the parts of two private interests in 
conflict (Larsson, 2008a, p. 161).
The conflicting relationship between public and private interests is also a key factor in permit 
handling for wind power developments, and particularly in the cases that have been appealed to 
The Land and Environment Court [Mark- och miljödomstolen] and The Land and Environment 
Court of Appeal [Mark- och miljööverdomstolen]. An assessment that demands some delicate 
handling lies in the fact that economic, corporate interests benefit from the construction of 
technology part of a development regarded as a public interest and may therefore, in essence, 
trump private interests in land ownership. Additionally, locations with good wind conditions 
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are often found in areas that are of great value to natural care, heritage protection and tourism. 
Questions concerning how wind power interests must be weighed against these other interests 
are an interesting and perhaps difficult issue.
1.7 THE FIVE ARTICLES IN THE THESIS
I: 3G and local participation
On the one hand, this article theorises around decision-making and the difference between 
legal form and legal practice, and on the other hand, analyses participatory aspects of the 
municipal building permits for 3G masts (Larsson, 2014). It focuses the hierarchical 
perspective of decision-making in spatial planning and compares it to various types of 
knowledge, as acknowledged in the title What Type of Knowledge Rules Where? Legally 
Regulated Participation in a Large-scale Mobile Infrastructure Planning in Sweden. It is 
published in Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy and I am the sole author. 
II: 3G on national level
The second article concerns the Swedish implementation of 3G as a national decision and 
the game between operators and the responsible governmental agency (PTS), with a critical 
analysis from the perspective of legal (un-)predictability (Larsson, 2008b). It is titled Non-
legal Aspects of Legally Controlled Decision-making – The Failure of Predictability in 
Governing the 3G Infrastructure Development in Sweden and has been published in the socio-
legal anthology Contributions in Sociology of Law. Remarks from a Swedish Horizon (Hydén 
and Wickenberg, eds., 2008) and I am the sole author. 
III: Expert and lay in wind power
The third article deals with regulatory aspects of the Swedish wind power development, 
particularly the permit processes. Theoretically, it concerns the distinction between 
calculating and communicative rationalities in terms of different types of knowledge, or what 
is sometimes referred to as the expert / lay divide. This perspective is similar to the first 
article accounted for above, but the study has been conducted differently in that it examines 
the appealed permit cases in southern Sweden and which arguments are judged as legitimate 
or not in these appealed cases. In addition, a handful of key persons have been interviewed, 
including judges from the environmental courts. I am lead author of this article which is 
written in collaboration with Lars Emmelin and is submitted to the international and peer-
reviewed journal Energy Policy under the title, Objectively Best or Most Acceptable? Expert 
and Lay Knowledge in Swedish Wind Power Permit Processes. 
IV: Multi level environmental governance and wind power 
The fourth article, entitled Multi Level Environmental Governance – The Case of Wind Power 
Development in Sweden deals with the Swedish wind power development and it does so 
from the perspective of tiering and multi-level governance. Therefore, it focuses the different 
administrative levels within the planning system in which the so-called municipal veto is of 
particular interest for having become so disputed and debated, since it strongly impacts the 
application processes even when they are not formally handled by the municipal building 
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permit regulation but by the county council’s environmental permit handling. I am lead author 
of this article which is co-written with Lars Emmelin and Sandra Vindelstam, and is published 
in the journal Baltic Environment. 
V: Law in books and planning in practice
The fifth article is written by me as the sole author and addresses the difference between 
the law’s intention and its actual application by using mobile telephony infrastructure 
development in Sweden as a case study. Three possible pitfalls for policy management in 
general are concluded and analysed. The first pitfall deals with legal complexity, which may 
be a result of piecemeal changes to the governing legal bodies over an extended time period 
and is argued, here, to be of relevance for issues of public participation and access to justice. 
A second, problematic pitfall concerns when law is internally contradictory without any 
clear hierarchy. The third possible pitfall, which often is a point of focus in sociology of 
law, concerns when extra-legal factors interfere in legal decision-making without this being 
articulated or acknowledged. The article is titled On Legal Complexity: Between Law in 
Books and Planning in Practice, and was published in the anthology Social and Legal Norms. 
Towards a Socio-legal Understanding of Normativity by Ashgate Publishing in November 
2013.
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2. Theoretical perspectives
A core interest in the studies conducted for this thesis is law as an object of empirical study. In 
this chapter I will outline the theoretical perspective I use for the analysis of the cases following 
this core interest, in a combination of planning and socio-legal theory. The purpose is to 
present a conceptual model that can assist in answering the research questions. The sources for 
this model are found in spatial planning with contributions from sociology of law. That being 
said, this entails a sort of limitation to the scope in terms of not fully investigating theoretical 
underpinnings to implementation theory or decision analyses that are not already included in 
either of the two mentioned disciplines. One model I have already employed in the articles is 
adopted from Emmelin which emphasises types of rationalities on the horizontal axis, and the 
levels of decision-making on the vertical (cf. Emmelin & Kleven, 1999; Emmelin & Lerman, 
2006; Larsson, 2008, 2009b; Vuorio, 2003) and is also used in the first article below (Larsson, 
2014). This chapter builds upon this model and seeks to theoretically further strengthen its 
central concepts. This means to some extent that I seek to point out some of its strengths as 
well as weaknesses, and thereby hopefully make it more robustly useful for the analysis of the 
Swedish 3G infrastructure implementation and wind power development. 
Figure 1: From Emmelin & Lerman (2006; see also Larsson, 2014).
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The figure first and foremost functions as a model to quickly reach an understanding of the 
types of decision-making at hand. For example, the top-down perspective can be located 
between the axis from central to local, which opens up for discussions concerning tiering 
and multi-level governance. At the same time, it is possible to discuss “calculating” and 
“communicative” rationalities (Sager, 1994) as two different knowledge-types that can form 
the basis for decision-making. Amdam and Veggeland (1998) recall the development of 
planning theory in a post-war era using a similar terminology.
As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis deals with three main perspectives 
relating to law and spatial planning that are necessary for the overarching analysis of the 
studies presented in the five articles below, which deal with 3G infrastructure and wind power 
development in Sweden: 
• Levels, theorised upon in terms of “tiering” or perhaps more commonly “multi-
level governance.” There is an often debated and inherent challenge in the 
centralistic policy-making that concerns the tensions between different levels 
in governance (Alexander, 2000; cf. Allmendinger, 2009), often referred to in 
the SEA literature as tiering (Lee & Walsh, 1992). This also expresses the first 
theoretical perspective presented below, and is elaborated in the first article 
in terms of “central v. local”, as well as in Article IV in terms of multi-level 
governance and tiering; 
• Knowledge-types or rationalities, refers to the tension between expert 
and lay knowledge, between calculation and deliberation (Calculating to 
Communicative, in Figure 1) and what knowledge that is regarded as legitimate 
basis for decision-making. The “knowledge-types” and rationalities are traced 
from much of the planning literature dealing with the centralistic and calculative 
rationalistic activities of planning in the post-war era, which is then compared 
to the communicative turn mentioned above (as in Amdam & Veggeland, 1998, 
cf. Etzioni, 1973, p. 217; Larsson, 2008a, pp. 95ff.). I address this in Article I 
below, in the analysis of legally regulated participation in the 3G case, as well 
as in Article III concerning the tension between expert and lay influences in 
decision-making within wind power development. 
• Law and consequence, concerns the difference between formal legislation 
and its implementation and its outcomes in practice (law in books v. law in 
action). At the core of a socio-legal tradition lies the issue of implementation, 
here framed as a difference between the formal law in books and the actual 
outcomes of law in action. This follows a terminology coined by the legal realist 
Roscoe Pound (1910) in a well-used trope of analysis in this tradition. This 
is generally discussed theoretically in Article V below, but also serves as an 
underlying perspective in the analysis of “the national game” of 3G in Article 
II. This tension described in sociolegal terms is also of relevance for the topic of 
efficiency in planning and steering infrastructure development, above described 
in the duality of “law’s promise versus achievement”. 
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As sometimes pointed out in planning literature, the formation and doctrine of planning is 
somewhat divided and eclectic in its composition. For example, in the Aims & Scope section 
of the respected journal Planning Theory, it is stated that sources of planning theories are 
“eclectic and diverse, drawing on disciplines and concerns that range from philosophy, 
architecture, post-colonial studies and law to the social sciences and design practices.”5 
Planning discipline is, however, sometimes referred to as stemming from a technocratic 
approach to policy-making (cf. Sandercock, 1998, p. 4, on Faludi). At the opposite end, the 
“communicative turn” in planning theory (Fischer & Forester, eds., 1993; Tewdwr-Jones & 
Allmendiger, 2002) was heavily influenced by Jürgen Habermas (cf. Allmendiger, 2008), and 
has been an inspiration for many social scientific perspectives, including sociology of law 
(see, for example, Deflem, 2008, ch. 8 on democratic aspects of law). There is arguably a quite 
natural explanation for this “eclecticism” in planning theory that can be found in the diverse 
and complex practice that it deals with. 
2.1 ON LEVELS AND THE ASSUMPTIONS  
 OF TIERING
As outlined in Article III on wind power and multi-level environmental governance, the 
layers and the hierarchical setting is of importance for the outcome of any infrastructural 
implementation. Breukers notes above (2010) that local decision-making plays an important 
role for the outcome of the entire system. One way to conceptualise this hierarchical image 
from a critical perspective is to use the notion of multi-level governance (MLG). A commonly 
shared perception, within the framework of rational decision-making, is that of a hierarchic 
system that encompasses an increasing level of detail within which implementation and daily 
operations can be allotted downwards. This is called level division or tiering in literature 
on strategic environmental assessments (cf. Lee & Walsh, 1992). This differentiated system 
is assumed to be internally consistent, from top to bottom, as far as scientific, calculative 
rationality concerns environmental issues (Sager, 1994, Emmelin & Kleven, 1999). The 
higher levels are presupposed to set clear limits for the degree of freedom of the lower levels 
via, for instance, binding and quantitative norms in the form of environmental standards and 
thresholds. This hierarchical and top-down model of multi-level governance has long been 
criticised from both theoretical and practical standpoints within planning theory (Alexander 
2000; for an overview, see e.g. Allmendinger 2009), political science (a classic is Etzioni, 
1967), and SEA theory (Cherp et al. 2007).
Houghton et al. (2010), mentioned above, set out to study whether the devolution 
they see in the new spatial planning in UK and Ireland “had seen a top-down, centralised, 
hierarchical planning system abandoned in favour of a more networked, multilevel approach 
to planning” (2010, p. 7). There is also now a strand in planning literature on the theme of a 
shift from rigid hierarchical systems of top-down government to other forms of governance 
(Jessop, 2000; Godwin et al., 2005; cf. Haughton et al., 2010). Arts et al. (2005) define the 
concept of tiering as a distinction between different levels of planning that are prepared 
5 http://www.sagepub.com/journals/Journal201559/aimsAndScope [last visited 5 August, 2014]. 
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consecutively and influence each other (cf. EC, 1999, pp. 16-22). Tiering, then, is “about 
how the different levels of planning relate to each other” (Arts et al. 2005, p. 2). One should 
refrain, here, from asserting an overly simplistic notion of consistency throughout the levels 
that seems to emerge every now and then and, for example, argued to be the case in both EU 
and national Swedish regulation of environmental assessments. It can thus be argued that 
while the notion of vertical consistency has weak theoretical foundations and highly varied 
practical applications in existing planning systems, to utilise national goals and objectives and 
methods of management by objectives is nevertheless an important component of multi-level 
governance (Emmelin, in press). 
Governance through central directives, goals or standards and thresholds is by its very 
nature top-down while in theory allowing lower level choice of means for achieving objectives 
(Emmelin & Lerman, 2008). However, the role of central directives, standards and norms, as 
well as more general national and supranational goals, may be to attempt to impose a measure 
of vertical and top down consistency rather than assume it to be an inherent characteristic of 
the system. 
2.2 ON KNOWLEDGE-TYPES AND RATIONALITIES
As mentioned above, the dialectics between calculating and communicative rationality have 
been developed in the post-war version of planning theory. Over the last two decades or so, 
we have seen the development of terminology and theory along the lines of “communicative 
planning” (Forester, 1989), “argumentative planning” (Forester, 1993), “planning through 
debate” (Healey, 1992), and “collaborative planning” (Healey, 1997; 1998. To a large extent, 
these describe and transform the concepts of Habermasian critical theory into planning theory 
(Allmendiger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Sager, 1994). I discuss this in Article I below, in relation 
to legally regulated participation in the Swedish 3G development (cf. Larsson, 2014). 
A benefit of turning to a “communicative rationality” as opposed to “practical reason”, 
according to Habermas – who has served as much of the inspiration for this trend in planning 
theory – is that it has “the advantage of not cutting social theory off from the issues and 
answers developed in practical philosophy from Aristotle to Hegel” (Habermas, 2011, p. 9). 
We can therefore quite safely assume that the project that Habermas undertook to contribute 
to was neither a never before dealt with project nor of a transient character. Habermas further 
makes use of the concept of juridification (Verrechtligung) – which is of particular relevance 
for the link between the socio-legal approach and planning – in the concluding chapter of The 
Theory of Communicative Action (1987), which means a formalisation of the social sphere 
(Teubner, 1987). According to Deflem (2013, pp. 81-82), juridification refers to an “increase 
in formal or written law, either in the form of an expansion of law of hitherto unregulated 
conduct or in the form of a densification of law in the form of a more detailed regulation of 
conduct that was already legally regulated.” The juridification of social phenomena has also 
been referred to as “the legal distortion of social realities” (Teubner, 1992, p. 1455). Although 
Habermas’ task is grander, through an historical approach that shows how welfare laws can be 
interpreted in terms of the institutionalisation of rights, he specifies a number of problems of 
which at least two are of particular interest here: 1.) claims need to be successfully petitioned 
under formally specified conditions; 2.) claims are implemented in ways that suit the needs 
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of large bureaucratic organisations rather than the people involved (Deflem, 2013). It is 
this process of formalisation that receives special attention in the studies conducted for this 
thesis, particularly regarding the encounter with court procedure inflicted on the plaintiffs 
and defendants when a wind turbine or 3G mast permit is appealed (as in Article III below, 
Larsson & Emmelin, forthcoming).
The analytical separation of a calculating rationality as opposed to a communicative 
rationality to a large extent translates to a strand in the literature that expresses a similar 
account, expressed as knowledge stemming from either experts or lay persons (Irwin, 
1995; Lidskog, 2008; Sager, 1994; Wynne, 1996). It addresses the broader question of the 
relationship between science and the citizen, which Irwin (1995) has addressed within the 
field of environmental risks. As described by Lidskog (2008, p. 78):
There is a clash between science’s universal and ‘decontextualised’ character and 
lay people’s local understandings. From this science-centred perspective, there 
is a need to educate citizens, which is believed to lead to greater acceptance for 
a (scientifically guided) policy. Thus, science is placed at the centre of policy-
making, whereas the public are seen as passive spectators, as witnesses rather than 
participants.
Irwin is critical of this understanding, claiming that science is not a homogenous practice. 
He argues that one reason for a clash between science and the public can be found in 
science’s ambition to create abstract, universal and formalised knowledge, which ignores the 
more context-specific, contextually generated understanding of lay people. Wynne (1987) 
criticises expert rationality for being a major obstacle in hazardous waste policies. Further, 
the consultation may steer the debate and discussion. As noted by Aitken et al. (2008, p. 793):
The unquestionable nature of policy within public inquiries can also be seen as a 
means of restricting the range of possible arguments that participants can make 
and further as defining a set of ‘rational’ assumptions underpinning the inquiry. 
Consequently, individuals (or types of evidence) that challenge or deviate from this 
set of assumptions can be easily disregarded.
Rydin (2007) states that “knowledge embedded in local relationships needs to be drawn upon 
to direct contextualisation of scientific knowledge” (p. 54). Interestingly, she also questions the 
approaches employed to deal with “multiple knowledges” to ensure that the most “appropriate 
knowledge” is used in decision-making, while Alexander (2008) highlights the difficulty 
of identifying which knowledge is most appropriate and why. Aitken et al. (2008) discuss 
“agenda-setting power” with reference to Lukes (1974 (2004)) and the “three-dimensional 
view of power” that acknowledges the power to shape people’s beliefs and ideologies (see 
Figure 2 below).
It is rather easy to agree with McKay (2014, p. 19) when he concludes that the 
“development of an appropriate toolkit to deal with strategic infrastructure applications 
presents many challenges.” He sums the challenges up with theoretical references:
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...those whose role as professionals is to gather evidence and make ethically 
responsible decisions on the basis of policy and other material considerations. 
They must unpack layers of both lay and professional knowledge (Wynne, 1996), 
sometimes tactically manipulated, and while identification of the “most appropriate 
knowledge” (Alexander, 2008) might be established through its ability to be tested 
(Rydin, 2008), inspectors will be challenged by complex conundrums. Here, of 
particular significance, are Forester’s (1989) comments that planning decision-
makers are expected to be aware of their own power and limitations (McKay, 2014, 
p. 19).
This, to a large extent, concerns a struggle between objectivism and subjectivism, i.e., expert-
based versus the deliberative approach to decision-making. When it comes to the explicit 
planning discipline, Friedmann (1989) has argued that it consists of an expert-based type of 
objectivism inherent in the profession: 
Planners claim that their advanced degrees in relevant disciplines and professional 
fields give them access to scientific knowledge and know-how. They also claim 
that this knowledge is generally superior to knowledge gained in other ways (from 
practical experience, for example). In this respect they speak as true heirs of the 
Enlightenment (Friedmann, 1989, p. 40). 
The focus of this thesis is more concerned with the legal selection of knowledge, what 
type of experiences and statements gain traction in court and in legislative revisions. The 
model above is simplistic in the sense that the communicative side of knowledge types may 
be further debated, for example, how the Habermasian approach that has stimulated much 
of the communicative turn in planning can be nuanced and criticised from a Foucauldian 
perspective. There is, simply put, a great difference between accounts of “best arguments” 
and accounts of the pragmatics of power also in the micro-perspective of everyday actions. 
Flyvbjerg & Richardson (2002, p. 53) describe this difference in terms of “both Habermas and 
Foucault are ‘bottom-up’ thinkers with regards to the content of politics, but where Habermas 
thinks in a ‘top-down’ moralist fashion concerning procedural rationality – having sketched 
out the procedures that are to be followed – Foucault is a ‘bottom-up’ thinker with regards to 
both process and content.” This means that the communicative side of the model presented 
above may have to deal with both communicative rationalities as well as power analytics. 
Therefore, the communicative side is not as simplistically characterised as the model 
(figure 1) may seem to imply. In fact, the nature of how to handle citizens in decision-making 
that concerns many people is a challenge any state wrestles with and is at the core of spatial 
planning. What is perhaps not sufficiently elaborated in the simplistic model is the difference 
between direct democratic decision-making, other versions collectivist decision-making, 
and representative democracy. The latter is also of direct relevance to Swedish municipal 
spatial planning, not the least due to the fact that every municipality is run by an elected city 
council which, for instance, often deals with the so-called municipal veto for wind power 
establishments. The stronger proponents of the communicative turn in planning have also 
been criticised for displaying an overly simplistic version of the rationalistic planning that 
 Law and Spatial Planning     |     33
is often linked to Faludi (e.g. Strömgren, 2007, pp. 38-44). Strömgren (2007) describes the 
treatment that Sandercock and Innes give the rationalistic planning as a “straw man” that they 
use to knock down. Strömgren argues that one mistake sometimes made is to fail to separate 
the post-war blueprint planning from the rationalistic planning theoretically developed by, for 
example, Faludi. Strömgren also argues that the starting point for Faludi was representative 
democracy. Faludi describes the plan process as a collaborative exercise and interaction 
between elected officials, planning experts and the citizens. Accordingly, the best way to 
enable the implementation of programs is to “formulate them in such a way that people regard 
them as their own because they have been involved in drawing them up” (Faludi, 1973b, 
p. 289). This leads to the fact that the model outlined above (figure 1) may also seem too 
simplistic on the calculating side – which of course is a characteristic feature of models: They 
cannot contain all the nuances that may be needed in the following analysis. The concepts 
in the model should therefore be regarded as ideal types that are used as instruments for the 
analysis. 
2.3 ON LAW: FROM FORMAL TO EMPIRICAL
The analysis of policy is of key importance when studying the outcome of legally regulated 
management processes. There are various, possible takes on environmental policy analysis 
and even on what a scientific approach towards landscape planning would mean. Taking the 
socio-legal approach that is found in the discipline of sociology of law, for one, involves an 
empirical approach to law and its social or societal consequences (see also Article V below; 
Larsson, 2013). Research within sociology of law tends to focus a social fundament of law that 
argues that law is shaped by, and dependent on, the social and economic structures of society 
(Drobak, 2006; Ellickson, 1991; Ellickson, 1998; Ellickson, 2001; Larsson 2011a; Svensson, 
2008). One way to distinguish between legal (dogmatic) intentions on the one hand, and the 
empirical consequences on the other, is to follow in line with what Roscoe Pound a century 
ago coined as law in books and law in action (1910; cf. Larsson, 2008b; 2013b), which I refer 
to in several of the articles in this thesis. This represents a field of literature, mentioned above, 
which Nelken has termed as a difference between “law’s promise and achievement” (Nelken 
2007; see also, 1981). Trubek, for example, has called for an analysis of the tension between 
“ideals and reality” within the legal order (Trubek, 1977, p. 566; see Article V below, Larsson, 
2013).
Of particular relevance, here, is the assessment of the differences between the intent of 
a legal regulation and what it actually leads to. A socio-legal approach to the legal revisions 
made for the regulations of the wind power permit system in 2009 is a fitting case for such a 
study and analysis. The revision itself has been analysed from a socio-legal perspective prior 
to the revisions coming into force (Larsson, 2009b). What is of interest here is to study to 
what extent the intentions expressed in the legal revision, for example in terms of making the 
management more “efficient”, have been fulfilled, or have failed. 
One way to analyse law from an empirical perspective based on the outcomes of its 
implementation would be to use theory developed by the highly influential sociologist Robert 
Merton. Merton is known for his “functionalist” approach to assessing effects of actions, which 
has reverberated in a multitude of areas that often refer to Merton (Aubert 1954; Brown 1992; 
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Christie 1965; House 1968; Larsson and Svensson, 2010; Mathiesen 2005; McAulay 2007; 
Ridgway 1956; Roots 2004; Sunstein 1994). By formulating the “unanticipated consequences 
of purposive social action” in 1936, Merton lent a higher profile to the idea of hidden 
effects of actions. Merton defined function as “those observed consequences, which make 
for the adoption or adjustment of a given system” (1949/1968, 105). “Function” is therefore 
something other than “dysfunction,” in the sense that just as structures or institutions might 
contribute to the maintenance of other parts of the social system, they could also have negative 
consequences for them. These can either be manifest (intended) or latent (unintended). Further, 
there are latent functions that are unintended but still operate in line with the intended purpose 
of the initial action. This means that latent dysfunctions are unintended and have “negative 
consequences for the structures and systems under consideration” (Merton 1949/1968, 105). 
When it comes to law, these latent dysfunctions can be direct consequences of what Sunstein 
speaks of as “self-defeating legislation” (1994).
This clearly relates to what often has been referred to within the planning literature as 
implementation issues. Issues of implementation on a national scale through law and policy 
that need local implementation have, for example, been addressed by Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1973), and the perspective – along with much of the governance literature – is often found 
within political science, or developed there to be applied in other disciplinary contexts. 
Spatial planning and environmental governance is to a large extent dependent on the steering 
functions that overarching policy levels use to govern the lower levels, as mentioned above in 
chapter 2.1 regarding tiering. The aspects of implementation as a theoretical foundation that 
are relevant in this subchapter deal with how formal instruments are dependent on local level 
characteristics for their realisation. Just as Lipsky (1980) showed that public service workers, 
in fact, constitute the services delivered by government, it is reasonable to assume that the 
formal steering mechanisms with regards to mobile infrastructure implementation and wind 
power development are also, to some extent, dependent on the setting of the local context 
and the character of the low-level administration (cf. Sinclair, 2004; Vedung, 2009). The 
outcome is, to some extent, depending on the “street level bureaucrats” that execute and apply 
the legislation, or, translate it into actions. With regards to the relevancy of implementation 
theory in Swedish municipal planning that concerns outdoor recreation and nature tourism, 
see Petersson Forsberg (2012). 
2.4 TWO “PARADIGMS” OF GOVERNANCE
I have presented the theoretical “map” above (figure 1) in Article I (Larsson, 2014; cf. Larsson, 
2011) and have aimed to elaborate on its theoretical connections to planning theory in a broad 
sense, in order to justify the concepts I use in the analysis below. To a large degree, the “map” 
is inspired by or retrieved from the work of Emmelin who used it to emphasise different 
modes of thought that govern land use and environmental planning. He does so in terms 
of an “environmentalist paradigm”, which he places on the top left, indicating centralistic 
and expert-based decision-making, and a “plan paradigm”, which he places on the bottom 
right, indicating a more deliberative approach within a local setting. Emmelin argues that 
these are consolidated through various legislations (basically, The Environmental Code versus 
the Planning and Building Act), education, and professional and administrative cultures 
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(Emmelin, 2009; Emmelin & Kleven 1999; Emmelin & Lerman 2006, pp. 21– 35; cf. Larsson, 
2014; Petersson Forsberg, 2012; Vuorio, 2003, pp. 23-25). They have also been described as 
normative, that is to say, containing directives for decision-making processes (Larsson, 2008, 
p. 116-117; Larsson & Emmelin 2007). The “paradims” can serve as explanation for what 
type of knowledge is regarded as legitimate in a specific setting of decision-making. The 
environmentalist paradigm takes its starting point in a scientific approach to the decision-
making process. A decision is legitimate when it is based in the best possible scientific 
assessment. The key actor here is the expert who owns a comprehensive overview of a field of 
knowledge. In the plan paradigm, the governance of and decisions concerning land governance 
and environment should be based in balanced deliberations between various, legitimate, 
but not necessarily compatible interests, and in compromise, if possible. Its legitimacy lies 
in that the various concerned interests have a voice and that the deliberations are based in 
representative, democratic, communal decision-making.
 
Figure 2: The notion of two paradigms in planning and environmental governance can be 
placed in the model outlined above, from Emmelin and Lerman (2006, p. 27). 
Depending on which paradigm one operates within in the decision-making process, this will 
determine how the decision should be made, as mentioned above. The knowledge base that 
constitutes the grounds for decision-making according to the environmentalist paradigm will 
be assumed to be able to address whether the decision is correct, that is to say, optimal. And the 
knowledge base that constitutes the basis for decision-making according to the plan paradigm 
is assumed to be able to address whether the decision, for better or worse, corresponds to 
the submissions of the concerned parties, that is to say, whether the decision represents a 
good compromise between in and of themselves contradictory, but legitimate, viewpoints. 
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The perception of public participation in the decision-making process will diverge drastically 
within the two paradigms. Where the expert-emphasis of the environmentalist paradigm leads 
to an attitude that the correct decision can be reached by a competent enough expert, the 
plan paradigm leads to an attitude that a good answer cannot be reached without deliberative 
participation from the concerned parties, and that it is those parties who own the knowledge. 
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3. Method & Material
This chapter initially describes the sources and the material used for the study of the two 
cases, and thereafter reflects somewhat on the more methodological issues following from 
this type of study. In general, it is often argued that case studies are suitable for answering 
“how” and “why” questions, that is, an understanding that extends beyond the merely 
descriptive (Yin, 2009). Case-based research has been argued to be a basic feature of social 
science research (Ragin & Becker, 2009). Nevertheless, the case study approach may also be 
suitable for discovery, description, and relational mapping (Vissak, 2010, p. 371). The key 
question here, when it comes to representation and generalisation, is what these cases are 
cases of. First of all, the roll-out of both the 3G infrastructure and wind power development 
is clearly related to the planning of the physical and spatial domain and the management of 
the environment. The masts and the wind turbines have physical attributes that impact the 
landscape – environmentally and aesthetically – in a way that makes them a concern not only 
for the constructors and property owners of the actual sites but also for the local authorities, 
neighbouring property owners, and – to some extent – anyone with a vested interest in the 
local landscape. Secondly, both cases, in being both a local as well as a planning concern, 
are very much regulated by law. Thirdly, the tiered challenge is apparent in a way that also 
explains why the two cases may conjunctively provide insight. A comparison of the two cases 
will likely shed more light on the general issues related to local implementation of national 
policy that are both regulated by law and highly dependent on local decision-making. 
The methodology is rich in the sense that I triangulate the object of study (cf. Perri 6 & 
Bellamy, 2012, pp. 270-272) through various types of methods that include the collection of 
case databases, partaking of national questionnaires as supplementary material, performing 
interviews, as well as studying law dogmatically (as in, what is existing law?) and assessing 
how the legal framework functions in terms of outcome, implementation and the empirical 
perspective. Mixed methods research can “collect a richer and stronger array of evidence 
than can be accomplished by any single method alone” (Yin, 2014, p. 66). Perri 6 & Bellamy 
(2012, p. 82) also state that case-comparative researchers often “employ multi-method 
designs to develop a more holistic understanding of the cases than is possible with a single 
method.” The simple fact that there are two cases under scrutiny, both 3G and wind power 
development, is arguably an asset when it comes to the corroboration of generalised results: 
“Analytic conclusions independently arising from two cases, as with two experiments, will be 
more powerful than those coming from a single case alone” (Yin, 2014, p. 64).
A comparison may also help deconstruct what may be seen as unique or inimitable, 
but it may also arrange unity from what would seemingly be divergent, practical categories 
(Wievorka, 1992, p. 170). The process of making results generalisable is to isolate theoretical 
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argumentation of some form or other that would be expected in well-defined circumstances 
or contexts in order to produce similar phenomena (cf. Palmås et al., 2014). Danermark 
et al. normatively state that “science should have generalising claims” (2002, p. 1). Any 
generalisation of the results of this study depends on what the cases can convincingly be said 
to be cases of. Let me first address the question of what the two cases share in common: 
• National policy: they are both, to a major degree, the results of national policy-
making that at face value is somewhat dependent on supra-national policy-
making; 
• Non-traditional, or at least more dispersed infrastructure: As outlined and 
clarified in the introduction, 3G and wind differ from traditional infrastructure 
planning (concerning roads and railways, for example) on a number of accounts, 
which may contribute to some of the imbalances in the implementations;
• They do not constitute a physically connected and continuous system that cannot 
be adjusted or adapted; 
• Only certain individual components of the system require a legally defined 
permit, e.g. the siting of wind turbines or wind farms and the siting of 3G masts 
but not the base stations and antennae.
This type of infrastructure, if we are to view it as that, is dependent on thousands of public 
authority decisions, and is flexible in the sense that its constituents are adjustable, but the total 
effect of the entire system is what defines the rate of success of the implementation. This can 
be measured in coverage as in the 3G case or in extracted TWh energy as in the wind power 
case. Given these circumstances, how does one adequately reconcile the systemic and national 
with the fragmented and local? This could be addressed through two questions: How does one 
establish the national perspective (energy type, telecom system) as relevant at a municipal 
level; how does one include local values and individual visions into national policies? 
This chapter describes the methods that have been used to answer the research questions, 
as well as the material. In order to be able to tell what can be generalised from this study, or 
these studies, I will here not only clarify what can be said with this methodological approach 
but also what cannot be said. 
3.1 THE WIND POWER CASE
The wind power case is studied at the national level in relation to the local level, and mainly 
through its legal representations. The main material used regarding the wind power case 
concerns five main sources which are combined in the analysis: 
• Legal documents such as preparatory work for the revision of how wind power is 
assessed and how the permits for the turbines are considered, where an important 
legal revision was made in 2009; 
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• A sample of court cases from southern Sweden where turbine permits have 
been appealed in both the court of appeals as well as the environmental court 
of appeals; 
• A sample of turbine permit documents from southern Sweden, irrespective 
of whether they were appealed or not, which includes documentation from 
consultations processes and EIAs;
• Interviews with a handful of key persons of relevance for wind power 
development; 
• Supplementary material, such as reports from relevant agencies as well as NGOs. 
Legal documents
The legal material has already been mentioned and consists of explicit legal regulations 
such as the Planning and Building Act (revised in May 2011, from 1987:10 to 2010:900) 
and the Environmental Code (1998:808), but also of the regulation of economic support for 
wind power planning (2007:160)6, the main directive for the wind power commission (Dir. 
2007:94) and the supplementary directive that is of most interest to the wind power processes 
(Dir. 2007:184). Further, the most important sources for studying the intentions behind the 
legal revisions implemented in August 2009, which may represent the manifest intentions of 
the law, consist of the proposal that was drafted by the Environmental Process Commission 
(Miljöprocessutredningen) in late 2008 (SOU 2008:86) and the subsequent governmental bill 
that followed in the spring of 2009 (Prop. 2008/09:146). 
Appeal cases
For the analysis, a sample of appeal permit cases was collected from the Land and 
Environmental Court (LEC) of Växjö [Mark- och Miljödomstolen] as well as the Land and 
Environment Court of Appeal (LECA) [Mark- och Miljööverdomstolen] (see Article III, 
Larsson & Emmelin, forthcoming). These two courts were created 2 May 2011 in their current 
arrangement. There are five LECs in Sweden that divide the country into five jurisdictional 
areas, and one LECA which accepts cases after approval in the “supreme court” sense. The 
sample of judgements from both the LEC and LECA has been selected from decisions passed 
since 2 May 2011, because the complexity that would follow from comparing different court 
systems on top of the already established research questions would risk obscuring the clarity 
I have pursued in the analysis. Therefore, cases analysed from LEC Växjö concern cases 
appealed from the area of Skåne and where the decision has been made between 2 May 2011 
and November 2013. There are 20 cases in the sample from LEC, and 9 cases in LECA, of 
which only three received leave to appeal and were tried in court, and of which the first two 
are the most relevant for this study. 
Sample of  permit applications
For the study on wind power development in Sweden, a sample consisting of 30 wind power 
processes in the county of Skåne was collected, which is one of 21 counties in Sweden, and 
the county that during 2011 had the second most installed wind power effect and number of 
6  Förordningen (2007:160) om stöd till planeringsinsatser för vindkraft. 
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wind power turbines of all the Swedish counties (Statens Energimyndighet, 2011, p. 12). The 
permit processes consist of applications from developers, letters from the public, consultation 
documents, appeal documents etc., including information on height, number of turbines, 
dates, locations etc.
Interviews
Interviews have been conducted with a handful of key persons, such as two expert judges in 
the Land and Environment Court as well as the appeal court, a regional officer handling and 
assessing turbine applications, and the wind power coordinator appointed by the government 
to facilitate the development in southern Sweden. This has been used for the interpretation and 
analysis of court cases thus aiding the understanding of the permit processes, particularly those 
cases that have been appealed, and how the courts evaluate various pleadings and opinions.
Supplementary material
The material described so far has been collected within this study. We have also used materials 
collected by others that consist of other studies relevant to the Swedish wind power processes. 
For example, the agencies that are involved have produced a number of reports, such as the 
Boverket report on the outcome of the economic support for wind power planning (2012a) 
and the report from the Swedish Energy Agency on the development of permit processes for 
facilities that produce renewable energy (2012). In June 2012, the Swedish Energy Agency 
commissioned Ramböll Management Consulting to study cases concerning renewable energy, 
which includes wind, hydro, electricity generation plants using biomass and/or waste, and a 
small number of cases relating to energy supply facilities, where it is not clear which type of 
energy is involved. The study included 198 cases. Moreover, a survey regarding the so-called 
municipal veto carried out by the wind industry association Svensk Vindenergi and targeting 
the developers is included. The survey was conducted amongst 23 of the member companies 
of the industry association during October/November 2010, that is, 15-16 months after the 
legal revisions of August 2009.
3.2 THE 3G INFRASTRUCTURE CASE
The empirical data for the 3G study concerns the following five main sources:
• A regional sample of 248 permit processes for 3G masts in Blekinge, from the 
initiation of 3G construction in 2001 until late 2005;
• Two PTA questionnaires;7 
 - A quantitative survey of all municipalities, and a qualitative study on 
 25 municipalities (7 April 2003); 
 - A quantitative survey of all municipalities (29 December 2003);
• Legal cases, appealed permit processes and other cases of relevance; 
7  'DWDPDGHDYDLODEOHE\WKH37$FRQGXFWHGE\7HPR$%IRUWKH37$
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• Legal documents, preparatory work, law studies etc;
• Both the PTA and other reports and PTA regulations and other documents, such 
as the call for 3G licence applicants. 
The collecting of empirical data of the permit processes in Blekinge was initiated in a pilot 
study on the infrastructure development which was undertaken prior to this research project 
(Emmelin & Söderblom, 2002), leading to the licentiate thesis (Larsson, 2008a) and was central 
for Article I below (Larsson, 2014).8 The Blekinge material concerning permit processes 
continued to be collected after the pilot study project. For the purpose of understanding and 
explaining sustainability issues in spatial planning via the 3G case, the Blekinge material has 
been extended and completed with the use of PTA questionnaires, as well as legal studies and 
document studies of PTA reports and others, as outlined below. 
Building permits
Of the legally regulated structures for 3G infrastructure development, one of the most 
important and relevant legal documents is the building permit. The Emmelin & Söderblom 
pilot study (2002) collected the initial permit processes of the infrastructure construction in 
Blekinge. This collecting of building permits was continued until late 2005 and early 2006 
in the municipalities. There are 248 permit processes in the sample for this study, see table 
1. These building permits allowed scanning for main issues and conflicts of interest that 
concern how the planning and environmental administration functions from a sustainability 
perspective. A selection of the permits was further analysed according to the research 
questions. For quantitative analysis of the Blekinge material, an access database and a SPSS 
database were built. 
The Blekinge data forms a case study which is then compared to the national 
questionnaires administered by the PTA. As mentioned, this has meant a sort of triangulation 
in the methodology, which consists of the use of various data on similar issues that can 
corroborate the results and raise the likelihood of reliable results. Systematic errors in any 
of the collected data are not likely to be reduced in the other (Esaiasson et al., 2004, p. 61ff). 
The Blekinge permit process data is primary in the sense that it has been retrieved from 
documents that concern, for instance, when the applicants applied and the actual application 
sent in to the local authorities, as opposed to the national questionnaire data in which planning 
officers answered a web based survey on matters of the permit process within their respective 
municipality. The important difference between these two types of data with regards to the 
validity of scientific method is that where the Blekinge data describes the actual dates and 
figures, I cannot similarly corroborate the questionnaire data, because this may in some cases 
indicate the opinion of the local planning officer rather than precise, measured figures. This 
is where one can assume that many different types of data all pointing in the same direction 
are more likely to be true (Denscombe, 2000, pp. 102-104). This increases the validity of 
the method, meaning that the chosen method is more likely to measure what it is claimed to 
measure. 
8  7KLVGDWDZDVFROOHFWHGE\/RYLVD%MDUWLQJDQG/DUV1LOVVRQ0DVWHUVWXGHQWVDW%,7XQGHUVXSHUYL-
sion by Lars Emmelin. 
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The PTA questionnaires
The two questionnaires on the building permit process performed by Temo on behalf of PTA 
addressed to the municipalities of Sweden are from 29 December 2003 and 7 April 2003. Both 
surveys are quantitative, however, the latter is complemented by a qualitative study based 
on interviews with handling officers, politicians and trade and industry spokespersons of 25 
municipalities and 2 county council boards. The interviews were conducted via telephone and 
a semi-structured interview guide. The two quantitative PTA questionnaires were conducted 
through a web based survey. The municipalities received e-mails containing a link leading 
to the web form. A number of reminders where sent during the research period to ensure 
high participation. All of Sweden’s 290 municipalities where included in the survey. The 
quantitative questionnaire of 2 April 2003 had a participation rate of approximately 75 per 
cent, meaning 218 municipalities. We have been given access to the raw data and information 
of this questionnaire. The questionnaire of 4 December 2003 had a participation rate of ca. 75 
per cent, or 217 municipalities. 
The qualitative research of 2 April was conducted through interviews with the help 
of a semi-structured interviewing guide. A total of 25 municipalities and 2 county councils 
(Kalmar Län and Västra Götalands Län) participated. In the municipalities, the responsible 
handling officers, local politicians and corporate representatives were interviewed. In the 
county council, the responsible handling officers were interviewed. A total of 73 interviews 
were conducted by Temo AB on behalf of the PTA. 
3.3 ON VALIDITY
The basic methodological question, irrespective of whether one seeks to describe, explain or 
interpret a phenomenon, has been posed by Perri 6 & Bellamy (2012, p. 12) as “how and how 
far can you argue from the particular data to the particular conclusions, or, to put it in another 
way, what argument, if any, do these data actually support?” While it is of sufficient interest to 
draw conclusions that are valid for the specific cases alone, one aim has been to draw analytic 
conclusions that tell of more than just the cases. Take, for example, Jane Jacobs’ famous 
book The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961). This book is mainly based on 
experiences of one great city, NYC, from which Jacobs develops broader theoretical principles 
in urban planning. Methodologically, the validity of the methods used needs to be judged by 
the details in the data and the methods. The interviews conducted for the wind case, to begin 
with, were semi-structured, with a few prepared key topics and questions that nonetheless 
retained an openness to follow up and develop the answers provided by the respondents. This 
means that all respondents approached the noise issue as well as the veto issue relatively 
voluntarily, indicating that in practice these are in fact significant challenges. The samples of 
permit processes and appealed cases are from southern Sweden (Blekinge and Skåne), while 
the preconditions in topography, settlement patterns and the overall landscape characteristics 
can be, and are, different in other regions in Sweden. The vast and less populated areas of 
northern Sweden also host larger parks of wind turbines that face other pressing challenges 
compared to the more densely populated southern Sweden. Furthermore, it is possible that 
other relevant factors, such as the attitudes of concerned parties and property owners, may 
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be related to different attributes in different regions. The study focuses more on the permit 
processes as they become juridified in appeal rather than the prior consultation process. 
The administrative system for land use planning is nationally regulated. This means 
that it is designed to be uniform for the entire country of Sweden. The country is divided 
into 290 municipalities (21 regions/counties) which, with regards to the larger portion of the 
spatial environment planning, are sovereign or delegated to the local authorities under the 
supervision of the county council. The region of Blekinge has a coastline with archipelagos 
as well as a rural inland, containing valuable culture and nature. The urbanised areas of 
Karlskrona, Karlshamn and perhaps Ronneby represent many of the middle sized urban areas 
of Sweden. Blekinge County is representative at a national level from several perspectives. 
Neither the Blekinge region nor Skåne, however, exemplify the extremely sparsely populated 
areas to be found, for example, in the northern parts of Sweden. The Blekinge focus of the 3G 
permit processes of the empirical data leads to the possibility that some issues and conflicts 
in the region of Blekinge to some extent do not find their representation at a national level. 
In such cases, this will be visible in the PTA national questionnaires. To be able to generalise 
issues of interest at a national level, however, the national questionnaires issued by the PTA 
during 2003 can be compared to the permit processes of Blekinge. The questionnaires provide 
a national snapshot of a few selected moments (a comparison that is further elaborated upon 
in Larsson, 2008a).
The legal documents are necessary for depicting not only the existing framework but 
also its legislative history. The legislative history can explain some of its political context and 
also which concepts were implemented early in the process, such as demands for “efficiency”, 
which also effect the legal revisions that result from the legal revisionary process. The legal 
material may, however, not tell us all about what happens when the formal statutes meet the 
local practice, nor the implicit narratives in court decisions. Other data is needed for that, 
such as the actual appeal cases or the use of interviews with concerned parties, for example. 
In socio-legal research, there is an expressed understanding that in studying law and legal 
authority, the researcher runs the risk of too closely accepting the legal terminology and 
conceptual framework, and thereby becoming less able to actually analyse law from any point 
of view other than the legal (Larsson, 2011a, pp. 76-79). Niemi-Kiesiläinen et al. (2007, 
p. 81), for example, emphasise the need for creating distance between lawyers’ methods of 
reading texts and the fact that the “objective” and neutral style of legal texts tends to mask 
“their discursive and constructive nature” (cf. Larsson, 2012). 
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4. Wind power development
The implementation of wind power has been studied far more extensively than the explicit 
implementation of 3G, which motivates why the presentation of literature on wind power here 
will also be more extensive than in the following chapter on 3G. The academic literature of 
most interest for this exposition concerns the reasons for local opposition or resistance, the 
legal frameworks – to the extent this aspect is studied – and the case of Denmark, which often 
is seen as a model due to having established a method to obtain a high proportion of wind 
energy, which I then relate to developments in Spain, Germany and the US. 
Wind power in Sweden has expanded the last few years and while it may continue to be 
overshadowed by Denmark, Spain and Germany, this has not stopped the Swedish government 
setting high targets for renewable energy. The Government has set a goal of reaching a share of 
at least 50 per cent of renewable energy in gross financial consumption by 2020 (Government 
Offices of Sweden, 2009). In 2011, 35 per cent of total energy was supplied by renewable energy 
sources, mainly from the addition of onshore wind power and solid biofuels (International 
Energy Agency, 2013) and in December 2013 the Swedish Government reported that the share 
of energy from renewable sources was 51 per cent (Regeringskansliet, 2013, p. 4). The Swedish 
Energy Agency in June 2014 reported that at the end of 2013, there were 2,640 wind turbines 
in Sweden with a total installed capacity of 4,194 MW. Total electricity generated from wind 
power amounted to 9.8 TWh in 2013. The three counties with the most extensively installed 
wind – Västra Götalands län, Västerbottens län och Skåne län – accounted for more than 1 
TWh each. According to statistics from 2013, the contribution to electricity consumption 
from wind power was 7 per cent, compared with 41 per cent from hydropower and 43 per 
cent from nuclear (Swedish Energy Agency, 2014, p. 6). Despite the growth in wind energy in 
recent years, much of the literature on Sweden and its implementation of wind power seems 
to focus either on the negative aspects of the slow and cumbersome wind power planning 
and permit process, or otherwise on the local opposition to wind turbines (cf. Bergek, 2010; 
Pettersson et al., 2010; Söderholm et al., 2005).
Writing on the influence of national wind power planning instruments in Sweden, Bergek 
notes the legal role that local municipal authorities have in land planning in identifying the 
areas that “are suitable for different types of activities as well as areas that need to be protected 
from exploitation since they are of high public value” (2010, p. 2359). Given this high level of 
responsibility in the planning of the use of land, the courts are also poised to pay attention to 
municipal planning in wind turbine permit decisions brought to the court of appeal (Söderholm 
et al, 2007). Vuorio has conducted a study on planning and outdoor recreation in the Swedish 
mountains which included a study on attitudes towards wind power (2003, pp. 134-135). It 
is interesting to note the scale between positive and negative attitudes towards wind power in 
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the mountains that correlates to a scale which ranges from the general view on wind power 
to a very concrete situation in which a group station is visibly salient to the respondents. The 
most positive attitudes were noted in the “general view of wind power in the mountains” and 
the most negative attitudes were noted in the example in which the respondents were informed 
that a group of 10-12 windmills would be visible from their residence. This is perhaps not a 
surprising result, but it clearly contrasts the inherent challenges of planning an infrastructure 
that is beneficial as an infrastructure – be it for telecommunications or renewable energy – 
with local impact in terms of the clear effect the physical constructions have on landscape 
aesthetics, as well as possible noise, lights and, at least arguably, electromagnetic radiation. 
It also points to the argument that perception is of relevance for the expressed attitudes and 
opinions. 
Figure 3: Development of sizes of wind turbines.9 
Much literature has been written on local opposition to wind turbines and wind farms (Ek, 
2005; Petrova 2013; Devine-Wright, 2005). This concerns a number of perspectives, such as: 
1. Noise and shadows (Agterbosch et al., 2007; Devine-Wright, 2005; Strachan 
and Lal, 2004; Wolsink, 2000); 
2. Decreased property values (Toke, 2005); 
3. Detrimental effect on tourism (Vuorio, 2003; Strachan and Lal, 2004);
4. Environmental concerns (Agterbosch et al., 2007; Strachan and Lal, 2004; Toke 
et al., 2008); and 
5. Visual and aesthetical concerns (Agterbosch et al., 2007; Devine-Wright, 2005; 
Johansson and Laike, 2007; Toke et al., 2008; Wolsink, 2000). 
9 The image is made available under the Creative Commons &&8QLYHUVDO3XEOLF'RPDLQ'HGL-
cation.
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Concerns for the sustainability of electricity production and the rising cost of current 
practices have seen countries around the world setting targets for renewable sources of energy. 
The European Council has implemented a directive for the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources. This directive sets the target at a 20 per cent share of energy from 
renewable sources by 2020 for the European Union (EU) Community (European Parliament, 
2009). Meeting such targets has seen many countries turn to wind power as an internationally 
important, sustainable energy alternative. As such, many countries around the world are 
seeking ways in which to promote wind power development. These developments range from 
adopting more straightforward permit handling legislation to providing incentive schemes 
for green energy providers. However, while wind power has become a component of official 
energy policy at the national level, it is well documented that it is often at the local level that 
wind power schemes meet the most resistance (Agterbosch et al., 2009; Bell et al., 2005; 
Gross, 2007; Pasqualetti, 2000; Wolsink, 2000; Parkhill, 2007). 
The following review of literature aims to provide an outline of the current, international 
legal framework for wind power permit handling to determine how planning and environmental 
legislation provides a basis for the issuance and construction of wind farms. It concentrates 
on four EU member states, Denmark, Spain, Germany and Sweden, to compare how different 
legislative structures and policy goals have resulted in different outcomes when it comes to 
wind power development. This literature review also provides a perspective from beyond the 
EU by briefly looking at the legal framework for wind power permit handling in the United 
States (US), and it also addresses the dissatisfaction and resistance often faced at the local 
level. 
4.1 INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES
At the European Council Summit in March 2007, the heads of state reached an agreement 
that the EU should adopt “a binding target of a 20 per cent share of renewable energy…
consumption by 2020” (Council of the European Union, 2007). However, as acknowledged 
by Cowell and Strachan, “as with all such steps…the prospect of closer integration brings 
with it exacting questions about the coordination of domestic action among the member 
states” (2007, p. 285). The actual implementation of wind power is multifactorial and involves 
numerous laws, policies, economic schemes and support at the national and local level (Anker 
et al., 2009). This exists not only at the member state level but also at the EU level, with 
legislative instruments such as the European Landscape Convention posing questions on the 
development of wind farms (cf. Oles & Hammarlund, 2011). 
In a hierarchic sense, the target goals for renewable energy are top-down and it is left 
to the local or regional level to implement these goals, which creates problems in the tiering 
between the levels in the Swedish wind power development as well (Larsson et al., 2014). This 
approach, while creating support at a general level, fails to filter down to the local level where 
wind turbines are either constructed or fail to gain permits. The literature tends to focus on the 
success of Denmark in bridging this top down approach and providing an effective system, 
where each decision from a government body is integrated to the next, penetrating all the 
way down to the local or municipal level and thus creating certainty in policy and influencing 
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success and support at both the national and local level (Agnolucci, 2007). With regards to 
an analysis of the successful implementation of renewable energy plants, Wolsink argues that 
success hinges on the socio-economic institutions that are “conditional to planning in two 
main domains – spatial planning and energy policy” (2007, p. 2693). In this sense, it is easy 
to see how Danish policy manages to tick off both categories in the process of wind power 
permit handling. 
Exploring this facet of the interaction between the integration of wind power and the 
European Landscape Convention, Contesse (2011) acknowledges that additional costs arise 
in the case of master planning by regional or local authorities that must perform preliminary 
analyses of non-landscape aspects, such as wind energy potential in landscape planning. This 
is in order for member states to meet the requirement of the European Landscape Convention 
in recognising landscapes in law “as an essential component of people’s surroundings, an 
expression of the diversity of their share cultural and natural heritage, and a foundation 
of their identity” (Article 5a). While such additional steps may pose a burden on member 
states, they nevertheless must be met to ensure compliance with legislative instruments and 
directives at the EU level, in conjunction with domestic laws. Furthermore, within the EU, the 
domestic legal framework for issuing wind power permits varies from country to country. The 
literature suggests that Denmark, Germany and Spain are the leaders in propelling wind power 
forward within the EU Community and as such this literature review will focus on their legal 
frameworks for issuing wind power permits.
Denmark
The success of Danish wind power has been the focus of many articles (cf. Sperling et al., 
2010; Möller, 2006) that often emphasise a long tradition of successful development and 
implementation of wind power technologies, in conjunction with a generally high rate of 
public support (Sperling, et al., 2010). In a comparative study focusing on England, Wales 
and Denmark, Loring identified that local public involvement in wind energy planning was 
an important variable for project success, factoring Denmark’s encouragement of local, 
cooperative ownership of such projects in the 70s and 80s as contributing to strong wind 
energy development in Denmark (2006, p. 2659). In addition to this, or perhaps as a result of 
its long history in Denmark where wind power turbines date back to the 1890s, one could argue 
that Denmark also has an effective legal process in place for wind power permit handling. 
The establishment of new wind turbines in Denmark is almost always regulated within the 
framework of spatial planning, meaning that localisation issues are integrated in the planning 
system (Denmark’s Wind Turbine Owners’ Association, 2007). There is not an extensive 
amount of literature focusing exclusively on the legal process and its impact on the success of 
wind power in Denmark. However, a comparative study of Nordic countries by Pettersson et 
al. (2010, p. 3120) has identified two important characteristics of Danish legislation relating 
to wind power development: “rammestyring” and the “strive for” provisions. Rammestyring 
relates to the various plans extending from the national authorities through to the municipal 
authorities which are, in essence, vertically integrated. This is connected to the “strive for” 
provisions, meaning that the planning authorities strive to implement the plans or planning 
guidelines that have been adopted when exercising authority in accordance with the Danish 
Planning Act (Pettersson et al., 2010, p. 3120). 
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Spain
In 2005, Spain ranked as the second largest wind energy producer in the world and in 2014 
it has been heralded as the only country where wind energy is the primary electricity source 
(Sustainable Business News, 2014). The purpose of the wind power movement in Spain seems 
to be based on a more economic perspective, with the head of the European Wind Energy 
Association, Corin Millais, proposing that environmental concern has not been the driving 
force behind wind power expansion (Millais, 2005). While it has transformed the countryside, 
with windmills now dotting historic landscapes such as the Camino de Santiago Christian 
pilgrimage route, Graber reflects that the income from wind farms is “literally [saving] some 
communities” in the poorer rural areas (2005). In a comparative study of Spain, India and 
China’s leading wind turbine manufacturers, Lewis (2007) identifies that Spain uses particularly 
aggressive policies to directly support Spanish wind turbine manufacturers, with several 
Spanish, autonomous, regional governments insisting on local assembly and manufacture of 
turbines and components before granting development concessions. Exploring the role of 
policy in the diffusion of wind power in Spain, Dinica (2008) likewise accounts the success of 
wind power to policies of stimulative investments through public-private partnerships. 
Despite incentives at the national level, it is the local regions that grant authorisation for 
the siting of wind farms, and the administrative barriers and authorisation procedures have 
been argued to be a major obstacle for the deployment of wind energy (Blanco, 2008). In an 
analysis of the different administrative procedures for granting authorisation for the siting 
of wind farms, Inglesias et al. (2011) recognise the importance of an authorisation model 
that involves multi-criteria bidding procedures and provides a more objective and transparent 
authorisation procedure. They argue that greater cooperation is needed between the regions 
to “reduce investment costs and encourage wind energy deployment” (Inglesias et al., 2011, 
p. 4075). 
Germany
According to Sahu et al. (2013, p. 351), Germany leads the European wind power market 
with 29.06 GW of installed wind power capacity in 2011. Focusing on the policy behind wind 
power in Germany, Szarka and Blühdorn (2006, p. 8) acknowledge the success of basing the 
policy framework on the concept of ecological modernisation, essentially “a reconciliation of 
technological, economic and environmental objectives to achieve a sustainable energy supply” 
of which the feed-in tariff proved an experimental success. Once again, the success of the 
feed-in tariff for the development and deployment of wind energy in Germany seems to be the 
focus of much of the literature (cf. Drechsler et al., 2012; Ohl and Eichhorn, 2010; Ragwitz 
et al., 2012). While economic incentives prove important to successful development of wind 
energy, there are other factors that make conditions in Germany favourable for developers, 
including a framework in which planning tools operate in union with economic schemes 
(Jobert et al., 2007). For example, the law in Germany dictates that local authorities can be 
forced to accept wind turbines on their territory. 
United States
The US is a leader in wind power as a source of alternative energy. At the national level, it 
has set a target for renewable energy to make up 20 per cent of all energy consumption by 
2020 (Obama, 2013). It is suspected that wind energy will form a large bulk of this renewable 
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energy source with wind energy already generating up to six per cent of the nation’s electricity 
(Natural Resources Defense Council, 2011). As with Sweden, opposition against wind power 
within the US has been the focus of much of the literature, with visual and landscape concerns 
colouring negative discourse (Petrova, 2013). Notably, while wind power is framed within an 
environmental dialogue due to its non-polluting properties, it is also the environmental legal 
framework that is often used to prevent the construction of wind power. As Dinnell and Russ 
argue (2007, p. 538), environmental statutes are “formidable foes” to development projects 
such as wind power, despite its environmental benefits. Another barrier to wind power is the 
fact that within the US, wind farm regulation varies from state to state, with some states 
having no regulation at all and others leaving wind farm regulation to local governments 
through municipal or county zoning boards. As such, the focus of academic writing seems 
to be on the planning and regulation of large wind farms in particular states (Rosenberg, 
2008; Hansen, 2005). Since the US does not have any centralised regulation or authority 
designed to address wind energy, potential projects are often left to “traipse through a mire of 
local, state, and federal regulations” (Bova, 2013, p. 572). Perhaps due to this de-centralised 
framework, there is little information on the regulation of backyard wind turbine systems and 
local government involvement. However, regulatory models have been suggested to address 
this gap in the local legal framework, one suggestion being a model that allows for small wind 
turbines for accessory use in all residential zoning districts with tight regulations surrounding 
height, security, noise and appearance (Merriam, 2009, p. 309).
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5. Swedish 3G infrastructure 
Two issues relating to 3G infrastructure development reported in the academic literature 
concerned health – for example, links to electromagnetic radiation – and aesthetics or 
visual amenity. The literature is often country specific, dealing, for example, with the UK 
(Allmendinger, 2007; Drake, 2006; Walton, 2002), including Scotland (Law and McNeish, 
2007), Sweden (Larsson, 2008a; 2013; Palm & Wihlborg, 2007) and other countries. Palm and 
Wihlborg (2007) focus on the interplay between implementation and design of technological 
innovations by analysing broadband and 3G infrastructure at the local level in Sweden. The 
changing regulation is studied within the UK context (Walton, 2002), and it is argued that 
the resulting, differentiated approach to mobile phone mast control represents an early and 
important departure from what constituted a unified planning system within the United 
Kingdom. The licentiate thesis preceding this particular study (Larsson, 2008a) has summed 
up much of my previous research on Swedish 3G development. There, I studied the handling 
of sustainable development in the 3G infrastructure development in Sweden by formulating 
indicators found in the 3G case that demonstrate the handling, or non-handling, of different 
aspects relevant to sustainable development. The case of 3G development in Sweden shows 
the conflict between authoritative, scientific knowledge and local knowledge, which has 
been addressed in general by writers such as Feyerabend (1987) and Wynne (1996), and also 
addressed in this specific case by Larsson (2008a) and Larsson and Emmelin (2009). I return 
to the question of knowledge-types and rationalities in the analytic chapter below. 
5.1 FEAR OF RADIATION
Electromagnetic radiation has been a widely debated issue during the infrastructure roll-out 
in Sweden (Larsson, 2008a, pp. 80–88; Soneryd, 2007) as well as in several other countries 
such as the UK (Allmendinger, 2007; Burgess, 2004; Drake, 2006; 2011; Stilgoe, 2007) 
and Denmark (Kristiansen et al., 2009), although it has been debated differently in different 
countries (Burgess, 2002). The magnitude of the issue was not foreseen prior to the roll-out. 
There has been public debate, the media have been very much involved, non-profit organisations 
have been formed, websites established and numerous opinion articles have been produced in 
protest against 3G development in Sweden. Stilgoe (2007) analyses mobile phone health risks 
as an example of the “public understanding of science” through an explanation based around 
the coproduction of scientific and social order. Drake (2006) conducts an in-depth study into 
the attitudes and beliefs of one local protest.
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The electromagnetic radiation has been the subject of many legal processes in Swedish 
3G development, especially in regards to mast building permits, as shown in Article I (Larsson, 
2014) below. The questions have concerned whether or not the radiation is hazardous for 
residents living nearby, and in line with this, whether this worry or fear of radiation is a 
matter that can be acknowledged legally and, for instance, constitute reason to deny a building 
permit. For example, the legal decisions refer to the responsible governmental authority, the 
Radiation Protection Authority, which in June 2002 appointed an international expert group 
(Independent Expert Group on Electromagnetic Fields) to follow the ongoing scientific 
research on electromagnetic fields and its effects on human health. On 18 September 2003, 
the group presented its first report.10 In short, the experts stated that no comprehensive results 
in recent years provide any reasons to amend the risk estimates of electromagnetic radiation. 
In an extensive and comparative analysis of the precautionary principle in practice Zander 
(2010) also has studied the Swedish context and included the specific case of 3G development. 
He argues that due to the fact that the national radiation protection authority concludes that 
the radiation is not hazardous, the precautionary principle is side-lined in municipal planning.
5.2 BACKGROUND ON THE 3G DEVELOPMENT
I shall, here, merely provide a brief introduction to the 3G development, since it can be 
found in the articles below, especially Article II (Larsson, 2008b). The infrastructure for the 
third generation of mobile telephony in Sweden formally began in late 2000 as the licence 
allocation process, the so called beauty contest, came to its conclusion. Four operators were 
given licenses to build the infrastructure. Following from the promises the licence winning 
applicants had made in order to receive the licences, the operators were obliged to build 
partly competing systems within three years. The licence conditions stated that 8,860,000 
persons, at that time meaning more than 99.98 per cent of the population, were to be covered 
by 31 December 2003. The legal framework allows the responsible authorities, the Post and 
Telecommmunications Agency, the PTA, to sanction operators who have not fulfilled their 
licence conditions with a large fine. The coverage by the end of the period, however, was found 
lacking by between 34 and 26 per cent of the 8,860,000 persons, with only three remaining 
operators still participating in the development. It was not until 1 December 2006, roughly 
three years after the initial deadline for coverage reach, that the first operator reported to the 
PTA that their common net had reached the promised coverage, followed by the remaining 
two operators seven months later. 
The operators blamed a slow municipal permit handling for the delay, a reason that 
“could not have been foreseen”, which would exempt them from the PTA sanctions. The 
operator actions, the appeal of PTA decisions and the application for changes in licence 
conditions during the roll out postponed the formal deadline. This is compared in Article II 
to the PTA handling of the situation, as well as national and regional coverage data at various 
points in time, in order to see how legitimate the reasons stated by the operators were, with 
regards to the claim that the municipal permit handling processes unforeseeably slowed down 
10 Recent research on mobile telephony and cancer and other selected biological effects: First annual 
report from SSI’s independent expert group on electromagnetic fields, Dec 2003. www.ssi.se/eng-
lish/EMF_exp_Eng_2003.pdf
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the roll out (cf. Larsson, 2008a). The licentiate thesis of 2008 shows that a slow municipal 
permit process cannot explain the lack of coverage by the end of the roll out period in some 
areas of Sweden. The “regional balance” and social cohesion aspects tied to the extreme 
coverage were not implemented as designed. The market logic had been formally controlled, 
but had been applied in practice. The PTA did not sanction any operators, and operators not 
given a licence did not sue the PTA.
3G in Europe
In February 1995, following the workshop “Towards 3rd-Generation Mobile Communications 
Systems” held in Brussels, the European Commission set up the UMTS Task Force, with 
the mission to propose a Universal Mobile Telecommunications system, UMTS, strategy for 
Europe (The UMTS Task Force report 1996). UMTS is the 3G standard of choice in Europe. 
The UMTS Task Force was a high level advisory group consisting of twenty recognised persons 
from network operators, manufacturers and European regulatory authorities, appointed by the 
European Commission. The group submitted a final report on 1 March 1996, which included 
a preliminary program for developing and introducing UMTS by 2002. In December 1998, 
the European Parliament and the Council came to a decision (Nr 128/1999/EG) whereby all 
the European Union member states were to enable a coordinated and gradual introduction 
of 3G services in their respective countries, starting no later than 1 January 2002 (Lindmark 
et al., 2004, p. 315). A directive by the European Parliament and the Council (97/13/EG, 10 
April 1997) states that the member states shall grant 3G licenses on grounds that should be 
objective, non-discriminatory, specified, transparent and proportional. In article 10, section 3, 
the directive emphasises competition and benefit to the consumers, with regards to how the 
selection criteria for the licences should be organised. 
In the decision of the European parliament and the Council of 14 December 1998 (nr 
128/1999/EG), it is clear that the purpose is to facilitate a fast and coordinated construction 
of compatible UMTS-nets and services within the community. In 1998, the European 
Commission stipulated that member states reserve at least one 3G license. It was left to the 
member states to decide on the licensing terms. In practice, two main licensing formats were 
used: The auction and the “beauty contest.” In the auction system, the licenses were given 
to the highest bidders (which sometimes turned out to be sold at the minimum price, since 
participatory parties were in some cases fewer than the available licenses). In the “beauty 
contest”, the contestants could be assigned a license based on qualitative criteria. Finland, 
Ireland, and Portugal also chose the so-called beauty contest as a means to allocate the 3G 
licences. France, Spain and Norway had a form of beauty contest that has been described 
as a sale with a set price. Seven countries chose to allocate the licences through auctions 
(Hultkrantz & Nilsson 2001, p. 52). 
Legal changes prior to the infrastructure roll-out
Prior to the distribution of the licences, three main changes were made in the Telecommunications 
Act (SFS 1993:597) (replaced by the Electronic Communications Act on 25 July 2003). The 
first change, undertaken by Parliament on 8 December 1999, meant that mobile operators 
with their own infrastructure were obliged to offer net capacity to companies without an 
infrastructure of their own. The purpose was to make it possible for operators to offer mobile 
services to consumers via networks owned by other operators. Good accessibility and regional 
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balance were stressed as part of the political telecom goals (Prop. 1999/2000:1, utg. omr. 22, 
p. 92). The second change, decided on 14 April 2000, concerned the operators’ obligations to 
allow other service providers to use the infrastructure. The competitive aspects were stressed, 
stating the importance of allowing market conditions to rule (Prop. 1999/2000:57, p. 15 ff.). 
A minor change was also made at the same time to make it possible to hold a so-called beauty 
contest as a method for net capacity allocation. The third change of the Telecommunications 
Act was decided by Parliament on 14 June 2000 and concerned the fact that operators that 
owned their own network for mobile services were obliged to supply national roaming for 
other operators within their own network. National roaming can be of much assistance for 
coverage for an operator that is to establish itself at a later stage than the already existing 
operators. Thus, once again, competition aspects were stressed (Prop. 1999/2000:100, p. 129). 
The changes were in force by 1 July 2000.
Utility easement
The amendments of the Utility Easement Act (1973:1144) to include the siting of 3G masts 
marks an event during the roll-out that is of interest both concerning the tension between 
public and private interests and the perception of 3G as a joined infrastructure, as outlined in 
Article I (Larsson, 2014, pp. 172-173) and the licentiate thesis (Larsson, 2008a, pp. 49-50, 79, 
158). The law was amended during the infrastructure roll-out to explicitly include 3G masts 
from 1 August 2004 in order to “facilitate the roll-out” (Prop. 2003/04:136, pp. 9-10). Utility 
easement signifies the utilities owners’ right to use property owned by others, for example, to 
set up power lines or communication wires of public interest. 
One of the reasons for changing the law was that all of the operators had claimed that 
difficulties in attaining building permits had slowed down the roll-out (Prop. 2003/04:136, pp. 
9-10). The possibility of a utility easement decision for an operator who wished to erect a mast 
on another person’s property strengthened the operator’s position in contract negotiations with 
the landowner. The amendment can arguably also be seen as emphasising the notion of the 3G 
roll-out as a joined infrastructure as opposed to a dispersed set of singular masts. 
5.3 THE LICENCE CONDITIONS
Applications were assessed by an initial consideration in which financial capacity, technical 
and commercial feasibility and access to appropriate expertise and experience were 
investigated. At the second stage of the review, the operators were awarded points according 
to the extent and speed at which they offered coverage by the end of 2003, 2006 and 2009 (cf. 
Article II, Larsson, 2008b). Coverage was defined on the basis of three factors: Proportion 
of population, territorial coverage and distribution throughout Sweden. The applicant had to 
promise to cover 30 per cent of the populated areas of Sweden with their own coverage, and 
up to 70 per cent collectively. 
The 30 per cent self coverage obligation was a prerequisite set up by the PTA to ensure 
competition amongst the operators (PTA 22 Mar 2001, section 3.1). The licence conditions 
in themselves did not contain any sanctions for the operators should they not fulfil the 
requirements. Instead, the sanctions were expressed through a more general description in 
the legal provision controlling the PTA. According to chapter 7 section 5 of the Electronic 
Communications Act (2003:390), there was an option for the PTA to issue “such orders and 
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prohibitions as are necessary for a rectification to take place” when it came to operators not 
fulfilling the conditions bound to the 3G licence. This is of importance especially since the 
operators did not complete the coverage within the time limits of the licence conditions, 
and given that one of the operators withdrew its participation in the construction. The most 
important licence condition concerned the fact that the licence holders by 1 March 2004 at 
the latest should verify that 8,860,000 persons in Sweden were covered by 31 December 2003 
(PTA 22 Mar 2001, section 1.1.2 and 1.3.1). In regards to the starting point of a functional 
network, the licence holders were to make net capacity available by 1 January 2002 (PTA 22 
Mar 2001, section 2). Another important aspect was that the licence conditions were in force 
until 31 March 2006. After this date they could be reviewed, which they also were. 

 Law and Spatial Planning     |     57
6. Results and analysis
Since the purpose here is to better understand and explain the role of law in planning and 
environmental management, responses to the research questions will be controlled by these 
preconditions. The following chapter answers the research questions before elaborating on 
this purpose, in relation to the contribution provided by the thesis. Law is explicitly present in 
RQ1 from a structural point of view and deals with levels of governance, while RQ2 from an 
empirical and alternative (to the dogmatic perspective) point of view deals with situations in 
which siting and permit conflicts go to court. In the third RQ, the emphasis on “efficiency” is 
in relation to law in order to analyse it as an explanatory factor for some of the challenges in 
the debate surrounding “efficiency” in the implementation of these types of infrastructures. 
The responses to the research questions are closely connected to the theoretical concepts and 
the model elaborated on in chapter 3 above. Given that this is a compilation thesis, there are 
a fair amount of references to where the data and results can be found in the articles below, 
following each RQ. Subsequently, the results are recollected and further developed within the 
scope of the thesis. 
6.1 LEVELS
The issues relating to levels of governance specifically relate to the first research question 
outlined in chapter 1.2 above. The key interest lies in how to adequately reconcile the systemic 
and national with the fragmented and local, which can mean both how to establish the national 
perspective (energy type, telecom system) as relevant at the municipal level as well as how to 
include local values and individual visions into the national policies. The research question, 
however, has deliberately more of a descriptive approach in order to build support for the 
more normative statements that follow in the suggestions below for the planning legislation 
and permit system. 
• RQ1: What is the role and the practical implications of law for the tiering of the 
national to local in the planning and implementation of the cases studied?
Chapter 6.1 answers this question by referencing and elaborating on the most relevant sections 
of the articles included in the thesis. When it comes to the hierarchical issues in the studied 
cases, the question is explicitly dealt with in Article IV regarding Swedish wind power 
development, and more secondarily in the combination of Article II (national level game of 
licence conditions) and Article I (public participation and appeal of building permits) in 3G 
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development. I have also discussed the tiering issues in the licentiate thesis on 3G development 
(Larsson, 2008a) and elsewhere (Larsson, 2009b; 2011). Chapter 6.1 recollects the most 
important findings and attempts to combine them in order to find more general insights in 
infrastructure planning and implementation with regards to law and levels of governance. 
The bottom-up dependency of  dispersed national infrastructure
First of all, the so-called riksintresse, which roughly translates to “area of national interest”, 
is an instrument at the governmental level – to a disputed degree – to steer land use that 
otherwise largely falls under the local planning monopoly. The national interest areas have not 
been a prominent part of the analysis in the articles of this thesis, but the institution represents 
a somewhat contested instrument for governmental steering of local level planning, and should 
therefore be mentioned here. They address areas and interest that are of particular importance 
for preservation, and the national authorities are responsible for pointing out the national areas 
of interest in line with their respective subject areas. For example, the Swedish Energy Agency 
is responsible for selecting area of national interest for wind power. Designated national 
interest areas shall, according to chapter 3 of the Planning and Building Act (2010:900), be 
recognised and addressed in the municipal comprehensive plan. In December 2013, there 
were 310 areas of national interest for wind power, with 281 areas on land and 29 at sea and in 
lakes. The total area is 7,868 km2 and accounts for just over 1.5 per cent of the country’s land 
area, including Swedish waters.11
The problem is that there are a number of different types of area of national interest and 
combined they cover a significant part of the surface of Sweden, while also overlapping each 
other (Cars el al., 2013, p. 69). In an assessment of how the municipal authorities implement 
and handle the designated areas of national interest, it is argued that they are so vague, poorly 
described or out of date that they cannot function as support for planning (SKL, 2011, p. 2). 
Critics claim that the system of designating area of national interest does not work (Cars et al., 
2013; SKL, 2011; cf. Petersson Forsberg, 2012, pp. 98-100). 
Wind power development represents an inherent conflict between the national and local 
level in which the local decisions will cumulatively determine whether a national political 
objective can be reached or not. This begs the crucial question of how to balance management 
of spatial planning in which one key lies in the legitimacy of centrally governed developments 
that are dependent on local implementation. The bottom-up dependency of this particular type 
of infrastructural implementation is emphasised in a study on local involvement in wind power 
development in North Rhine-Westphalia, where Breukers (2010) discusses the importance of 
understanding the perspective of social acceptance in order to be able to properly assess the 
conditions for implementation: 
Implementation achievements cannot be explained with reference to technological, 
economic, or climatological conditions only. These conditions are no indication of 
the capacity that will be realised, for that depends on the motivation to invest in 
the technology, as well as on social acceptance of wind projects (Breukers, 2010, 
p. 38). 
11 According to the Swedish Energy Agency, http://www.energimyndigheten.se/Om-oss/
Var-verksamhet/Framjande-av-vindkraft/Riksintresse-vindbruk-/ [last visited 4 August 2014]. 
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Hindmarsh and Matthews (2008, p. 218) state that “the key problem for wind energy 
expansion is socio-political. Wind is confronted by a maze of inconsistent state, federal, and 
local government policy positions and planning approval processes that also direct community 
consultation processes.” Article IV below (Larsson et al., 2014) to a large extent deals with the 
so-called municipal veto right in Swedish wind power regulation; that is, that the municipality 
in which a planned wind power turbine is located has to approve the project when it is applied 
for at the regional county council. This right can be seen as a compromise in lawmaking in the 
major revision of 2009. Originally, the municipalities were not intended to have this influence 
in the regional environmental assessment, but it was added during the five months following 
the preparatory bill to the final legal proposal. The results indicate that various parties 
perceive the municipal veto differently. Interestingly enough, as indicated in the consultation 
documentation, concerned citizens tend to want municipalities to assume a greater role in 
the process, even when the process is mainly located at the regional level. The wind-power 
companies tend to regard the veto as an instrument that increases uncertainty and makes it 
harder to foresee the outcome of the permit processes. Wind power, as with many national 
policies that have clear local environmental and spatial implications when implemented, 
becomes in essence a different issue at the various levels. People may agree upon the need for 
renewable energy as a general, abstract goal, but not necessarily that the actual wind turbines 
should affect their local landscape.
If we compare to the large scale telecom infrastructure of 3G, it likely means a balancing 
of partly conflicting goals at the national central level. In the Swedish 3G development, 
the competitive aspects were centrally emphasised at the national level alongside regional 
development, in a decision based on a strong belief in the technology and its benefits for 
both social cohesion and growth. The environmental impact of four, partly differing, physical 
infrastructures was never assessed, however, which entails that the sustainable development 
management in the 3G decision is distorted by the fact that the ecological dimension remained 
unhandled at a central level, and was allocated downward to be handled in local building 
permit assessments, as well as in the regional “natural impact” assessment of the 12:6 
consultations. This means that the vertical dimension remains un-tiered, since the extreme 
coverage requirements and rapid roll out speed pressured the municipal handling system, and 
to some extent undermined the local planning monopoly. In Article II (Larsson, 2008a), we 
see that coverage by the end of the first licence period (31 December 2003) was significantly 
lower than the promised coverage, at between 66 per cent and 74 per cent of the promised 
8,860,000 population coverage, with only three of four remaining operators continuing in the 
development of the infrastructure. It would take three to four more years for the operators to 
reach the promised coverage. The municipal permit processing was blamed for the delay, a 
reason that remarkably was considered as “could not have been foreseen”, and which helped 
the operators avoid sanctions from the responsible agency (Article II, Larsson, 2008a; 2008b). 
A perhaps surprising feature was that environmental aspects were not handled at the national 
level but assessed locally in the building permit process, as well as in the regional 12:6 
consultations within the county council boards (Emmelin & Söderblom, 2002). This is why 
the municipal permit process holds many of the keys regarding environmental management 
and planning, and why the design has been criticised for its lack of comprehensive assessment 
(Emmelin and Lerman, 2004, pp. 78-79; Larsson, 2008a, pp. 128-131).
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One point, from the perspective of infrastructure planning, would be that different types 
of infrastructures might cause differences in what constitutes the most reasonable method of 
organisation from a developmental and implementational perspective. Wind power and mobile 
infrastructure are not physically and spatially linked or as rigid as is transport infrastructure. 
Wind turbines are dependent on being sited where wind conditions are adequate, while 3G 
infrastructure needs to be more rigidly and evenly distributed, albeit with a focus on where the 
services are most needed. 
“About” or “for” wind power development?
The Environment Process Investigation’s report (for legal revision in the wind permit process) 
underscores the importance of a comprehensive plan, and during 2007 and 2008 it was 
possible for municipalities to apply for planning grants in order to improve these plans. My 
report from 2009 describes how several experts bear witness to many shortcomings in the 
current status of the municipal comprehensive plans (Larsson, 2009b). The experts stated that 
the comprehensive plan instrument in practice failed to live up to its expectations – at least 
at that point in time. Whether planning grants for comprehensive plans for wind power, for 
instance, lead to increased development of wind power in the country’s municipalities or solely 
to “clarify the preconditions”, as the regulation stipulates (2007:160), is up for debate. It is 
claimed that the comprehensive plan, in practice, generally has not attained the importance 
that was initially intended in The Planning and Building Act, which is particularly visible in 
the fact that many municipalities have not updated their comprehensive plan for far too long 
(Emmelin, in press; cf. Larsson, 2009b, and the interviews presented in the report). Seen from 
a Foucauldian power perspective, when it comes to the issue of who governs over land and 
environment, one might raise the question of whether increased state funds for such a targeted 
development constitute a way of circumventing the planning monopoly. The impression, then, 
is that it (too) creates political pressure on the municipalities to abide by national policy. The 
intent is, of course, perceived as necessary: to increase wind use and decrease, for example, 
nuclear power dependency, but it simultaneously highlights the who-question, the issue of 
who should decide over land and environment planning. Should the development consist of 
a dependence on local decision-making and planning, as tradition has emphasised, or is it 
preferably forged through centralised expert decision? In the background looms a classic legal 
sociological dilemma pertaining to legitimacy and potential problems in the wake of top-down 
management. 
Summing up results on RQ1 from papers and licentiate thesis
• The (national and local) levels interact or communicate poorly. The national 
decisions, irrespective of the normative viewpoint of who should control the 
landscape planning, could be better informed of the preconditions at the local 
level that factually define the outcome of the implementation. 
• The municipal 3G mast permit processing was blamed for the delay of the 
infrastructure development for being a reason that was claimed “could not have 
been foreseen.” This played an essential role in allowing the operators to avoid 
sanctions from the responsible national agency, the PTA.
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• Regarding the 3G infrastructure, in many parts of Sweden it is highly unlikely 
that municipal decision-making was the cause of delays in the process. The 
applications arrived late and were often of low quality or incomplete.
• In a multi-levelled system, the local decisions will cumulatively determine to 
what extent national policy-making objectives can be reached or not. Local 
decision-making, however, tends not to be assessed when national policy is 
drafted. 
6.2 KNOWLEDGE-TYPES AND PARTICIPATION
The knowledge-types and rationalities in legally controlled decision-making are dealt 
with primarily in Article I, with regards to both the appeals of building permits and fears 
of electromagnetic radiation in 3G development, and Article III, on wind power permit 
appeal and the role of the municipality in the governmental strive for efficiency in national 
implementation. The thesis is particularly attentive to understanding the role of law in 
infrastructure planning, which here includes how law functions as a filter for what values, 
experiences and types of knowledge (or knowledges, in plural, as in Rydin, 2007) that prevail 
in shaping the grounds for decisions. The explicit research question was accounted for in 
chapter 1.2 as: 
• RQ2: How does juridification of siting and permit conflicts determine what type 
of knowledge that can legitimately affect the decision-making and thereby set 
conditions for participation?
While juridification and legitimacy are somewhat commonplace as analytical concepts in 
socio-legal research, participation and knowledge-types are emerging more often in planning 
relevant studies. The thesis has studied these aspects in two legal forms, where one constitutes 
the formative and national perspective on the legislature and concerns how law is revised, 
developed and implemented, and the other constitutes the judiciary system that concerns 
– primarily – how the courts rule in the appealed permit cases. How public participation 
is handled in decision-making and planning is also of clear relevance, which also links to 
expert and lay knowledge and the representation of these types in formal decision-making. A 
perspective brought up in literature on the aspects of the control of who may appeal, for what 
reason and so on, which can be seen as an expression of administrative power, is also relevant 
here. For example, a common occurrence among private individuals in both the 3G as well 
as the wind power case is to object to more than just single mast and turbine establishments. 
A broad take on wind power development, at least, is supported by Ellis et al. (2007, p. 521), 
who contends that ‘‘the key issues facing wind farm development are not ‘objective’ policy 
blockages, but clashes of values related to inter alia, governance, technology, landscape 
aesthetics, issues of participation and power inequalities.” 
Ellis et al. (2007, p. 535) further argue that previous research in wind power planning 
has focused almost exclusively on the objectors: ‘‘the way in which support is constructed has 
been rather neglected.” Their study provides an insightful account of the divergent views of 
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both the objectors and supporters and highlights the numerous, and often conflicting beliefs, 
experiences or values which influence and shape individuals’ attitudes towards particular 
wind power developments, and to wind power in general. This is also in line with the notion 
of steering towards “acceptance.” This is evident not least in, for example, Wizelius’ (2007) 
procedural advice which stresses the importance of not having any formal meetings with 
municipalities at an early stage in a wind power development process, because this would 
risk leaking information of such a development and thereby contribute to a negative attitude 
from the supposedly excluded and alienated local population. This perspective is also present 
in Klintman and Waldo’s advice, suggesting that an establishment preferably “should not be 
presented as a yes/no question (and neither as an already settled yes-issue). It is better to 
present a couple of alternatives that the public and other parties may respond to and perhaps 
elaborate” (2008, p. 49). Here, the researchers offer insights on methods to encourage 
concerned people toward a more positive stance on wind power development, presented as a 
technique for how to frame a particular siting.
The legislature and “municipal values”
From a legal perspective, it is of interest to see what rationalities or types of knowledge come 
to be represented in the legal revisionary process. In the Environment Process Investigation’s 
preparatory legal work from 2008, there is a clear centralistic notion concerning who should 
set the agenda for the Swedish wind power development. They see problems with the fact that 
“municipal values” may be affecting the implementation of wind power: 
...there is a risk that an extensive use of the detailed development plan instrument 
will mean that wind power development in Sweden will depend on different 
municipal values of what is regarded as appropriate in the particular municipality 
and that wind power will not be developed in the areas that from an objective 
perspective are seen are the most suitable (SOU 2008:86 p. 229).
This succinctly expresses the paradigmatic conflict between a central policy based on 
calculating rationality and the local, political power over the landscape (cf. chapter 2.4). 
The proposal that laid the ground for the following legal revisions reveals a quite centralistic 
and expert-based perspective on how the development of wind power should be handled. 
The “objective perspective”, for example, does not include opinions, political stances or any 
participatory values, but solely wind measurement. This means that the discussions concerning 
efficiency in the planning and permit systems seem to be based mainly in a perception of 
local planning processes and the right to appeal permit decisions as technical obstacles to the 
implementation of a national development – be it reaching politically set goals for wind power 
or administratively determined modes of coverage for mobile telephony.
The Environmental Process Investigation expresses its stance in this paradigmatic 
conflict extremely distinctly in claiming that the municipalities’ involvement in the licensing 
process is problematic within the context of wind power development, as quoted above. The 
approach of the calculative environmentalist paradigm expresses that “municipal evaluations” 
risk being an obstacle to wind power development at the “objectively perceived” most 
favourable sites. An inherent problem with such policy goals is that their emergence and 
origins do not lie in an assessment of what can reasonably be achieved within the framework 
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of a planning system that extends deep into the local context. The starting point is not to first 
test the realism of an objective based in the system’s preconditions and its principles as much 
as for the processes to remain legally secure. Problems such as the abovementioned arise in 
what planners may call tiering problems, i.e., the entirety is not level-coherent, and the parts 
do not fit together. A decision is made at an overall national level that the authorities and the 
public are then left to sort out as best they can at a local level. From that perspective, top-down 
requests may easily arise for local and regional processes to, at least, not stand in the way of, 
or constitute any obstacle to, the objectives that have been decided nationally. The Swedish 3G 
expansion is a good example of this. Similar developments have been noted regarding wind 
power in Great Britain where governmental and industrial goals for solving the “planning 
problem” have emerged, aided by strengthened national control (Cowell, 2007).
Public participation
From a relatively straightforward perspective of whose knowledge, rather than what knowledge, 
various aspects of how public participation is handled is of interest. In Article I (Larsson, 
2014), I show how different types of knowledge are perceived as legitimate at different levels 
in the planning system, regarding the Swedish 3G development. 
The right to appeal is one of the most important means for taking part and having a say 
in both cases studied for this thesis. It also serves as a protective mechanism for individual 
rights from overly far-reaching governmental expropriation in the name of public interest. 
This right to appeal is tied to the “concerned party” to the actual mast or wind turbine 
permit process. This rather fundamental right risks being eroded if appeals never change the 
outcomes of the permit process. This has been called a “token participation” (Evans-Cowley 
& Hollander, 2010). I further address this in Article I, regarding 3G mast permits and appeals 
from concerned people, in relation to the governing administrations: 
Are they, to use the title of the Conrad et al. (2011) article, ‘Hearing but not 
listening’? In that case it risks looking like a right, without functioning as one, 
and the already taken decision to roll out infrastructure for an extreme mobile 
coverage may end up in a top-down information strategy aiming at only convincing 
the public that the decision is for the best—as a ‘token participation’ (Article I, 
Larsson, 2014, p. 176).
Bell et al. (2005, p. 463) have noted; ‘‘[t]he structure of the planning system may encourage 
‘oppositional’ participation but planning policy and government support for wind energy may 
make successful opposition increasingly difficult.” The question of public participation raises 
the efficiency dilemma once again in the sense that it asks what type of planning we prefer. A 
communicative, participatory approach may be time consuming from an efficiency perspective, 
but it may also lead to consensus and “good planning” from an efficiency perspective. 
The judiciary: Courts and the selection of  knowledge
The radiation issue in 3G development is particularly lucid from the perspective of what 
constitutes knowledge and how courts distinguish between expert knowledge and lay opinion. 
The centralised decision of how radiation should be taken into account in 3G infrastructure 
development is instrumentally rationalistic and calculating, as concluded in Article I:
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From this perspective the issue of whether or not the public fears the radiation 
is irrelevant. From this perspective the public should not fear the radiation, since 
expert judgment claims that it is not hazardous (Article I, Larsson, 2014, p. 177).
Questions of who should decide and based on which knowledge are closely related to issues 
of legitimacy. The investigation included the issue of controversial factors in the license 
and appeals processes, and parallels to 3G development can be drawn advantageously here. 
At the same time, one might question the legally drawn boundaries and how the affected 
individuals perceive these. The relation between that which disturbs and worries the public 
and scientific perceptions of the problem is interesting. In the case of 3G, we have the example 
of electromagnetic radiation which many people expressed concerned for and perceived as 
a potential hazard. This also lay at the root of relatively many appeals filed against building 
permits (see Larsson 2008, pp. 80-87, 143-147, Larsson, 2009b). Noise pollution from 
wind power plants is probably less of an issue from a scientific point of view than from the 
complainants’, and there are therefore some similarities to 3G. None of the respondents bring 
up the issue of infrasound from wind power as a matter of any particular controversy. Very few 
legal cases in higher instances mention infrasound in their assessments.
Aitken (2009) analyses the scope for non-experts to influence decision-making, 
including how the planning process structures relations between “lay” and “expert” roles. 
Wynne (1992) demonstrates the value of local lay knowledge and expertise, which according 
to Aitken (2009, p. 50) typically is given a marginal role in decision-making in scientific or 
technical issues: 
It is ... interesting to consider the role of public involvement in planning processes 
for wind power developments. In particular it is worth questioning the role played 
by lay knowledge in policy decisions. Planning policy statements and guidelines 
typically highlight the important contribution of the public and the need to reflect 
public interests. However, this paper demonstrates that planning policy limits 
the contribution of the public in decision-making and therefore the role that lay 
knowledge can play (Aitken, 2009, p. 54).
Soneryd (2007, p. 4), in a study on public deliberations in Swedish 3G development, argues 
that “[t]he boundaries between ‘uncertain’ and reliable knowledge are drawn in negotiations 
that take place in hybrid science-policy “communities.” Furthermore, my analysis (Article 
I, Larsson, 2014) of the sample of 248 building permit processes in Blekinge on 3G masts 
suggests that even if there were tendencies towards a more deliberative approach at a local 
level that also included fears of electromagnetic radiation, the “juridification” of a permit 
conflict that emerged when a permit was given and appealed meant that an appeal hardly 
ever led to a permit being revoked, irrespective of the reason. Of the 37 appeals raised by 
neighbours or other non-operators, only one finally led to a permit being denied (Larsson, 
2014, p. 174). 
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These [deliberative] features fade, however, as the appeals reach the higher courts, 
and the ‘black box’ of law closes in on the decision making and expert knowledge 
takes over as the more heavily weighted knowledge (Article I, Larsson, 2014, p. 
178).
Article III, in general, deals with the horisontal axis of the model – the knowledge-types and 
rationalities at play in wind power development in Sweden, with particular focus on the legal 
side. The wind power case displays a number of interesting features along the axis of calculative 
and communicative rationalities. As mentioned above, the common complaints and objections 
are related to noise, decreased property values, effects on tourism, environmental concerns 
for example regarding birds and bats, but also visual and aesthetical concerns (Agterbosch et 
al., 2007; Strachan and Lal, 2004; Toke, 2005; Wolsink, 2000). Common among the analysed 
cases from southern Sweden was the concern for noise, various fears, concerning for example 
the aesthetic effects of an erected wind turbine or plant on the area, and also for property 
values.
Noise, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, upsets many people. And the 
issue of noise is particularly interesting here, because the court cases reveal a constant battle 
surrounding threshold values, what they mean, to what extent they constitute guidelines or 
absolute rules, who has assessed the expected noise levels for the particular turbine that is to be 
erected and even how the models for measurement are constructed, as in one case in Tomelilla 
(M3665-10, LEC 26 November, 2011) or another case from Linderödsåsen in Kristianstad, 
where the resident plaintiffs in the area used a research report from Aalborg University to 
support their claims on the unreliability of noise measurements (M 1492-11, LEC 30 January 
2012). The expert judge in the Land and Environment Court of Appeals (LECA), i.e. the 
“supreme court” of these types of cases, raised objections to how people, municipalities and 
even lower courts exaggerate the importance of drawing exact borders in terms of decibel 
levels, and authoritarian definitions of what level should govern. The LECA judge claimed 
the assessment to be much broader than such a narrow and singular attribute allowed for, 
where the noise issue was only one of several aspects to take into account. Interestingly, 
however, irrespective of this dogmatically holistic perspective – which by legal standards is 
correct, since the highest courts set precedential standards on a number of issues – from 
a wider empirical perspective, the issue nevertheless remains present; people, companies, 
municipalities and lower courts, in practice, continue to handle the issue of noise as a sort of 
scientific threshold value. 
People’s perception of what seems relevant is by no means necessarily mirrored in what 
the court finds to be of relevance for its decision-making on permits. For example, on the 
issues of property values and how property owners feared value would decrease if wind power 
turbines were erected, often an anxiety emerges that can be seen in appeal cases as well as in 
the consultation documentation from the environmental examinations by the county councils. 
The expert judge of the Land and Environment Court (LEC), which is the first appeal court, 
expressed bluntly, following the decision in the county council that “we do not take that issue 
into account.” 
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The role of birds and bats, particularly nesting sites for raptors, indicates a strong 
argument in opposition to turbine permits. The LEC expert judge expresses this as “eagle 
owls, bats and eagles are very much taken into account.” This is seen, for example, in the 
debate of to what extent a wind turbine establishment in Hallabjär, Kristianstad, would be 
inappropriate due to the presence of a “very rare bat” – Barbastella Barbastellus (Case M 
2687-12, LEC 18 December 2012). Another example of strategic formation of argumentation 
can be exemplified by the Linderödsåsen case mentioned above: 
The golden eagle is probably not nesting in the area yet, but the nearest known 
breeding site is only a few kilometers away and a new establishment of territory is 
to be expected if the area remains undisturbed (M 1492-11, LEC 30 January 2012).
Or, as argued for by plaintiffs in a case from Helsingborg: “[t]he golden eagle and the eagle 
owl is about to be established in the area” (Case M 1180-11, LEC 1 March 2012). 
Appeal, control and power 
Interestingly enough, not least from a socio-legal perspective, is Aitken’s et al. (2007) 
suggestion that the planning appeals process, through various means, serves an implicit role in 
controlling democratic processes and can be taken to represent an exercise in “social control” 
by steering how, and according to what standards, citizens may engage and participate. Social 
control is also the terminology used by Ellickson, which has influenced many studies on 
behaviour and normativity (cf., Svensson, 2013; Svensson & Larsson, 2012). For example, a 
central, relevant consideration for Aitken et al. (2008) is how a particular individual or group 
can be perceived to possess (or not possess) power.
Some of the appealed cases for wind turbines reveal a mismatch between the courts’ 
(regulated) unwillingness to let the plaintiffs speak for a wider context against the infrastructure 
development and what are described as “concerned parties” (see Article III below). This can 
be problematic, as noted in Article I below, with regards to 3G development: 
The mast-by-mast participation in the case of 3G development in Sweden can be 
analysed in relation to public participation and its legal formalisation. In relation to 
a wider context, the single-case participation may bypass participation in solving 
problems of a more structural character. And some issues in the case of 3G are of 
a structural nature: many have protested against the rollout as a whole, which is 
tied to the extreme coverage of the infrastructure, and its landscape impact and the 
feared hazardousness of the radiation. It is safe to say that many of those protesting 
have wished for more scope to participate and affect the infrastructure roll-out, far 
beyond the individual cases (Article I, Larsson 2014, p. 177).
This is one way in which the formal legal system structures and controls the possibilities 
for participation and opposition. Aitken et al. (2008, p. 794) address Lukes’ (1974 (2004)) 
definition of the three-dimensional view of power which acknowledges the power to shape 
people’s beliefs and ideologies. There is a systemic constraint that moulds the objectors’ 
beliefs of what constitutes “appropriate” objections set out in the planning system: 
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Clear boundaries exist as to what is acceptable and admissible within the inquiry 
and arguments that fall outside of these boundaries are simply dismissed. However, 
such boundaries do not exist naturally but rather are constructed and reinforced 
within each inquiry (Aitken et al., 2008, p. 793; cf. Wynne 1982). 
Furthermore, as stated by Aitken et al. (2008, p 793), inquiries maintain legitimacy by creating 
the illusion of being objective “fact-finding” exercises; however, this illusion conceals a 
number of subjective value judgements, which are necessary in order to reach a decisive 
outcome (Wynne 1982, O’Riordan et al. 1988). With regards to how the law determines what 
is relevant knowledge for the decisions in permit applications, the complainant is allowed only 
to represent their affiliation to a property: 
…the need to present their arguments in the appropriate language and within the 
boundaries of acceptability defined by public inquiry structures. Such observations 
resonate with Wynne’s (1982) assertion that the public inquiry can be taken to 
represent an exercise in social control whereby individuals must express themselves 
in accordance with accepted knowledge or be categorised as irrational. In this case 
study it became clear that witnesses who could not back up their evidence with 
‘reliable’ data or scientific reasoning were discredited as illegitimate and as having 
little to contribute to the inquiry process (Aitken, 2009, p. 62).
This also justifies practices which clearly differentiate between expert and lay knowledges, 
as if each existed a priori. However, there is also evidence in the sample of wind turbine 
appeal cases that the plaintiffs formulate their arguments based on a notion of what constitutes 
winning concepts. 
The judge in the Land and Environment Court stated that plaintiffs seemed to “throw in” 
narratives of nesting eagles, eagle owls living in the area or the importance of bats in the area of 
testing. Several of the appeal cases indicate this too. Toke (2005a, p. 1528) also observes that, 
‘‘one should be wary of associating such linguistic judgements (which are made to fit in with 
planning law) with ‘real’ factors which will motivate people to oppose wind power schemes.” 
It is likely, in agreement with my observation at the seminar on wind power noise mentioned 
in the introduction of the thesis, that people have all sorts of driving-forces and emotional 
responses to planned wind turbine establishments, but when facing the legal administrative 
system in appeal cases, the concerns are voiced in a more strategic manner. This could also 
be related to the NIMBY-issue, where Esaiasson (forthcoming 2014) has experimentally 
shown NIMBY to be a driver for protest also regarding wind power establishment, while 
simultaneously being a motive that is overlaid with more altruistic arguments, contradicting 
what Wolsink (2000) has described as the “NIMBY-myth” in wind power. 
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Summing up RQ2
• There is a legal-rhetorical adaptation to the expert-based decision-making in 
court;
• A common cause in the case of 3G, among several, for appeals was fear of, or 
concern for, possible hazards of electromagnetic radiation; 
• In court, the radiation issue was clearly handled from an expert perspective 
stating that the electromagnetic radiation is not hazardous, and therefore that the 
citizens’ “ought not” fear it;
• In the appeals, verdicts indicate that the plaintiffs formulate their arguments 
based on a notion of what constitutes winning arguments, as opposed to the 
concerns that might be the actual, underlying driving force for objections; 
• However, the citizen plaintiffs tend to make broader arguments (i.e. for the area 
etc.) than the court accepts their role to consist of, which they tend to link to 
being concerned property owners.
6.3 ON EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS
As mentioned in the introduction, aspects of efficiency in terms of speed are a common call 
in infrastructure developments. The UK Renewable Energy Strategy (2009, p. 14) promised 
a “swifter delivery” for wind power development (McKay, 2014, p. 4). It was emphasised 
in the Swedish 3G development, where the municipalities were blamed for delays, and it is 
continuously repeated in the Swedish wind power implementation and a key reason for the 
legal revisions that came into force in 2009, as I have shown above. In line with this, it is 
appropriate to address what we actually wish the review and planning system to achieve. 
• RQ3: What are the results of the strong emphasis on “efficiency” in the planning 
and permit processes for wind power and 3G-infrastructure and what can be 
learnt from the experiences of the attempts at increasing efficiency?
The necessity of efficiency and speedy permit trials are emphasised from the policy-making 
perspective in both 3G and wind power development in Sweden. This emphasis, as it has played 
out, can be seen as an attempt to control the infrastructure implementation from a centralist 
and national perspective, arguably at the loss of local and municipal impact. Furthermore, this 
emphasis on formalising quicker processes may also be studied from the perspective of there 
often being a difference between the formal side and what is played out in practice. 
What is considered efficient depends on how “efficiency” is defined. One way to refine 
the debate surrounding calls for efficiency is exemplified in discussions within planning 
literature concerning the terms “efficiency” and “effectiveness” (Emmelin, 2006; Hilding-
Rydevik, 2006; Törnqvist, 2006). These may be divided into the aspect of speed on the one 
hand and the quality of the process on the other. “Efficiency” could thereby be referred to as 
following goal-rationality, whereas “effectiveness” follows process-rationality. An underlying 
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assumption in the cases studied here seems to be to translate efficiency to speed. If one were 
to include a concept such as “democratically justified” within the definition of efficiency, 
the task would become more complex – and interesting. Here, one could of course argue 
that the democratic aspects are sufficiently included through being represented by elected 
professionals, primarily at national and municipal levels, but also at the regional level. On the 
other hand, one could argue that representative democracy is a weak form of democracy and an 
unsuitable tool for reaching justified and balanced decisions in very local landscape matters. 
This could be related to the new localism reaction in the UK which expresses a concern for the 
lack of citizen involvement in political life (Corry and Stoker, 2002; Pratchett, 2004). Another 
challenge to the representation argument is that some issues that actually deal with political 
acts of balancing develop into technocratic decision-making as a result of features embedded 
in the legal processes. 
From purpose to consequences
Any legislative action has a manifest purpose, be it to reduce crime, pollution or to stimulate a 
creative sector. This purpose is often quite clearly expressed in preparatory work, in directives 
for the task force preparing the texts or in the initiatives taken early in the legal revisionary 
process. The manifest purpose of the revisions of relevance for the Swedish wind power 
development that entered into force in 2009 can be studied in the supplementary directives 
for the so-called Environmental Process Investigation, which states that “[t]he purpose of 
the review will be to identify the need for regulatory changes that facilitate the continued 
expansion of wind power in accordance with established goals while environmental objectives 
are to be achieved…” (dir. 2007:184, see SOU 2008:86, p. 321). The purpose is further 
clarified through the proposals from the investigation that “should mean that the permit 
processing is coordinated and allows for a more transparent and temporally shorter and more 
efficient handling, while the trial at the same time should remain diligent and in accordance 
with the rule of law.” They are also emphasized in the proposals following (SOU 2008:86) 
which state that the background is a “demand for a faster and easier process from design to 
erection of a wind turbine in conjunction with a planned greatly expanded wind energy use” 
(SOU 2008:86, p. 13). Consequently, in the governmental bill following the proposal, it is 
stressed that “it is important that the handling processes become simpler and more efficient” 
(Prop. 2008/09: 146, p. 18), but the bill also stresses that the purpose, here, is to achieve the 
set objectives of the planned goals for wind power, and to reduce the climate impact of energy 
use in order to “facilitate the transition to an ecologically sustainable society” (p. 17). It is 
also here that municipal influence is accentuated through the municipal approval that has been 
called a “municipal veto”, as a direct response to critique of the foregoing proposal. 
Speed, efficiency and rule of law are emphasised as manifest purposes. In light of this 
it is, of course, of interest to note to what extent the manifest purpose is fulfilled, and to 
what extent latent functions of the legal revisions emerge, that is, consequences that were not 
foreseen but emerge as a direct consequence of the regulatory reform. The legal revisions for 
wind power development that entered into force in August 2009 contained threshold values, 
based on the height and number of turbines, for when the permit process is to be initiated as 
a municipal building permit and when it is to be initiated as an environmental permit at the 
regional county council. Since 2009, the environmental permit process must be conducted 
by the county council when two or more turbines are taller than 150 meters, or seven or 
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more plants are taller than 120 meters. Under these limits, it is sufficient for notifications and 
building permits to be managed at the municipality level. As outlined in Article IV below, the 
results indicate that the industry sees the “veto” as leading to problematic uncertainty in the 
process at a regional level and, therefore, prefer to keep the applications at a level that entitles 
them to use the municipal handling system – which is determined by height and number of 
turbines – a consequence contrary to the aims of the legal commission when revising the legal 
system.
Efficient or effective wind planning?
Much of the Environmental Process Investigation’s mission lay in “effectivising” the wind 
power review, which is goal-oriented in the sense that the process leading to increased wind 
power development and the fulfilment of planning objectives is emphasised. However, the 
intent of this effectivisation is not as obvious, aside from there having been – and continuing 
to be – a politically grounded wish to speed the review up, which is expressed in the 
investigation’s amendment directive. 
One interesting problem concerning potential development delays caused by permit 
processes is what they are compared to when making claims about the length of the process. 
As far as wind power development is concerned, many concerned parties claim that the 
total review process is too lengthy. This applies particularly to developers and the Energy 
Agency, and the main point of The Environment Process Investigation with regards to wind 
power therefore also concerns “effectivising” wind power development. The majority of the 
concerned parties, however, would appear to agree that the process could be improved, without 
being in agreement on how. Some feel that the issue is a matter of the reviewing authorities’ 
resources, others that the role played by appellations in the process should not be exaggerated. 
3G – blaming local decision-making for delay
On a similar note regarding time-frames and speedy implementation schemes, the 3G 
development in Sweden put much pressure on local decision-making concerning building 
permits for antennas and masts. The argument that municipal planning was an obstacle 
to rapid development was voiced at a very early stage of the development with limited, 
actual evidence. In the licentiate thesis (Larsson, 2008a), I showed that this argument was, 
at least partly, wrong. For example, a majority consisting of 61 per cent (122 of 201) of 
the municipalities that answered the questionnaire of 2 April 2003 did not receive a single 
building permit application for 3G base stations with antenna during the first three years of 
implementation (there are 290 municipalities in the entire country). In fact, only about one 
fourth of the municipalities received more than two permit applications during the first of the 
initial three years of infrastructure implementation (2001). This led to a significant element of 
the roll out; it reached the municipalities with a slow start. For example, only one building 
SHUPLWIRUD*PDVWZDVDSSOLHGIRULQ%OHNLQJHGXULQJWKHÀUVWRI WKHWKUHH\HDUV 
This means that municipal planning is in fact not an obstacle but was a very convenient excuse 
for the operators to evade the commitments made in the licensing process at the height of the 
IT-bubble. Furthermore, the data shows that in a large number of cases, delays were caused by 
incomplete applications. 
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Public participation as inefficiency
There have been many attempts to increase citizen engagement in spatial planning practice 
(Arnstein, 1969; Leino and Laine, 2011; cf. Article I, Larsson, 2014). The majority of 
such approaches discuss intensifying participation in terms of a higher degree of citizen 
empowerment. The famous “ladder of citizen participation” by Arnstein (1969) became a 
very influential basis to measure the degree of empowerment (Leino and Laine, 2011). As 
Arnstein shows, citizen participation reflects the level of control afforded to participants, 
ranging from feedback-only options to interactive, participatory self-determination. Further, 
Arnstein discussed the the difference between the “empty ritual” and “having the real power 
needed to affect the outcome of the process” (Arnstein 1969, p. 216). Important factors that 
influence the acceptance and support of public participation are personal characteristics such 
as education or age, but also the involvement of citizens in their neighbourhood, trust in the 
agency and previous experience of citizen participation (Putnam, 1995; Dekker, 2006).
The argument here is that an interesting issue pertaining to Swedish wind power 
development concerns the tension between national decisions of a strategic nature on the 
development of this particular energy type, the local implementation and the approaches 
towards citizen participation that this displays. As Larsson and Emmelin have noted (2009), 
this is comparable to similar structural challenges found in the Swedish development of 
3G-infrastructure for mobile telephony (Larsson, 2014). In Article I below, I discuss the 
dilemma that public participation poses to a centralistic development perspective: 
From a development perspective, public participation becomes nothing more 
than an irritating element and an obstruction to the roll-out. The result of such 
an approach is that the issues that are most important to the public are likely to 
be bulldozed over, and the result can be perceived reduced legitimacy of the legal 
order, which in some cases have lead to dismantled masts and sabotaged sites, in 
the case of 3G development in Sweden (Larsson, 2014, p. 177).
One reason for why the topic of “efficiency” in planning is interesting is in part because it is 
part of the balancing of levels in the governance system. If local decision-making is to be a 
strong factor in land-use planning, it has to entail that it is less controllable from a national 
implementation perspective. You cannot reasonably have a swift implementation of national 
policy on physical infrastructure and at the same time allocate the planning powers to the local 
level. In such cases, the local level must have the freedom to not streamline their land-use 
in line with the national infrastructure implementation, and may even have the right to plan 
against it. This is also one of the reasons that pro-implementation legislation to some extent 
needs to be masked by the policy-maker to avoid local level protests. Local level protests are 
the factor that seem to have led to the insertion of the so-called municipal veto into Swedish 
wind power permit regulation (Prop 2008/09: 146, pp. 39-40). On the other hand, the reduction 
of local power was not very well masked in the original proposal for legal revision.
The broader issues of the multiple roles and tasks of planning and permit systems 
do not seem to enter into these discussions. The search for efficiency may lead to lowered 
effectiveness – the democratic legitimacy of a governance system is an inherent component 
of its effectiveness. This is also the case in what Lundquist (2004) terms “environmentally 
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rational governance” where criteria for local involvement and democratic decision-making 
– as opposed to technocratic policymaking – are central. What is presented as technical 
and legal issues of clearing up inefficiencies are in fact major shifts in the power over the 
landscape from the local level to the national, with a shift also from political deliberation to 
decision making by courts and administrative agencies. The attitude of the Energy Agency 
in stressing local understanding and acceptance of wind power development, as opposed to 
local self-determination over the landscape, is consistent with this. One risk is that of lessened 
public legitimacy for national developments. McLaren Loring shows in a study on wind power 
in England, Wales and Denmark that projects with a higher degree of participatory planning 
are more likely to be successful due to their public acceptance (McLaren Loring 2007). This 
risk is further emphasised by Wolsink’s conclusions, who states: “Hence, for wind power, 
local involvement to represent the local values of site-specific landscapes is crucial” (Wolsink 
2007). This can be compared to Cowell’s (2007) studies of why certain states are inclined to 
resolve “the planning problem” for wind through strengthened national control, where spatial 
planning has been a method to avoid conflicts and more sensibly and deliberatively steer wind 
power toward areas of less conflict.
Further, it should be clarified that there may be a contradiction inherent in a speedy 
process and a good process. Reasonably, there is a lower limit to how much the review process 
may be reduced before it begins to lose the qualities pertaining to, for instance, participation 
and legal certainty, which are vital ingredients in our planning tradition and within our legal 
system. Henecke and Khan confirm this contradiction:
…the problems of introducing genuine civic participation in spatial planning is 
largely based in the fact that it conflicts with the parallel goal of achieving an 
effective and speedy planning process (Henecke & Khan, 2002, p. 34)
This may be expressed in the claim that civic participation takes time. To refine the wind 
power debate on “effective planning”, there is also the issue of whether the results of the 
planning process for wind power development come through “good planning”, which naturally 
plays a key role in the planning system (and hence depends entirely on what the concept of 
“good planning” is loaded with). One might suggest that there may be a minimum time frame 
required for “good planning” to continue to be just that. “Good planning” requires, among 
many things, time expenditure to maintain any sort of quality. In other words, one should 
remain observant of the risk, when strong pressure is applied to the planning system to speed 
processes up, of achieving a procedural effectiveness but, as far as results are concerned, poor 
planning – that is to say, as far as the intent of the planning is concerned. The difficulty, then, 
is to achieve an efficient process, something both the Energy Agency and the review directive 
explicitly aim for, which simultaneously is effective - that is to say, legally secure and mindful 
of the planning’s various other measurements of quality.
According to Henecke and Khan (2002), in addressing civic participation in spatial 
planning, aspirations of efficiency have time after time led to restrictions on actual civic 
participation, even when the impact of increased civic influence and actions to combat the 
effects of political imbalance is emphasised in directives and legislation. It is here that the 
dilemma of simplifying regulation lies: How much should one simplify and reduce without 
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losing the most important deliberation in the review? Therein lies a danger that the political 
discussion and directives that strive for efficiency primarily concern themselves with time and 
cost aspects, while quality aspects are awarded limited attention in these contexts. If one all 
too often defines an inefficient system in terms of “a lengthy process”, this risks leading to the 
perception that a speedy process is translated precisely to a good process. 
The struggle for efficiency is end-focused rather than means-focused and likely 
an expression of the centralistic, calculating and politically oriented will to control the 
development of wind power. This leads to legal proposals to change the balance between the 
two main laws for a particular energy type, to the detriment of local governance and planning. 
Summing up RQ3
• The right to appeal mast permits in the 3G development can largely be seen as 
merely a “token participation” due to the fact that it only very rarely changed the 
outcome of a permit decision;
• Despite the manifest purpose of making the permit process more efficient for 
wind development, many people do not perceive the legal revision of 2009 as 
leading to that;
• Efficiency or effectiveness? The struggle for efficiency is end-focused rather 
than means-focused and likely an expression of the centralistic, calculating and 
politically oriented will to control the development of wind power;
• The results indicate that wind power permit applicants prefer to remain below 
the 150 meters level and choose the municipal building permit process. This 
is due to the insecurity that the so-called veto has added to the environmental 
assessment, whether perceived or factual, in combination with the mandatory 
threshold levels for when to initiate the process at the county council level;
• The discussions concerning efficiency in the planning and permit systems seem 
to be based mainly in a perception that local planning processes and the right 
to appeal permit decisions are technical obstacles to the implementation of a 
national development;
• Speed, efficiency and legal certainty are emphasised in the directives for and 
the legal revisions concerning both infrastructure implementations. The 3G 
development was far from speedy, and the national handling was not legally 
transparent and secure; 
• There are indications in the wind power case that the processes have become 
more unpredictable due to the so-called municipal veto; 
• What is presented as technical and legal issues of clearing up inefficiencies are, 
in fact, major shifts from local power over the landscape to the regional and 
national level. 
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7.  Law and spatial planning –  
 concluding reflections
One argument throughout this thesis on spatial planning emphasises the importance of law 
for planning and environmental management. Further, the emphasis has been on seeing law 
as an empirical object of study which success and failure can be measured and understood 
by its outcomes. As pointed out in the introductory chapter, empirical studies in law teach 
us that the actual outcome of laws and formal statutes are not necessarily precisely what 
they were intended to be. This discrepancy, how to address it, theorise around it and study 
it, is of fundamental importance to spatial planning, including large-scale implementation 
of telecommunications infrastructure and wind power development, and can be summed up 
accordingly: 
• The legal framework plays a significant role in allocating power and balancing 
between authorities, but the outcome of the legally regulated actions is to a large 
extent an empirical question. 
• Planning theory and research tends to disregard the fact that spatial planning to 
a large extent is a legally regulated activity, which adds to the fact that law and 
its implementation is not reflected upon as a problematised issue relevant to 
planning and its outcomes. 
For example, Article II deals with the explicit difference between policy/law and its 
implementation in the case of 3G development at the national level. This includes the licence 
conditions and the regulatory framework for the Post and Telecommunications Agency (PTA) 
responsible for the control of the operators. The article argues that the results of the licence 
conditions and lack of promised coverage, in conjunction with a lack of sanctions, cannot 
be explained by aspects of the regulatory framework alone. Instead, financial aspects in 
combination with the size of the project are used here to explain what at first glance is not 
understandable – why were no sanctions placed on the operators when they so clearly failed 
to fulfil the prerequisites of the licence conditions? The more likely explanation “included 
non-legal aspects to a decision-making that was defended by legal rhetoric” (p. 195). I argue 
that “there seems to be a bigger game unlocking the legalistic approach” (p. 195; see also 
Article V, Larsson, 2013, p. 300). The 3G development was underpinned by a technological 
optimism that included a perceived positive national economic development including notions 
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of sustainable development in terms of promoting regional development (Larsson, 2008a). 
The discrepancy between law and its outcomes is returned to in Article V in order to theorise 
on complexity, legal (internal) contradictions and extra-legal interference in legally controlled 
decision-making.
Another issue relates to legal complexity and uncertainty when addressing the benefits 
of a strengthened awareness of the consequences that the legal system leads to in spatial 
planning. Complexity is an issue when it comes to law, particularly for the people it concerns. 
An overly complex system may alienate those that the system – at least in part – serves to 
protect, in practice excluding them from the right to appeal and what has been called “access 
to justice” (as in the Aarhus Convention). As expressed in Article V, with regards to a worst 
case scenario in 3G development:
Three different legal institutes, handled at two administrative levels, by three 
authorities – all with its own court hierarchy for appeal – create a complex 
assessment system (Larsson, 2013, p. 292).
Not only do citizens face problems when the legal system becomes overly complex, but so 
do the entrepreneurs that need permission to site masts and turbines. Breukers illustrates 
this in stating that “[w]ind project developers (German) states were complaining about local 
permitting procedures, which they regarded as lengthy, inconsistent and complex” (Breukers, 
2010, pp. 45-46). As mentioned above, in the policy perspective planning tends to be the 
transformation of policy into spatial action with less attention to the bounding aspects of 
the planning legislation as a subsystem of the general legal system and context of a given 
jurisdiction.
7.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
As outlined above, one of the objectives of this thesis is to develop a theoretical understanding 
of the intersection of the legal system with its internal tensions in the environmental and 
planning fields, and the management dilemmas in multilevel governance specifically the 
tension between national policy and local sovereignty over the landscape. This dialectic re-
emerges in national infrastructure ventures that are dependent on local planning and permits. 
The advantages of the theoretical model arguably lie in its three-headed combination of 
strands within planning theory, and the usefulness of the elaborated approach to analysing the 
role of law in planning and infrastructure implementation. The conclusions that combine the 
results of the two cases studied in this thesis can be listed as follows: 
• There is a legal-rhetorical adaptation to the expert-based decision-making in 
court.
• The levels interact poorly. The national decisions, irrespective of the normative 
viewpoint of who should control the landscape planning, could be better informed 
of the preconditions at a local level that will factually define the outcome of the 
implementation. 
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• In a multi-levelled system, local decisions will cumulatively determine to what 
extent national policy-making objectives can be achieved. Local decision-
making, however, tends not to be assessed when national policy is drafted. 
• The discussions concerning efficiency in the planning and permit systems seem 
to be based mainly in a perception of local planning processes and the right 
to appeal permit decisions as technical obstacles to the implementation of a 
national development.
• Speed, efficiency and legal certainty are emphasised in the directives for and 
the legal revisions concerning both infrastructure implementations. The 3G 
development was far from speedy, and the national handling was not legally 
transparent and secure. There are indications in the wind power case that the 
processes have become more unpredictable due to the so-called municipal veto. 
• What is presented as technical and legal issues of clearing up inefficiencies are, 
in fact, (attempted) shifts in the power over the landscape from the local level to 
the regional and national.
This thesis points out the importance of understanding the approaches to knowledge and 
rationalities embedded in spatially relevant decision-making. The axis that positions the 
calculating on the one hand and the communicative on the other signals an issue that is often 
forgotten, namely, that leaning towards either one or another type of knowledge produces a 
significant difference, see Figure 4. By this, I mean that both sides are not only necessary 
but self-evident; however, the calculating knowledge, often described as more scientific, also 
often has some precedence over the communicative, which is more concerned with weighing 
legitimate but often contradictory interests against each other. This may have something to do 
with the somewhat more binary logic of calculating knowledge more coherently coinciding 
with how law traditionally works, according to a similar binary right/wrong dichotomy. 
The communicative section on the right hand side of the model can, as mentioned earlier, 
be nuanced further, and is thus both more problematic and interesting than a reductionist 
model allows for. The development may lead in different theoretical directions – concerning 
rationality and decision-making, concerning values and culture, concerning power.
Figure 4: Some analytical conclusions of the study. 
Regarding wind power, the so-called municipal veto seems to constitute an unclear compromise 
between two systems. Here, one could discuss what we in Article IV tentatively suggest ought 
to be the point where the main permit handling should be conducted, whether at the local 
planning level or at the regional environmental assessment level. One could here argue that 
the decision-making powers should be reinstated on the planning side, as opposed to the 
environmental permit side, but there is at the same time a need for more regional planning for 
cases of infrastructural characteristics, such as wind and also telecom.
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Furthermore, there seems to have been too strong a focus on the legal design in the legal 
dogmatic perspective of the investigators with regards to the legal revision of the wind permits 
process, amended in 2009, as opposed to the practice and outcome of the regulations. This is 
likely a combination of the investigation lacking methods to measure as well as lacking theory 
to predict the outcome of the regulatory revisions, perhaps in combination with the fact that 
permit handling in many first instances is paper-based and not part of a digital system capable 
of aggregating information on the processes on a larger scale. Simply put, compiling such 
data involves hard work. Based on this argumentation, at least two recommendations can be 
made: The first one concerns the permit handling, and the second the official investigations 
and commissions that propose new legislations: 
• Digitise the permit handling for aggregation possibilities in a transparent way. 
There are at least two strong benefits to this: The feedback on the effects of 
the legal design is direct and can provide information for further revisions; the 
democratic value of allowing participants, investors and citizens in general to 
take part in the processes in an effortless way. 
• Add multidisciplinary competence to the legislative commissions. Proposals, of 
course, need to be legally correct, but merely the opportunity to create new law 
that actually leads to what it is manifestly intended to do would provide many 
benefits. However, at least two advantages are clear: Law may function better as 
the steering instrument it is intended to be, which includes a more predictable 
rule of law, as well as making law-making more efficient and less of a waste of 
public funds. 
An overarching question indicated by the results relates to the question of to what extent there 
is a trend towards less local self-determination and more strength in national policy-making 
in infrastructure related development. For example, from a broader perspective, it may be 
relevant to pose the question of whether the Environment Process Investigation’s proposal 
is an expression of a broader tendency to dismantle “participation” in the planning of land 
and environment. Is there a trend within planning towards more centralised and rationalistic 
planning, that is to say, a growing mass in the direction of this normative pole? If one 
compares the issue of interested parties in wind power development with the same issue in 
3G development, one difference is that smaller actors may invest in individual wind power 
plants. This means that the polarisation that emerged in 3G development between a few, large 
developers operating under the condition that they cover a large portion of the country and 
people residing in the proximity of masts and antennas is broken down into a more complex 
situation. One important difference regarding the potential for conflict is that wind power 
does not suffer from the same coverage problems as does 3G development. There are, in other 
words, degrees of freedom within a potential construction, and planning can be adjusted to 
avoid conflicts. Moreover, it is when one succeeds in making wind power projects a part of 
“the local identity” and “an asset to the local community” that a critical perspective can be 
turned towards a more positive attitude, according to Klintman and Waldo (2008, p. 47). 
As the international literature on wind power implementation suggests, the biggest hurdle to 
successful implementation of wind power is local opposition at the private and public level. 
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However, this can be addressed through a comprehensive approach that takes into account the 
legal, political, economic and public opinion frameworks. 
Emmelin and Lerman (2006) identify a conflict between the environmentalist paradigm 
in the upper left corner and the plan paradigm in the bottom right. One way to describe this 
conflict between the paradigms, in this context, is to observe how the planning objectives for 
wind power emerge. The Energy Agency defines the planning objectives as, “the planning 
objectives for wind power, within community planning, are to create conditions for an annual 
production of wind power generated electricity of a certain amount of TWh” (ER 2007:45, p. 
8). The proposed planning objectives initially mention an “appropriate level of ambition for a 
planned objective by 2020 is dependent of the division of burden of the EU’s renewable energy 
target, as well as its implementation.” This bears witness to an instrumental rationality that 
leads to the perception that the available space for wind power sites in Sweden is not the result 
of an assessment, the land owner’s will or local interests in having wind power in the county. 
The planning objective comes from a top-down or central perspective of the proportion of 
renewable energy that is politically desirable. This leads to the “vertical” conflict of who is to 
govern over land and water between the national political decision-making process and the 
municipal monopoly on implementing plans. There are also possibilities for countermeasures 
to any centralistic trend. For example, in the UK there has been a reaction against what is seen 
as the increasingly centralised nature of the political system in recent years and concerns over 
the lack of citizen involvement in political life. This reaction has been called new localism 
(Corry and Stoker, 2002; Pratchett, 2004). Devolving power to local communities and 
neighbourhoods is not a new idea (Burns et al., 1994; Illsley et al., 1997) but it is, according 
to Illsley and Coles, one that has been gathering significant momentum in recent years (2009). 
7.2 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As stressed in the introduction, without understanding the legal logic and the fact that 
infrastructure planning is caught in a “struggle between daring and deliberating” (cf. Larsson, 
2008a), I argue that we are likely to miss something crucial in the understanding, and how 
to change the outcomes, of national infrastructural development. The case studies of 3G and 
wind power in Sweden can be seen as an expression of infrastructures in one sense, but can 
also be seen as a very particular type of infrastructure that depends, at a componential level, 
on local and regional decision-making. The entirety affects the nation’s energy use and its 
systemic telecommunication status, but each mast or turbine requires either a building permit 
or an environmental permit. Thus, an inescapable dialectic arises between national policy 
and local permit-giving. Participatory involvement for the general public also manifests 
itself differently at the various levels. Where the national level is primarily concerned with 
representation, in local events this representation is combined with the inclusion of residents 
and affected parties in the consultation process, in local debate and in the possibilities to 
appeal in individual cases. 
In this study, I have largely focused on various types of knowledge in terms of how 
they are legitimised or not in the encounter with legal regulation in this field. This therefore 
concerns juridification, formalisation and to some extent the encounter between the residents’ 
conceptual world and the administrative system the society has created to manage landscape 
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and environment through official plans and legally binding decisions. This seems often to 
occur within the tension between preservation and progress. Viewed from an aggregate 
systemic level at a national level, it is understandable that efficiency becomes a central issue; 
one needs to know what one may or may not do and the political visions are not made relatable 
to the more difficultly determined permit handling at the highly decentralised, local level. 
A part of this difficulty lies precisely in the extremely distributed legal reviews that 
this particular form of infrastructure is divided into. Since masts and turbines are units in 
themselves, they are easier to conceptualise as such entities. There is no similar counterpart 
in the spreading expanse of roads or railways. There is, therefore, an ontological difference 
in these infrastructures which is reproduced within their administrative organisation and 
planning. Thus, there is also some flexibility in the localisation of masts which has not been 
included in traditional infrastructure, even though the 3G mast cells, i.e., their coverage, do 
not extend beyond a few kilometres. From a participatory perspective, it could be argued that 
there is a gap in the level of influence that residents were allowed. In many of the appeal cases, 
as well as in documentation from the consultation process, residents expressed a desire to 
have some influence in such establishments beyond the relatively narrow avenue that the law 
affords “concerned parties” in regards to specific mast or wind power establishments.
On the other hand, one can state that both municipal as well as national politicians 
are elected by popular vote and that the municipal comprehensive plans can be debated 
during their conception. Whether this is sufficient remains an unanswered question, however. 
Opponents to 3G mast infrastructure and wind power energy have generally often felt that their 
opportunity to influence at a higher level other than in regards to individual establishments 
has not been sufficient. Therefore, one might at least discuss whether this particular form of 
dispersed infrastructure could be more effectively planned at a regional level. 
The relatively common wish for more efficient processes for this type of infrastructure 
that is voiced both in Sweden and within an international context could be seen as a sort 
of developmental imperative. This often concerns ensuring at the national level that the 
politically determined and private enterprise-dependent infrastructure comes to fruition and 
is not hampered by local autonomies or conservative landowners and residents. There are 
problematic aspects on both sides of the developmental imperative; on the one hand, one does 
not want vocal minorities to overly annex the issue and undemocratically and self assumedly act 
towards preservational goals, which also tends to colonise the opinions of confused residents 
when faced with a new establishment, and on the other hand there is a built in ostensibility 
in creating law under the guise of the concept of efficiency which largely appears to concern 
relocating decision-making power upwards within the hierarchy towards the national rather 
than the municipal level. From a development perspective, it often appears that steering the 
issue away from values – and thereby a need for deliberation – and instead towards public 
interest, sustainability and measurability is key to the expert paradigm. If one successfully 
frames the issues in terms of expertise-dependence, even more centralised decision-making 
appears more legitimate. 
So we return to the dichotomy of preservation and progress, the dilemma of daring 
and deliberating. We must not let vocal minorities stand in the way of societally desirable 
developments. However, what a history of socio-legal studies has taught us is that law and 
policy – and likely infrastructure development – cannot function in a normative vacuum and 
control from above what is not perceived as legitimate from below. Any implementation is 
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depending on legitimacy. This is also why some of the suggestions above relates to method in 
law-making; we need to know what parts of the system that is perceived as not legitimate, we 
need feed-back on the law “in practice” to be able to make functioning and useful amendments 
to the law “in books”. 
With regards to an argued lack of a broader, legal understanding – both empirically and 
theoretically – it can be stated that within the planning discipline the legal system is expressed 
as an instrument of control and change, while its outcomes are not considered an empirical 
object of study. This thesis’ main line of argumentation concerns highlighting precisely this 
aspect. The potential benefits of a more profound understanding of the legal system’s role in 
planning and infrastructure development is equally as large as the gap between law’s promise 
and its achievement is diminished.
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What type of  knowledge rules where? Legally regulated 
participation in large-scale mobile infrastructure 
planning in Sweden
Stefan Larsson
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-.,.I investigate the field of  tension between the national and the local level in spatial 
planning from a decision-making perspective. In doing so, I analyse the legal regulation 
for a large-scale 3G mobile infrastructure development in Sweden with a focus on how 
participation is expressed both in terms of  the ‘law in books’ as well as empirically, ‘in 
action’. Theoretically, a model of  decision making is elaborated, based on two axes: one 
concerning the decision level on a central or national to local scale, and one concerning 
what type of  knowledge is regarded as the most legitimate in terms of  a calculating 
approach versus a communicative approach. These two issues or approaches to decision 
making—who decides and based on what knowledge—are of  direct importance for 
understanding the frameworks as well as the practical outcomes of  public participation. 
The case of  3G in Sweden demonstrates how different types of  knowledge are perceived 
as legitimate at different levels in the planning system. For example, appeals against 
building permits rarely change the outcome of  permits issued, and appeals based on 
fear of  electromagnetic radiation are always rejected. The juridification of  a given mast 
conflict meant a development from a deliberative approach, where any concern is heard, 
to a calculating and expert-based one, where the general stance on a particular topic 
(such as whether or not the electromagnetic radiation from mobile masts is hazardous) 
is applied. This means that what knowledge is legitimate depends on where in the permit 
process it is presented.
 31),-public participation, calculating, communicative, law in books, law in action, 
3G infrastructure, UMTS, electromagnetic radiation, spatial planning
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Stefan Larsson
 
Non-Legal Aspects of 
Legally Controlled 
Decision-Making
 
The failure of predictability in governing the 3G 
 
infrastructure development in Sweden
 
Abstract
 
Predictability is a key function of law. When the application of law goes from being
flexible to becoming unpredictable this key function is lost. This article shows how
legal application can deviate from formal agreements and law, how legal predictabil-
ity experiences a setback when other forces or values affect the decision making that
is supposed to be strictly legally controlled. Non-legally acknowledged factors can af-
fect the decision-making tacitly. This means that causes like economy and politics
can affect the application of law, although not admittedly, and the legislative process
in order to change the application. 
The example used for this demonstration is taken from the Swedish development
of the third generation of mobile phone infrastructure, 3G, and more specifically the
responsible authority’s, the Post and Telecommunications Agency, supervision of
the four licence winning operators during the infrastructure roll-out.
The paper addresses the difference between the intentions of the law and the ap-
plication of the law, analyses and aims to explain parts of the legal complexities or
inconsistencies from a socio-legal perspective. To do so, data permit process data
from a regional case collected within a MiSt study (Larsson 2008) is used, along with
legal documents, cases, PTA reports and more. 
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Introduction
 
Predictability is a key function of law. Predictability is “one of the basic values in de-
mocracy and a state governed by law” (Peczenik 1995, p 89f.). Many legal theorists
hold the norm of “jurisdiction and the actions of public authorities in a democratic
state should be predictable” (ibid, p 90), as the very essence of legal security. When
the application of law goes from being flexible to becoming unpredictable this key
function is lost: the preconception of knowing the rules of the game, before and
when playing the game. A governmental authority is expected to apply law in a pre-
dictable, transparent and non-discriminatory way. This article shows how legal ap-
plication can deviate from formal agreements and law; how legal predictability can
experience a setback when other forces or values affect the decision making that is
supposed to be strictly legally controlled. The example used for this demonstration
is taken from the Swedish development of the third generation of mobile phone in-
frastructure, 3G, and more specifically the responsible authority’s, the Post and Tel-
ecommunications Agency (hereinafter the PTA), supervision of the four licence win-
ning operators.  
The 3G infrastructure in Sweden has been developed between 2000 and 2007 and
the PTA is the authority responsible for supervising the sector, as well as the operator
developing the infrastructure. Initially, within the course of three years four opera-
tors were to build competing systems to cover 99,98 percent of the population. This
was determined as a result of the licence allocation process, the so called beauty con-
test where operators made promises regarding coverage and how fast to reach this
coverage. 
These coverage requirements were extreme in relation to other EU countries’ li-
cence conditions, and the operators failed to reach the promised coverage in time. In
fact, it took twice the time agreed upon. Still the PTA did not order any sanctions,
even if the legal provisions clearly state that possibility. Based on a regional sample
of permit processes national coverage data and PTA reports, in combination with a
legal analysis, this article shows the PTA and the operators’ actions in relation to one
another. 
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Figure 1
 
 
 
The 3G development in Sweden
 
The article focuses on the relation between the operators and the PTA, a relation reg-
ulated by law but also an agreement (upheld by law). It describes how non-legally
acknowledged factors are likely to have affected the decision making of the respon-
sible agency for infrastructure development without this being explicit during the de-
velopment or foreseeable by the time of licence allocation. One could imagine that
this difference is an obvious one, but the legal domain can be more complex than
first assumed, and the deviations from the law in books has to be empirically inves-
tigated in a methodological way far different from the traditional legal method. The
legal field to some extent lacks the method to detect flaws of the legal system. This
task is therefore often what socio-legal researchers mainly take on, as a main research
objective for sociology of law. Much of the data and results are based on a study with-
in the MiSt-programme
 
1
 
 presented in a licentiate’s dissertation published in March
2008 (Larsson 2008).
 
Background
 
The PTA, is the “applier” of the legal order describing and setting the stage for the
legitimate PTA actions against the operators. The PTA’s role is mainly regulated in
 
1 MiSt is an interdisciplinary research programme on tools for environmental assessment in strategic
decision making funded by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. The programme is co-
ordinated by the Department of Spatial Planning, Blekinge Institute of Technology. See http://
www.bth.se/tks/mist_eng.nsf See also Larsson, Stefan (2006, 2008) .
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the Electronic Communications Act, the ECA. As an applier the PTA has to follow
the legal order and, if deviating from it in some way, the PTA will most likely still
formulate and legitimate this deviation in terms of the legal order. 
During 2002, a time when many operators throughout Europe wanted to change
the licence conditions they just had agreed to, the European Commission in a com-
munication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions in June 2002, stressed the importance
of a predictable environment in the 3G development sector. Any modifications in
the licence conditions should be “proportional, transparent and non-discriminatory”
(Section 3.1 of COM(2002) 0301). The Communication from the Commission is
an example of a principle in contract law stating: “Pacta sunt servanda”, agreements
must be kept.
The Swedish 3G infrastructure development has been analyzed from a planning
perspective (Emmelin & Söderblom 2002), from a planning and environmental le-
gal perspective (Emmelin & Lerman 2004), from a sustainability perspective (Lars-
son 2008, Larsson & Emmelin 2007) and from a spatial planning and sociology of
law perspective (Larsson & Åström), and the licence allocation process has been an-
alyzed as such by Hultkrantz and Nilsson (2001) and Andersson et al. (2005).  
 
Research questions of the paper
 
The article shows the relevant legal framework, including the most important licence
conditions binding the operators that received a licence in 2000. This framework is
especially interesting in comparison with the actual deviation from the formal licence
conditions that occurred in the infrastructure roll out, and how this was handled by
the supervising agency, the PTA, especially in relation to the operators that were to
develop the infrastructure. The investigation of the legal framework alone, the “law
in books”, does not explain this deviation or the result of the application of the
framework, the “law in action”. The objectives of the article is therefore
1. to investigate and present the legal framework relevant to the relation between
the operators and the PTA when it comes to the deadline of fulfilling the licence
conditions. 
2. to show the actions of the PTA and the operators in order to explain the delayed
reach of coverage, and hence to focus 
 
the application
 
 of the legal framework. 
The first question represents the law in books and the second the law in action. The
article suggests a socio-legal approach to explaining the deviation between the formal
law in books and its application. The first objective mainly requires legal sources of
data. The second requires a socio-legal approach were data in form of PTA reports,
operator applications as well as the contribution from other research made on specif-
ic parts or angles of the Swedish 3G development. It also requires a more elaborated
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view on law and the legal system. This socio-legal approach needs further presenta-
tion. 
 
Law in books, Law in action
 
When researching the empirical side of law, the distinction of law in books – law in
action, often comes up.
 
2
 
 The idea is that there are two sides to law, one dogmatic,
often written down, and one empirical, which you only can find outside the dogma,
for it is the application of law, the consequence. In other words, it is about the dif-
ference between intent and outcome, the difference between what you say, and what
you subsequently do. This composition is reflected in the two objectives of the arti-
cle, presented above. The research design is common in sociology of law research
where first the legal design is presented and then the actual deviation from this design
is measured or established through empirical data. 
Sociology of law offers a set of perspective-giving tools, tools that allow for a dif-
ferent perspective on law and legal institutions. Sociology of law offers a way to ques-
tion legal matters from a social scientific perspective, with social scientific method
and theory. The relation between society, on one hand, and law and legal institutions
on the other, is often the area of inquiry in the sociology of law discipline (Mathiesen
2005, se for instance p 18). In the governance and control of the spatial environment
the legal frame plays a significant role. How the legal provisions are manifested in the
factual sense, showing the empirical side of law, is one of the important fields of
study in the sociology of law. 
The method of finding 
 
existing law
 
 is legal dogmatic, but when questioning these
findings from a socio-legal perspective the perspective of sociology of law is taken,
which offers an analytical depth to the spatial planning context. This socio-legal per-
spective is often described as an external perspective on law (Bernt and Doublet
1998, Hydén 2002a). Whether or not you see it as an external perspective, the norm
science approach has generated a number of studies in the sociology of law discipline
as a way to focus and explain behaviour controlling entities that are socially repro-
duced (see Hydén and Svensson 2008 in this anthology) in addition to the legal sys-
tem. The norm perspective has been used to analyze different topics such as the con-
tinuing process of a struggling tunnel construction (Baier 2002), traffic rule compli-
ance (Svensson 2008) and the rise of environmental concern in school curriculums
(Wickenberg 1999). 
A way to describe sociology of law is the way in which it differs from legal dog-
matics and how it complements it (see the introduction to this anthology, Hydén &
Wickenberg 2008). Where the legal dogmatic perspective gives a very clear picture
of what knowledge and what factors should influence legal decision making (repre-
 
2 The dichotomy is credited to Roscoe Pound, whose work was a forerunner to the legal realism
movement. 
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sented vertically in the following figure), the sociology of law scholar can examine
legal decision making empirically and see if there have been other factors, generally
not explicit, that have influenced the legal decision making (represented horizontally
in the figure 2 below). 
In the case of the PTA supervision over the operators there is a significant useful-
ness to the sociology of law perspective. The legal order provides the framework for
the PTA’s actions, but when it comes to the precise decisions, the law has possibly
been only one of several factors that have affected these actions. This is returned to
below. 
 
Figure 2
 
 
 
from Hydén (2002b), p 16, see introduction to this anthology (Hydén & Wickenberg 2008)
 
 
 
Generally, legal decision making is formulated such that it operates strictly under the
principle of legality, that decisions are not affected by legally irrelevant factors such
as politics and economy (to the left in the figure), from the horizontal outlook. It is
the task of socio-legal science to show when such factors have intervened in the legal
decision making. Another task is to show when the application of law leads to un-
foreseen, distorting effects in society, (to the right in the figure) such as environmen-
tal problems or when the legal application results in consequences that are undesira-
ble from a norm perspective, which from a legal dogmatic perspective may be cor-
rect. This perspective helps in understanding the actions of the PTA in its relation to
the operators in the 3G case. Before turning to the empirical side of the in the Swed-
ish 3G infrastructure development the article now turns to the legal dogmatic per-
spective that regulates the relation between the PTA and the operators. 
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The PTA and the operators: The law in books
 
Before turning to the licence conditions and the specific law that applies to the rela-
tion between the PTA and the operators, let us take a brief look at the PTA’s role as
a whole, from the law in books perspective. What is the task of the PTA?
The duties follow under a governmental authorization, but the more detailed pro-
visions are described in the Ordinance (
 
2007:951)
 
 with instructions for the PTA. In
addition to supervising the postal services and other sectors the PTA’s duty among
many is to 
 
1 – Promote the access to secure and efficient electronic communications according to the goals
of the Electronic Communications Act. 
3 – Promote a sustainable competition (section 4 of Ordinance 2007:951 with instructions for
the PTA, author’s translation)
 
This means a further referral to the Electronic Communications Act and rather
vague tasks such as to promote sustainable competition. The Electronic Communi-
cations Act (translation made by the PTA):
 
Chapter 1, General provisions
Introductory provisions
Section 1 
 
The provisions of this Act aim at ensuring that private individuals, legal entities and
public authorities shall have access to secure and efficient electronic communications and the
greatest possible benefit regarding the range of electronic communications services and their
price and quality.
This objective shall mainly be achieved through the promotion of competition and the interna-
tional harmonisation of the sector. However, universal services shall always be available for eve-
rybody on equivalent terms throughout Sweden at affordable prices.
When applying the Act, particular regard shall be taken to the importance of electronic commu-
nications for the freedom of expression and freedom of information.
 
The PTA is not likely to be criticized on these grounds, but they show the purpose
of the PTA in the electronic communications sector. Of interest is the promotion of
competition and that the most important services should be available to everybody
under similar conditions. More important here is to show the specific legal frame-
work in the 3G case.  
 
The licence allocation and the conditions following
 
The reason for discussing the licence allocation process here is because it gives some
preconditions for understanding what part of the agreement the operators later
breached and why. 
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On May 12
 
th
 
, 2000, the PTA invited operators to apply for a licence. The number
of licenses was decided in April 2000 by the board of the PTA after the Parliament
had decided upon the framework of the license process (PTSFS 2000:5). While var-
ious other countries had an auction concerning the licenses, the Swedish licenses
were offered in a “beauty contest” to those who promised the highest coverage
reached within the shortest time-span. The PTA regulations stated that “at the most
four licences for a national coverage according to the UMTS/IMT-2000-standard
will be available” (PTSFS 2000:5, §6). The intention seemed to be to reach the high-
est number of licensees, with regard to the services of the 3G that subsequently could
be offered to consumers, as a result of a competitive operator market.  
Four licences were to be issued, valid until December 31, 2015. The selection was
divided into two steps where the contestants were reviewed using certain criteria.
The initial evaluation of the contestants was conducted in order to review if they had
fulfilled the preconditions for the establishment of a UMTS network. This included
financial capacity, technical as well as commercial feasibility, and appropriate exper-
tise and experience (PTA 12 May 2000, p 8-9 and Andersson, Hulthén & Valiente
2005, p 583). Five of the ten contestants failed to prove this (see Larsson 2008, p 23-
27). 
At the second stage of the beauty contest the operators were awarded points ac-
cording to the extent and speed at which they offered coverage by the end of 2003,
2006 and 2009. Coverage was defined on the basis of three factors: proportion of
population, territorial coverage and distribution throughout Sweden. The popula-
tion constituting the reference data for the PTA was the statistical data from SCB by
December 31, 1999 (PTA  May 12, 2000, p 10). This is relevant in relation to the
delayed roll out that later became the case, since it was primarily the urban popula-
tion that grew in the years of the delay, making it slightly easier to reach the coverage
demands when postponing the deadline. There had been some criticism of the li-
cence allocation regarding whether or not the last few percentage points could be
motivated by a combination of commercial and regional political reasons. The last
few steps of percentage points were considered to be extremely expensive
(Hultkrantz & Nilsson 2001, p 69, Emmelin & Söderblom 2002, p 47). And as a
result of the delay, people moved in under the masts, so to speak, making it possible
for the operators to avoid covering the last expensive percentage points in the sparsely
populated areas in the north of Sweden.
The importance of good access throughout the country was stated early in Swed-
ish broadband and 3G development (PTA report 27 June 2001, p 9). At the same
time the PTA did not want to add a clause requiring too high coverage in the licenc-
es, fearing it would discourage operators to take part in the development of the 3G
system, which was the case in the earlier application process regarding the GSM li-
cences in the 1800 MHz spectrum (PTA report 27 June 2001, p 9). This is the rea-
son for the application criteria where the applicant had to promise the coverage, and
the promise of higher coverage beats the promise of lower. 
The results of the so called beauty contest have been a roll out where Sweden dif-
fers from the rest of Europe both regarding speed and coverage. This is particularly
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interesting regarding the uncertainties of the practical use of the system, the handsets
and the applications, at the time of the decision (Emmelin & Söderblom, 2002, p
47-48). The process attracted a large number of applicants, and a large number of
new entrants – comparable only to the UK process. Six contestants were not awarded
licences.  
Ten applicants competed in the beauty contest. Three of the competitors were the
leading mobile telephone operators on the Swedish market: Europolitan, Tele2, and
Telia. The remaining seven were consortia formed for the 3G beauty contest (An-
dersson, Hulthén & Valiente, 2005, p 584).
 
3
 
Figure 3
 
 
 
From Larsson 2008, p 25.
 
The PTA decided that Europolitan (later Vodafone, now Telenor), HI3G (3), Or-
ange and Tele2 should each get a licence. All four undertook to cover at least 8 860
000 people by the end of 2003. These licences apply up to and including December
31
 
st
 
, 2015, and the licence conditions until March 31
 
st,
 
 2006 (PTA decision of 22
March 2001, p 8). 
Telia, Telenordia and Reach Out Mobile, which did not get a 3G licence, ap-
pealed the PTA decision to the County Administrative Court (Case nr 499-01). The
County Administrative Court confirmed the PTA decision on 27 June 2001, with-
out further appeal. The fact that Telia did not get a licence surprised many. Telia be-
came part of the infrastructure development through collaboration with Tele2,
which did get a licence. The three operators Hi3G, Telenor (Europolitan at the time)
and Orange signed a deal regarding collaboration on the coverage requirements of
the licence conditions. 
The licence conditions stated that each operator had to have at least 30 percent of
their own infrastructure and up to a maximum of 70 percent shared of the coverage
(PTA decision of 22 March 2001, p 3.1). An estimation conducted for the PTA stat-
ed that the area coverage likely would be around 170 000 km
 
2
 
, about 41 percent of
the total Swedish surface area (Björkdahl & Bohlin, 2003). 
 
3 Telia Sonera was founded January 1
 
st
 
, 2003, when Swedish Telia and Finnish Sonera joined.  
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An important licence condition regards the licence holders verifying, by March 1
 
st
 
2004, that 8.860.000 people in Sweden are covered by December 31
 
st
 
 2003 (PTA
22 March 2001, section 1.1.2 and 1.3.1). Regarding the starting point of a function-
al network, the licence holders were to make net capacity available by January 1
 
st
 
,
2002 (PTA 22 March 2001, section 2). Another important aspect was that the li-
cence conditions of the first period lasted until March 31
 
st,
 
 2006. After this date they
could be reviewed, which they subsequently were. 
Parts of the licence conditions, such as the maximum of 70 percent shared infra-
structure, follow from set values that were decided before the so called beauty con-
test, and some conditions emanate from the contest itself, such as the degree of cov-
erage and the speed of the roll out. The licence conditions themselves do not include
any sanctions for the operators if they were not to fulfil the requirements. Instead,
the sanctions have a more general description in the legal provisions controlling the
Post and Telecommunications Agency. 
 
The Electronic Communications Act
 
The Electronic Communications Act (2003:389), the ECA, came into force on July
25
 
th
 
, 2003 (prop 2002/03:110). The act replaced the Telecommunications Act
(1993:597) and the Radio Communications Act (1993:599). The Telecommunica-
tions Act was in other words the main legislation controlling the introduction of the
3G development in Sweden. A number of changes had to be made to the law during
1999 and 2000 in order to be able to make demands of coverage in the licence allo-
cation (decided December 8, 1999), to obligate operators to make available net ca-
pacity for other service providers, for the sake of competition (decided April 14,
2000) and national roaming (decided June 14, 2000).
The ECA covers all electronic communication networks and electronic commu-
nication services, which includes the role of the Post and Telecommunications Agen-
cy’s relation towards the operators; the legal grounds for the agency actions that af-
fects the operators. Since the ECA replaced the two earlier legislations on July 25
 
th
 
,
2003 it became the most relevant legislation for the relation between and the actions
of the PTA and the operators. 
The regulation in chapter 7, section 4 of the ECA, giving the operators reasonable
time to voluntarily correct errors after notification from the PTA, had no equivalence
in the former legislation (prop 2002/03:110, p 398). This possibility, the “reasona-
ble time”, was introduced in the Act just six months before the deadline for reaching
the coverage requirements. 
 
If the supervisory authority considers that there is reason to suspect that a party conducting op-
erations under this Act does not comply with the Act or the decisions concerning obligations or
conditions or the regulations that have been issued under the Act … the authority shall notify
the party conducting the operations about this circumstance and give it an opportunity to state
its views. In the notification, the authority shall state that it may issue an order or a prohibition
 133
 Stefan Larsson  |  Law and Spatial Planning     |   
 
Antologi 187
 
187
 
in accordance with Section 5, unless rectification takes place within a reasonable time. Reasona-
ble time may not be less than one month, except in the case of repeated cases of violation, unless
the party that is notified consents to a shorter time limit.
 
If the operators till after “reasonable time” fails to “rectify” the failure, of for instance
to reach a promised coverage, the following section, 5, explains the rights that the
PTA has as a supervisory authority to sanction the operator. 
 
If a notification in accordance with Section 4 does not result in a rectification, the supervisory
authority may issue such orders and prohibitions as are necessary for a rectification to take place.
If the order is not complied with, the supervisory authority may
1. revoke a licence, alter licence conditions or decide that the party that neglected the obligation
should completely or partially cease the operation, unless the violation is of minor importance, or
2. issue such additional orders or prohibitions as are necessary for compliance with the Act or the
decisions on obligations or conditions or the regulations that have been made under the Act.
 
To interpret the words “may issue” we have to look at preparatory work and the pre-
paratory work states that “orders or prohibitions according to this regulation is in
force instantly, if nothing else is decided, and can be combined with a fine” (Prop
2002/03:110, chapter 30, and section 22.2, author’s translation), with reference to
the specific law for fines (Viteslagen 1985:206), which states:  
 
When a fine is ordered, an amount is to be decided with reference to what is known regarding
the addressee’s economic circumstances and to other circumstances, that can be assumed to make
the addressee to comply with the order that goes with the fine Section 3 of Viteslagen, (author’s
translation).   
 
The fine is meant to sting, in order to make the addressee rectify the mistake instead
of choosing to pay the fine. In the case with lacking coverage, which especially con-
cerned the sparsely populated areas of Sweden, the investments required were large,
and the fine could therefore have been expected to be substantial. 
A comment in the preparatory work regarding chapter 7, section 4 is particularly
interesting in the case of the PTA supervision of the operators’ obligations under the
licence.
 
The circumstance that a party has not responded within the time frame the authority has given,
does not hinder that the authority proceeds in its supervision. Neither do repeated or new and
changed applications to the authority mean that the authority cannot proceed in its supervision,
unless it is clear within the time frame that further supervisory action is unnecessary (Prop 2002/
03:110, chapter 30, author’s translation)
 
This will be returned to below, in the case where the PTA seemingly paused in the
supervision over the operators whenever the operators appealed a decision or handed
in an application for any matter. The preparatory work clearly states that the fact that
the operators hand in new or changed petitions does not mean that the PTA should
stop the supervision. 
So, the law does not force the PTA to take action explicitly, it only states that it
may. In most cases this is not a problem, because the PTA is bound to supervise the
telecom sector such that it functions at its best (see provisions above) and in most
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situations this means that the PTA needs to put pressure on a failing party. But, and
this is an important but, when a matter is of such importance that it outgrows the
Agency, the supervision and enforcement may not be of top priority to the PTA,
even though this is never openly stated. This may be a weakness in the legal construc-
tion and can furthermore be said to be a weakness in the actions of the PTA. But
without jumping to conclusions, it is time to tell the story of the actual rolling out
of infrastructure, the PTA and the operators’ interactions within this legal setting. 
 
The PTA and the operators: The law in action
 
In order to depict the law in action in this case, a somewhat detailed story has to be
told of the actions of both the operators and the PTA. But first, let us take a look at
an overview of the actions whereby the operators try to postpone the deadline for the
reach of coverage, which they only a few years earlier had promised to fulfil in order
to receive the licence, and the response from the PTA. 
 
Figure 4
 
Shows operator and PTA actions in the 3G infrastructure development in Sweden (Larsson
2008:62) 
 
The interaction between the operators and the PTA has been extensive. In order to
see the reasons behind, the detailed story has to be told. When the operators already
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in 2002 started to apply for an extended time limit, the PTA turned down the re-
quests. Orange was first out in August, to apply for an extended deadline and less
coverage, followed by Vodafone (which went under the name of Europolitan by
now) in September and Hi3G in November, and Svenska UMTS-Licens AB (Tele2/
Telia) in April the following year. The operators’ requests were all denied (PTA de-
cisions of 30 September, 25 November 2002 and 14 May 2003). The operators all
pointed to the municipal permit handling process being slower than expected as the
reason for the delay. 
When the operators in April 2004 were confronted with the fact that they had
failed to reach the coverage of the licence conditions stating December 31, 2003, the
reported coverage had at the most been between 65-75 percent, when it was sup-
posed to be 99,98 percent of the populated areas (PTA 10 March 2004). The oper-
ators were given “a reasonable time” to “voluntarily” (as expressed in the PTA deci-
sions of 17 May 2004) rectify the lack of coverage, with a referral to the preparatory
works of the Electronic Communications Act (prop 2002/03:110, p 398). The time
limit for reaching the full coverage according to the licence conditions was post-
poned until December 1, 2004, meaning 11 months later than the original time lim-
it. The PTA explained this by agreeing with the operators claim that the prerequisites
for the construction had been changed after the initial licence agreement by factors
outside the control of the operators. These factors where said to be a slow municipal
permit process and that the assessment from a flight hindrance and telecommunica-
tions conflict perspective performed by the Armed Forces in different respects had
delayed the processes (PTA decisions of 17 May 2004). The PTA concluded:
 
In some respects the circumstances for the company have been changed in a way that could not
have been foreseen at the time of application, and that has been beyond the control of Hi3G
(PTA Decision of 17 May 2004, p 3, author’s translation). 
 
The same wording has been used in the decisions regarding all four operators. The
wording is interesting, especially in reference to the time required for the permit
processes. In what way had the conditions changed? And in what way could these
“changes” not have been foreseen? Is this a legitimate reason for the coverage delay
at all? To be able to answer these questions we have to take a look at the actual roll
out empirically, which is done below and in more detail in Larsson (2008). 
In the time following the decision, in  June 28, 2004, all operators (but Orange),
meaning Hi3G, Vodafone, SULAB (Tele2 and TeliaSonera) applied for a change in
the licence conditions, which mainly concerned a delay in the coverage conditions
to be fulfilled by December 31, 2007, and a lowered pilot signal in the sparsely pop-
ulated areas. These operators’ main arguments regarding the postponed coverage
were that the permit processes had been taking considerably longer time than expect-
ed due to the public debate regarding the effects on the environment, cultural and
nature values and the worry about electromagnetic radiation (PTA decision  Decem-
ber 7, 2004, p 4). Parts of the arguments from the recent postponement decision by
the PTA were re-used, but now with a bigger jackpot at stake: more than three addi-
tional years to reach the full coverage. The PTA found that the reasons to change the
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licence conditions regarding the delayed coverage were not strong enough to change
the conditions. This was partly based on a Communication from the Commission
to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions from June 2002 – (Towards the Full Roll-Out of
Third Generation Mobile Communications) stating the importance of predictability
and stability in the regulatory environment. 
 
When balancing the benefits and drawbacks of a rigid application of the conditions determined
by the issued 3G licences, the Commission is of the opinion that in principle the 
 
licensing
 
 
 
con-
ditions should not be changed
 
 because the sector is best served by a predictable environment.
Predictability allows business cases to be established in a reliable manner and to be credibly de-
fended when accessing investment funds (Underlining and bold letters are as in the text, 3.1 of
COM(2002) 0301 and p 8 of the PTA 7 Dec decision).
 
And the communication continues: 
 
Changes to licence conditions should be envisaged only when circumstances have changed un-
predictably and in these cases any modification should be proportional, transparent and non-dis-
criminatory.
 
The pilot signal strength was lowered in sparsely populated areas, meaning a change
of the licence conditions to some extent. The reasons that resulted in a delay of 6
months from the date of the PTA notice to the operators until  December 1, 2004
(11 months from promised reach of full coverage according to licence conditions),
were not considered strong enough to change the licence conditions. The operators
were just given a respite. The reported coverage on  December 1, 2004 was 84 per-
cent for Hi3G, 86 percent for Telia and Tele 2 and 84 percent for Vodafone (PTA
report  January 27, 2005). The fact that the argument nevertheless ended in a respite
means that the PTA gave the argument some credibility. On what empirical grounds
the respite was given, is however unclear. 
In late December, 2004, Hi3G and SULAB (Telia and Tele2) appealed the deci-
sion (in addition to the lowered pilot signal they had appealed the decision of not
postponing the deadline) to the County Administrative Court (Länsrätten) on the
basis that more areas of Sweden should be included in the lowered pilot signal re-
quirements, in addition to the postponed time limit. The processes made the PTA
accept a lowered pilot signal in some additional areas, which is for the benefit of the
operators, and the appeal was withdrawn. 
By January 2005 the PTA stated that since the licence conditions had been changed
(lowered requirement in the way of measuring coverage in the sparsely populated areas)
the operators should have a new respite to rectify the lack of coverage. This time how-
ever the respite was set to one month and by February 28, 2005 the operators should
have reached the coverage of the licence conditions or the PTA “may issue an order”
according to chapter 7, section 5 the Electronic Communications Act and the order
may be combined with a fine (PTA report of 22 February 2005). 
What is interesting here is that the changes of the obligations connected to the pi-
lot signal in the rural areas of Sweden meant a beneficial way of measuring the cov-
erage for the operators. It was this beneficial change (less base stations required for
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the same degree of coverage) that gave the operators another respite, due to the
“changes of the licence conditions”. The logic here is not obvious. It is possible that
the radio planning connected to these conditions demand some extra planning time,
a reallocation of resources, which would support the need for extra time. This could
on the other hand be balanced against the fact that the operators saved up to 
 
one
fourth
 
 (according to the PTA press release of October 24, 2005) of the infrastructure
costs of the remaining 15 to 20 percents of full coverage by the decision to lower the
pilot signal (PTA decision by December 7, 2004, when the coverage was somewhere
around 80-85 percent of the coverage requirements). This would be more than
enough to outweigh any reallocation costs, and hence make the reasons given by the
PTA not legitimate. The pilot signal was allowed to be lowered further in the so
called buffer zone in October 2005 (PTA report of February 22, 2006, p 20).
 
4
 
 
So on one hand, when it comes to the coverage percentage, the PTA stresses the
importance of predictability and to not change the coverage requirements of the
original licence conditions, and on the other hand, when it comes to the perhaps a
bit more complicated pilot signal issue, the PTA changes the licence conditions in
favour of the operators. Consequently, instead of changing the coverage conditions,
the definition of coverage is changed. What happened when the operators in March
1, 2005 reported that the lack of coverage was not rectified? In fact, SULAB had not
raised the level of coverage at all between  December 1, 2004 and March 1, 2005,
see table below. The story told on this issue in the PTA report from  February 22,
2006 stops here. Nothing is said about the order that “may be issued” or the sanc-
tions that could follow (see p 12-13). 
 
Table 1
 
 
 
From PTA report of  February 22, 2006, p 10. 
 
When Hi3G and Vodafone in June 2005 applied for the PTA to allow some of the
3G activity to be performed through an alternative 3G technology, the so called
CDMA2000 in the 450 MHz band, the PTA decided to ask all operators if they
could ensure the continued infrastructure development with this new technology. At
the same time the PTA decided to await these results before issuing an order, com-
 
4 This buffer zone consists of the area that reaches three kilometres from the boundaries of the pop-
ulation centres for places with more than 1000 inhabitants according to the Statistics Sweden, SCB,
as of December 31, 2000. 
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bined with a sanction, for the operators to rectify the lack of coverage. But why did
not the PTA act during the three months following the reported lack of coverage in
March 1? The PTA concluded, regarding NMT450 and 3G (UMTS), that there was
no way to bridge the technologies without lowered quality for the consumers. For
instance, there where no handsets on the market covering both technologies. The
PTA turned down the request and through the application the operators again
gained some time in the continuing strive for an adequate coverage. The decision
came on October 24, 2005. 
One of the operators, Orange, chose not to fulfil the commitment at a relatively
early stage, resulting in, after a series of events, the Orange frequency spectrum being
split between the three remaining operators. Orange applied in August 2002 for
more time to develop the infrastructure for a lower coverage, without success. A PTA
press release from  December 19, 2002, reveals that the PTA found out from an Or-
ange press release that Orange intended to withdraw its participation in the 3G in-
frastructure development in Sweden. The PTA had not been informed. Orange, on
February 6, 2003, applied to the PTA to allow a transfer of the licence to a subsidiary
company, GGG Licens AB, which the PTA denied on the ground that Orange was
likely to be planning to sell this subsidiary company in order to withdraw the Orange
contribution to the Swedish 3G infrastructure construction (PTA Decision April 23,
2003). On September 30, 2003, Orange and the Telia Sonera and Tele 2 owned
Svenska UMTS Licens II AB applied to the PTA to allow a transfer of the Orange
licence to Svenska UMTS Licens II AB. The PTA denied the request primarily based
on competitive aspects; that the competition in the market would decrease resulting
from the fact that SUNAB would be in control of two of four licences (see the PTA
April 28, 2004 document referred for consultation, and PTA decision of May 26,
2004). 
In short, Orange, from late 2002 to 2004 tried different ways to make use of the
licence, all denied by the PTA realizing that Orange would not invest in a full infra-
structure. During the fall of 2004 the PTA, on application from Orange, retrieved
Orange’s licence (PTA report of  February 22, 2005, p 10) by a decision in Novem-
ber 8, 2004. Chapter 7, section 6 of the Electronic Communications Act states:
 
A licence may be revoked and licence conditions amended immediately, if…
…5. the licence holder requests that the licence should be revoked.
 
It should be remembered that the PTA has the right to request the operators to
present documentation of the roll out with the penalty of a fine if they refuse (section
15, part 1, 4 of the abolished Telecommunications Act 1993:597, chapter 7, section
3, Electronic Communications Act). The PTA did not put much pressure on Orange
during the time the company still formally participated in the 3G development, yet
obviously showed no intent to fulfil the requirements. This once again shows the
scope of action available to the PTA. 
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Twice the time
 
When the first licence period ran out by July 1, 2006 the coverage was between 93
and 94 percent of 8 860 000 people. The new licence conditions were favourable to
the operators. The pilot signal in the outskirts of the urban areas was lowered, result-
ing in a higher coverage. With the lowered demands for the pilot signal the area to
be covered increased to 98 percent. This is without any new base stations being con-
structed. On August 9, 2006, the PTA notified the operators when the full coverage
should be reached, and the new dates were based on the operators’ own estimates of
when to be ready. 
This means that the operators had managed to reach the end of the first licence
period without completing the promised amount of coverage and without receiving
expensive fines from the PTA. It also means that on the other side of July 1, 2006,
the coverage requirements where lowered and dependent on their own estimates.
The PTA had avoided heavy critique, as well as being sued by applicants that did not
receive a licence. On December 1, 2006, about three years after the initial deadline
for reach of coverage, the first operator (Tele2/TeliaSonera) reported to the Post and
Telecommunications Agency, the PTA, that their common network had reached the
coverage of 8.860.000 inhabitants of Sweden, followed by the remaining two oper-
ators, Hi3G and Telenor, 7 months later (PTA fact sheet of June 1, 2007, PTS-F-
2005:5, p 6).
 
A change of circumstances that could not have been 
foreseen?
 
The story above leads to the important question of why the coverage was not reached
in accordance with the licence conditions, which is one of the implementation issues
of the 3G infrastructure construction in Sweden and, if the reason was not legiti-
mate, why did not the PTA sanction the operators for breaching the licence condi-
tions? The second question is returned to in the analysis below. Regarding the first
question, the debated issue, or rather the used explanation, was the municipal han-
dling of mast building permits the unforeseen hindrance of the infrastructure roll
out. Or were the permit processes exceptionally slow, as often claimed in the numer-
ous applications for changed licence conditions? What was it in the permit process
“that could not have been foreseen at the time for the application”? Orange’s appli-
cation to postpone the deadline expressed (PTA decision  September 30, 2002): 
 
“Orange assumed that there would be a wish to get UMTS-coverage fast, why the permit proc-
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Whose wish the company is talking about is left out in the discussion, but it is surely
the municipalities’ wish Orange is referring to, which calls for the question of wheth-
er the operators expected to get exceptional treatment when it comes to the permits?
And on what grounds they expected this. 
The PTA can sanction operators not fulfilling licence conditions through a con-
siderable fine. The coverage by the end of the period was between 66 and 74 percent
of the promised 8 860 000, with only three operators remaining. The first operator
to reach full coverage was the Telia/Tele2 collaboration on December 1, 2006, fol-
lowed by the two remaining operators (Hi3G and Telenor) that reported on June 1,
2007. The municipal permit handling was blamed for the delay, a reason that “could
not have been foreseen”, which helped the operators avoid sanctions from the PTA.
It has been shown that a slow municipal permit process cannot explain the lack of
coverage in some areas of Sweden, and therefore is not a fully legitimate reason for
the delay (Larsson 2008). It was especially the coverage in the sparsely populated ar-
eas of Sweden that was neglected, which the licence allocation process so generously
had promised would not be the case (Larsson 2008, p 124-127). 
 
Analysis and conclusion
 
A quick conclusion is one that has already been told: The way the legal framework
was applied regarding the supervision of the operators in the case of the 3G infra-
structure development in Sweden cannot be explained from a legal dogmatic per-
spective. Something is missing in the explanation of the PTA actions. 
One way to approach an explanation on some of the legally controlled decisions
in the 3G case is to return to the horizontal perspective of sociology of law in relation
to the vertical perspective of legal dogmatics. When having strict and clear conditions
attached to the allocated 3G-licences and a governmental authority enforcing these
conditions armed with legal tools of making it possible to order substantial fines, one
would think that alternatives would be clear. Either the conditions are fulfilled, or
they are not fulfilled and sanctions are imposed. Although the picture is not that sim-
ple, there are legitimate ways to stall the deadline as well, a certain scope of action.
And some PTA actions can be explained in the vertical perspective, for instance giv-
ing the operators a chance to correct the lack of coverage within “reasonable time”,
but not all. Some of the delay of the PTA enforcement seems to lack explanation in
the vertical, legal dogmatic, perspective. This is where the horizontal perspective is
necessary as an explanatory tool.  
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Figure 5
 
From Hydén 2002b, p 16, see also the introduction to this anthology, Hydén & Wickenberg
2008.  
 
Figure 2, in chapter 3.0 above, has here been complemented with arrows pointing at
the legal application, symbolizing the influence from economy, politics etc. The
PTA is the “applier” of the legal order describing and setting the stage for the legiti-
mate PTA actions towards the operators. The PTA’s role is mainly regulated in the
Electronic Communications Act, the ECA. As an applier the PTA has to follow the
legal order, and if deviating from this in some sense, the PTA will most likely still
formulate and legitimate this deviation in terms of the legal order. 
While we should not safely assume that the agency is lawful in all its actions, at
the same time the exact legal provisions are not clear in all cases, still to be defined
by practice. The ECA sets the framework for the PTA; meaning that the PTA can
have different strategies for how hard the PTA will control the operators, within this
framework. Regardless if you view it as strategic freedom within a vague legislation
or a breach of law and agreements, the outcome is clearly unpredictable and conflict-
ing the intentions expressed in the planning stages of the development. It is accept-
able to assume that both political values as well as causes like an IT-sector in a period
of decline will affect the PTA application within the legal framework, or beyond the
boundaries of the same. 
In either case, it has included non-legal aspects to a decision-making that was de-
fended by legal rhetoric. This means that the actions were affected by values that
were not outspoken. This can be described as the societal forces in the horizontal di-
mension becoming so strong in the individual case that they push aside the legal reg-
ulation of the vertical dimension. Here there seems to be a bigger game unlocking
the legalistic approach. It is in this sense that the PTA can both accept a delay in
reaching of coverage, and at the same time claim that the licence conditions have not
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changed and blame the operators for stalling the infrastructure development by re-
ferring to the legal order. The operators can, at the same time, point their fingers at
the municipalities’ unexpectedly slow permit process as the reason for the lack of cov-
erage, which at least partly is not a fact. 
Such an analysis of the PTA/operator relation suggests a PTA handling of the op-
erators’ responsibilities in consensus with the operators, as two participants in a game
teaming up in a way that the rules of the game do not intend them to. The period
before the licence allocation, when the draft was prepared and the preconditions
were decided upon, the times in the IT sector were extraordinarily good, the sector
was booming and the optimism connected to information technology was strong
(Larsson 2008). The stocks of key players in the 3G development such as Telia, Eric-
sson and Tele2 were peaking (pictures below). As a result of this, during the autumn
of 1999 critical voices were heard regarding the infrastructure development running
a risk of being delayed in Sweden, and was an expression for fear that Sweden would
lose its world leading position in the telecom sector (PTA report June 2001, p 5).
Behind the critique were Swedish telecom operators and producers of telecom equip-
ment. The responsible Ministry called for the PTA to speed up the licence allocation
process.
 
5
 
 Finland had already allocated the licences, a fact that most likely stressed
the Swedish critics, especially Ericsson (PTA report June 2001, p 5). It was the nec-
essary changes of the Telecommunications Act that partly delayed the Swedish allo-
cation, which were made in order to secure competition in the telecom market. 
 
Upper left:
 
 The Ericsson stock charts for the times before, during and after the intended 3G infrastruc-
ture roll-out. Note the good times of the planning stages of the Swedish 3G development prior to the
intended infrastructure roll-out (in pink/red), when Ericsson pushed for a faster licence allocation proc-
ess.
 
Source: Six AB
Upper right:
 
 The Tele2 stock charts for the times before, during and after the intended 3G infrastructure
roll-out. The pattern is recognized. Tele2 made promises during optimistic times and the attempts to
postpone the deadline started sometime in the middle of the “intended” roll-out. 
 
Source: Six AB
 
5 ”Mångfald, valfrihet och lägre priser på mobiltelefonmarknaden”, Press release issued by the Min-
istry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications (Näringsdepartementet) Dec 15, 1999.
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Below:
 
 The TeliaSonera stock charts for the times before, during and after the intended 3G infrastruc-
ture roll-out compared to the operator actions and the PTA response see figure 4. 
 
Source: The PTA, Six
AB and Larsson 2008.
 
When the infrastructure roll out, as a result of the promises made to receive licences,
were to speed up in 2002, the IT bubble burst and the market went into decline, cer-
tainly affecting the investment interest of the operators facing problems. They faced
harsher times and decided to try hard to postpone the deadlines for the reach of cov-
erage according to the licence conditions. How the PTA reasoned is hard to tell but
the important point here is that the PTA, by its lack of sanctions, participated in the
game for the benefit of the operators. 
Is it not a good thing that the PTA can be flexible enough to let the operators’ roll
out depends on reasonable investment strategies and fluctuations in the market?
From a licence allocation as well as a legal security perspective it is problematic, to
say the least. This is because a “yes” to this question means that the licence allocation
would be nothing but a charade, and the promises made by the contestants would
not be followed by a duty to fulfil these promises later. Such a system is neither trans-
parent nor predictable and just. If what is stated in the licence conditions is not what
will later be fulfilled, the conditions are not transparent. The transparency of the 3G
licence allocation in Europe was prior to the allocation especially emphasized in the
EU directive of 97/13/EC. Also, predictability is “one of the basic values in democ-
racy and a state governed by law” (Peczenik 1995, p 89f.). Many legal theorists hold
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the norm of “jurisdiction and the actions of public authorities in a democratic state
should be predictable” (ibid, p 90) as the very essence of legal security. The licence
conditions of the 3G development can also be judged in light of the most basic prin-
ciple of civil law, described by the Latin phrase 
 
pacta sunt servanda
 
, – agreements
must be kept. 
When the European Commission in a Communication to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions in June 2002 commented on the matter of the 3G roll out in Europe, it
stressed the importance of a predictable environment in the sector and any modifi-
cations in the licence conditions should be “proportional, transparent and non-dis-
criminatory” (Section 3.1 of COM(2002) 0301). 
From an analytical point of view, there were three basic alternatives open to the
PTA when handling the operator breach of fulfilling the licence conditions. One was
the “the hard way” – imposing heavy sanctions on the operators in order to make
them comply with the licence conditions. Another was “the honest way” – that the
PTA would have confessed that the results of the so called beauty contest were not
reasonable in light of the changed market conditions of 2001 and 2002, hence allow-
ing changes in the conditions and risking to be sued by other applicants as well as
being criticized for not sustaining a predictable environment, transparent and non-
discriminatory handling. The PTA chose a third alternative, a middle path, the bal-
ancing act of not formally changing the licence conditions (which 
 
formally
 
 sustains
the above said) and not sanctioning the operators for their breaches, but from several
aspects 
 
informally
 
 leads to an application that is quite the opposite of what the Com-
mission communicated. In fact, the PTA’s handling of the operators is not 
 
predicta-
ble
 
 – the licence conditions have not been upheld. Not formally (when it comes to
the pilot signal), but more importantly not actually, in the application. This means
that the handling has not been 
 
transparent
 
, in the sense that the formal documents
did not describe the actual outcome, and 
 
discriminatory
 
 towards the other applicants
as regards the lack of demanded realism in the promises made in order to get the li-
cence.
The PTA’s role in the governing of the Swedish telecom sector can be returned to
here. For instance, it can be questioned that the PTA fulfilled the goal of “promotion
of competition” in this case, if the governing was discriminatory. A comment in the
preparatory work regarding chapter 7, section 4 is particularly interesting in the case
of the PTA supervision of the operators’ obligations under the licence.
 
The circumstance that a party has not responded within the time frame the authority has given,
does not hinder that the authority proceeds in its supervision. Neither do repeated or new and
changed applications to the authority mean that the authority cannot proceed in its supervision,
unless it within the time frame is clear that further supervisory action is unnecessary (Prop 2002/
03:110, chapter 30, author’s translation)
 
The PTA clearly had let the supervision responsibilities rest whenever an operator
applied for a change in the conditions or appealed a decision. The preparatory work
clearly states that the PTA would not have had to do so. So, again, why the soft treat-
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ment, when the design of the development had emphasised the importance of speed
and coverage, the reach of a “regional balance” and the importance of ensuring that
Sweden remains a “leading IT nation” (Larsson 2008)?
The bigger picture applies and in the long run the results may have been the best
in the given circumstances in an IT sector in decline.  A bankrupt operator would
not have been beneficial to anyone. But the lack of predictability in the actions of an
important governmental agency is still a problem. In this case it meant that the ap-
plicants in the licence allocation process that could foresee the PTA’s lack of sanc-
tions most clearly benefited the most. Note the interesting comment from Europol-
itan (later Vodafone, now Telenor), one of the 3G licence winners, which, when re-
viewing the draft before the licence allocation process in 2000, asked for clear and
apparent sanctions for the operator that does not reach the promised coverage in
time, in order to prevent too high bids (PTA 13 March 2000). This shows that the
operator knew that the design of the licence allocation could stimulate too high bids,
and perhaps feared that other applicants would bid higher. Bearing in mind that Eu-
ropolitan actually made the highest possible bid regarding coverage and time limit,
just months later. This may have been a tactical manoeuvre or perhaps became a
strategy the moment the company realized that no heavy sanctions would be clearly
stated in the conditions, even though the company had asked for it. This operator
later fulfilled the coverage conditions by June 1, 2007 instead of the promised De-
cember 31, 2003 (PTS fact sheet of  June 1, 2007, PTS-F-2005:5, p 6).
The differences between how the 3G infrastructure development was designed
and how it was rolled out can probably be explained by the radical transformation of
the IT and telecom market in late 1999 and into the early years of the new millen-
nium. Still the approach of the article has not been economics or market fluctuations
but from a socio-legal and spatial planning point of view. The focus has not been the
players of the market as much as it has been the public handling of different key as-
pects, included the actions of the government, the PTA and the operators. 
The unsanctioned operators’ lack of coverage according to what had been agreed
upon illustrate a lack of transparency in the governmental steering of a billion dollar
project, which shows the incrementalist approach where a short-term (daring rather
than deliberating) perspective reigns where developments are made step-by-step. The
question is to what extent not only the operators but also the PTA were, informally,
comfortable to find ways out of the pressured time limits and formal statements of
the year 2000. Formally, in any case, the PTA has to refer to legitimate delays. When
focusing on the appeals and new operator applications, this can be seen as a method
of not putting too much pressure on the operators and to make up for the mistakes
made in the licence allocation process that became apparent a little too late, at the
cost of predictability in the legal application. 
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OBJECTIVELY BEST OR MOST ACCEPTABLE? 
Expert and lay knowledge in Swedish wind power permit processes
BY STEFAN LARSSON AND LARS EMMELIN
 
Abstract
This article analyses legal aspects of the Swedish wind power development, theoret-
ically based on how different types of knowledge are represented in legal contexts, 
mainly in court. A sample of appealed wind power permits is analysed, a handful 
of relevant informants are interviewed – including two judges in the Land and 
Environment Court and the appeal court – and the legal setting is analysed. Of key 
interest here is the interplay between expert and lay statements in the court cases, 
which here are related to the concepts of calculating and communicative rationalities 
that are developed in planning literature. The results indicate that the juridification 
– that takes place as a permit issue is appealed in the judiciary system – supports the 
calculating rationality more than the communicative, and that the plaintiffs often 
attempt to adapt in how they shape their argumentation. A common reason for 
appeal, according to the sample of cases and of particular interest for this interplay 
between expert and lay, is the issue of noise – or fear of what the noise level and type 
of disturbance will be like – along with aesthetical and visual concerns, as well as 
environmental concerns, including birds and bats.
KEYWORDS: WIND POWER, SPATIAL PLANNING, KNOWLEDGE TYPES, EXPERT/LAY, JURIDIFICATION.
1. INTRODUCTION  
– ANALYSING SWEDISH WIND POWER POLICIES
This article deals with the question of how different types of knowledge are repre-
sented in the legally regulated control and planning of the spatial environment, with 
particular focus on the planning and permit-giving of Swedish wind power devel-
opment. This can be described in terms of the difference between expert and lay 
knowledge, but also in terms of two different approaches towards decision-making 
that can be called a calculating rationality, on the one hand, and a communicative, 
on the other (Sager, 1994). The expert and lay types of knowledge have recently been 
addressed in terms of how “new relations between expertise and citizens can be ne-
gotiated and designed” in risk regulation (Lidskog, 2008). The challenges relating to 
how to balance experts and lay knowledge have also been addressed in wind power 
research (Aitken, 2009). There are case studies dealing with attitudes and the com-
plex set of issues around renewable energy and wind power (Peel & Lloyd, 2007). 
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Peel and Lloyd (2007) highlight the “emerging experiential learning of state, market 
and civil interests in this new infrastructure age” (2007, p. 344) and mainly refer to 
the Scottish and the UK situation. 
Much of the motivation to study and analyse how expert and lay knowledge is 
played out in the development of wind power can be found in the fact that there is 
a quite significant resistance at the local level, which needs to be better understood, 
including the role of the public in policy-implementation in a spatial context. A 
number of studies have targeted local opposition to wind turbines and wind farms 
(Ek, 2005; Petrova 2013; Devine-Wright, 2005), for example, regarding noise and 
shadows (Agterbosch et al., 2007; Devine-Wright, 2005; Strachan and Lal, 2004; 
Wolsink, 2000) or environmental and animal concern (Agterbosch et al., 2007; Stra-
chan and Lal, 2004; Toke et al., 2008). These are issues that are of interest also when 
it comes to how knowledge is presented, reproduced and negotiated in relation to a 
legal permit assessment. 
First of all, the Swedish planning system has its base in the planning conduct-
ed by local authorities, which poses an interesting challenge from a national policy 
perspective. In fact, one could argue that the Swedish legal framework is unique in 
relation to the siting of wind turbines and the granting of permits. While national 
authorities set guidelines for the sectorial spatial planning that exists at national level 
through relevant legislation, it is in fact the Swedish municipalities that are the most 
powerful authority when it comes to the implementation of landscape planning, a 
fact often referred to as the “municipal planning monopoly” (cf. Petterssen et al., 
2010, p. 3118). In Sweden, granting of wind power permits is governed by the leg-
islation for spatial planning through the Planning and Building Act but also by the 
Environmental Code. These two legislations need to be balanced, which is not neces-
sarily always easy, an aspect perhaps further underlined by the fact that there are two 
separate administrative bodies – the municipality versus the county council – that 
are the main operators under these two legislations, and that they also operate at two 
administratively and spatially different levels (local versus the regional). The differ-
ence is also seen in that the county council board is appointed by the Government 
to coordinate administration with national political goals for the county, whereas 
a locally elected assembly governs the municipality. This creates a complexity that 
in itself can be detrimental to participation and access to justice (Larsson, 2013b) 
and it signifies a type of challenge in the Swedish system that deals with handling 
the governance of different levels and – arguably – different types of rationalities 
which, compounded with other factors, can be described as separate paradigms of 
governance (Emmelin & Kleven, 1999; Emmelin & Lerman, 2006; Larsson, 2014). 
The Swedish legal framework for spatial planning is not vertically integrated with 
the planning and localisation aspects that are the responsibility of the municipalities 
(Khan, 2003). In addition, the Swedish permit process for wind power was criticised 
for being inefficient and slow and containing superfluous “double permit processes” 
in the two sets of legislation and administration. A major revision in 2009 was meant 
to let environmental permit procedures also replace local planning as the instru-
ment of spatial planning of wind power development. To what extent this changes 
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the conditions for public participation is a question of interest, and how concerned 
citizens interact with courts in terms of what knowledge and what narratives that are 
accepted regarding the construction of wind turbines as the permit process becomes 
an appeal case is central to this study. In another Swedish large-scale infrastructure 
implementation, the 3G mobile telephony which demanded a large number of local 
building permits, it has been shown that the way concerned parties were involved 
changed when the cases reached the appeal courts (Larsson, 2014). The institution-
alised demands on which knowledge was deemed relevant changed as the process 
became “juridified.” In the cases of the specific topic of electromagnetic radiation 
from telecommunication base stations, its alleged hazardousness and the fear that 
constituted a common reason for appeal in the Swedish 3G development, Larsson 
shows how the deliberative and communicative aspects faded as the appeals reach 
the higher courts, the “‘black box’ of law closes in on the decision making and expert 
knowledge takes over as the more heavily weighted knowledge” (Larsson, 2014, p. 
178). Similar results are found by Aitken (2009) in a study on wind power develop-
ment in Scotland. Aitken concludes that the planning application process had two 
separate stages, which structured the roles of lay and expert knowledge differently. 
Local objectors were able to influence the early planning application stage, where 
the decision-making power lay with the local authority. This resulted in an appeals 
process which was beyond the influence of lay people, and within which lay know-
ledge played only a marginal role (Aitken, 2009, p. 61).
This is not likely the outcome of a consciously controlled and policy-based develop-
ment, but rather a consequence of how the process is structured. It can be related to 
what Lidskog (2008, p. 78) describes as a “clash between science’s universal and ‘de-
contextualised’ character and lay people’s local understandings.” To what extent this 
characteristic can be seen in the wind power appeal cases forms part of this study. 
The conflict in rationalities between the often centralistic view of the ex-
pert-based perspective and the often more local lay approach can also been seen 
in the legal revisions made in 2009 in terms of a conflict between a central policy 
based on calculating rationality and local, political power over the landscape. This is 
succinctly expressed by the preparatory work for the legal changes that entered into 
force on 1 August 2009 suggesting changes to increase the efficiency of wind power 
development by removing much of the local planning of wind power.
In addition, there is a risk that extensive use of the detailed development plan 
instrument will mean that wind power development in Sweden will depend on 
different municipal values of what is regarded as appropriate in the particular mu-
nicipality, and that wind power will not be developed in the areas which, from an 
objective perspective, are seen as the most suitable from an overarching perspecti-
ve (SOU 2008:86, p. 229, authors’ translation).1
1 ”Det kan dessutom finnas en risk för att en omfattande användning av detaljplaneinstitutet medför 
att vindkraftsutbyggnaden i Sverige blir beroende av olika kommunala värderingar om vad som 
är lämpligt i just den egna kommunen och att vindkraftsutbyggnaden inte sker på de platser som 
objektivt sett är mest gynnsamma ur ett helhetsperspektiv.”
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The noticeable positioning towards the calculating paradigm is expressed in that it is 
the “municipal values” that threaten to impede the expansion of wind power at the 
“objectively” most favourable locations. This is found at a legislative level, and should 
here be regarded as a background to the purpose of this study that focuses the court 
proceedings following from the legal setting. 
1.1Purpose and research questions
The main purpose of this study is to better understand how different types of 
knowledge or rationalities are negotiated and taken into account in face of the legal 
regulation controlling the Swedish wind power development. A particular focus here 
is placed on the judiciary processes relating to permits and their appeal. In line with 
this purpose, the following research questions are asked: 
1. What reasons for appeal are common and how are they handled in the appeal 
process? 
2. How does the permit process structure relations between “lay” and “expert” 
roles?
3. How do participants respond to those structures in attempting to influence 
outcomes of the permit process?
4. How does the handling of lay and expert knowledge in appealed cases deter-
mine public participation?
The expert/lay divide is here mainly studied through court cases of wind turbine 
permissions that have been appealed and how different arguments relating to subjec-
tive values as well as expert-statements are played out in court. The material used for 
the study comes from three main sources: 1.) A sample of appeal court cases from 
southern Sweden, i.e. the Land and Environmental Court (LEC) and the Land and 
Environmental Court of Appeal (LECA), 2.) Interviews with a handful of key per-
sons such as two expert judges, regional administrators and a regional wind power 
coordinator appointed by the Government; 3.) Legal documents such as preparatory 
work for the 2009 revision of the legislation and permit process. 
1.2  Background
On the one hand there is in Sweden a national policy to increase the speed of wind 
power development, where legal change is one measure taken, and on the other the 
spatial planning system which is based on a local planning monopoly. The develop-
ment of wind power in Sweden is an interesting case of conflict between national 
goals for technological development and local spatial planning and governance of 
land use (Larsson et al., 2014). As already mentioned, this conflict between central 
and local power is further emphasised by what can be seen as a paradigmatic conflict 
relating to what type of knowledge should control decision-making; on the one side 
there is a calculating rationality, where expert-based knowledge is held as the defin-
ing paradigm, and on the other there is a communicative or deliberative approach 
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that deals with balancing legitimate but not necessarily compatible interests. 
Swedish wind power development has fallen behind the development of coun-
tries such as Denmark, Germany and Spain during the last decade or two, although 
Sweden produced about the same amount of energy from wind power in the early 
1990s as the aforementioned countries (Söderholm et al.  2007, p. 369-270, Vin-
dkrafthandboken 2008, p. 12). In recent years, the political goals and actions to 
speed up the development of wind power has grown, which has also resulted in an 
increase in installed capacity. The Swedish national policy is to produce 30 TWh of 
wind power by 2020. Criticism has been levelled in recent years against the spatial 
planning system for being an obstacle to many different types of infrastructure 
development, including the critique that handling of wind power plant permits is 
too slow and ineffective, partly as a result of “double permit process”, under both the 
planning and the environmental legislation (see Dir. 2007:184, SOU 2008:86, En-
ergimyndigheten, 2007, p. 18). A government commission examined the possibilities 
of making the permit processes more efficient to allow for rapid development of the 
use of wind as an energy source. The application process was changed in 2009 from 
requiring both planning and permission under the two regulatory bodies to primari-
ly depending on the environmental trial under the regional administration regulated 
under the Environmental Code. 
2. KNOWLEDGE-TYPES AND THE EXPERT/LAY DIVIDE
In the theoretical planning literature, the difference between “calculating” and “com-
municative” rationality is often brought up (Sager, 1994; cf Tewdwr-Jones & All-
mendinger, 2002), for example, in a narrative of a historical, post-war development 
in planning (Amdam & Veggeland, 1998). As a reaction to the more centralised and 
expert-based planning profession, the “communicative” response grew, and devel-
oped terminology and theory of “communicative planning” (Forester, 1989), “argu-
mentative planning” (Forester, 1993), and “collaborative planning” (Healey, 1997; 
1998). If we use these two strands as a dichotomy, the goal here becomes to be able 
to use them as an analytical tool in the case studied. For example, the calculating is 
often seen as expert-based, as opposed to a more communicative and/or lay ap-
proach to knowledge (Emmelin, 1997; Emmelin & Kleven, 1999) That is, these two 
perspectives on rationality or these different types of knowledge are both legitimate 
and necessary for land use planning, but the challenge is how to balance and negoti-
ate between them. The appropriate type of knowledge in the right place, so to speak. 
This is sometimes described in terms of an expert/lay divide (Lidskog, 2008). In 
spatial planning, for example, regarding environmental concerns, the issue is often 
raised of an expert based bias which means that lay input often has to be phrased on 
the expert’s terms. Aitken (2009) brings up Epstein’s work on “lay” AIDS treatment 
activists that managed to present themselves as “credible” by adapting their approach 
and ways of communicating in order to be accepted by scientists. On a similar ac-
count, Collins and Evans (2002) suggest that this is a method that could also be used 
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by others that seek to be credible in “scientised” areas. Such arguments, according to 
Aitken (2009), imply that it is lay people who need to change or adapt if they wish to 
be taken seriously by experts:
Thus the notion that lay knowledge might provide valuable contributions, and 
hence that experts should proactively endeavour to access this knowledge-base, is 
ignored. The onus is on lay people to be flexible and learn new styles of communi-
cation, despite the fact that it is expert knowledge which currently has a privileged 
status and position within decision-making processes (Aitken, 2009, p. 49).
Aitken et al. (2008, p. 793) elaborate on the “unquestionable nature of policy within 
public inquiries” in which they see a rationalistic thought structure that underpins 
how participatory processes can be set up, “restricting the range of possible argu-
ments that participants can make.” Consequently, individuals or types of evidence 
that challenge or deviate from this set of assumptions can be easily disregarded. This 
can be related to an “agenda-setting power” (Aitken et al., 2008). At face value, this 
relates to what sociologists of law sometimes address in terms of “juridification”, 
that is, some sort of formalisation of the social sphere (Teubner, 1987). Within the 
frame of this study, how the legal order shapes the negotiations between rationalities 
in wind power issues is of clear relevance, which could be addressed in terms of a 
“juridification of social phenomena” (Teubner, 1992) or even “the legal distortion of 
social realities” (Teubner, 1992, p. 1455). 
The dialectic perspective between expert and lay is, however, very much a 
present challenge in the legally regulated control and planning of the spatial envi-
ronment, a fact sometimes described in its more dysfunctional characteristic. As put 
by Darier et al. (1999): 
[T]he nature of the relationship between ‘expert’ knowledges and ‘lay’ publics is at 
least as much about the ‘public(s) understanding of scientific knowledges’ as about 
the general (mis)understanding of the ‘publics’ – and their ‘lay knowledges’ – by 
those who have specialized scientific knowledges (Darier et al., 1999, p. 105). 
Interestingly enough, empirical studies of lay judgments of judicial decision-making 
show that the public opinion on court judgements is “outcome-dominated”; that is, 
participants gave favourable evaluations of the judges and their decisions when they 
agreed with the judges’ outcomes (Simon & Scurich, 2013). Similarly, lay people’s 
reactions to experts attending in court follow a similar pattern. The experts are 
“deemed competent and their commentaries are deemed reliable when the par-
ticipants agree with the outcomes propounded by the experts, but the opposite is 
true when the participants’ preferred outcomes are incongruent with the outcomes 
endorsed by the experts” (Simon & Scurich, 2013, p. 797).
 157
 Stefan Larsson  |  Law and Spatial Planning     |   
3. RESISTANCE AND PARTICIPATION IN  
WIND POWER DEVELOPMENT
An important aspect to consider in terms of local decision-making in relation to 
wind power permit handling is the legal framework that surrounds the decision to 
either grant a permit or decline a permit. Arguably, both consistency in approach 
and a somewhat integrated spatial or building law are crucial to an effective process. 
Stemmer argues that in relation to the wide spectrum of wind power regulation 
within the US, states ought to streamline the wind power farm siting process. He 
suggests this could be done through channelling all such decisions through a desig-
nated state agency, for example, a public service commission (Stemmer, 2011, p. 86). 
Much literature has been written on local opposition to wind turbines and wind 
farms (Ek, 2005; Petrova 2013; Devine-Wright, 2005), from a number of perspec-
tives, such as: 1.) Noise, shadows and flickering (Agterbosch et al., 2007; Devine-
Wright, 2005; Strachan and Lal, 2004; Wolsink, 2000); 2.) Decreased property values 
(Larsson et al., 2014; Toke, 2005); 3.) Detrimental effect on tourism (Vuorio, 2003; 
Strachan and Lal, 2004); 4.) Environmental concerns, including animal concerns 
(Agterbosch et al., 2007; Strachan and Lal, 2004; Toke et al., 2008); and 5.) Visual 
and aesthetical concerns (Agterbosch et al., 2007; Carlman, 1986; 1988; Devine-
Wright, 2005; Johansson and Laike, 2007; Toke et al., 2008; Wolsink, 2000). 
Some literature blames either the aesthetics of wind turbines in local areas 
or the concept referred to as NIMBY-ism. NIMBY-ism or “not in my back yard” 
syndrome is described by Bell et al. (2005, p. 460) as a proposed “gap between an 
attitude motivated by concern for the ‘common good’ and behaviour motivated by 
‘self-interest’”. While there generally seems to be support for the idea of renewable 
energy through wind power at the national level of most countries, this does not 
always filter down to the same level of support at the local level which often allocates 
the sites for wind farms (Jobert et al., 2007). The local opposition to wind farms no 
doubt has an effect on the decision process of permit granting by local authorities. 
Much of the literature has focused on addressing the issue of local opposition, while 
one strand focuses on overcoming the opposition and creating acceptance. As a 
general concept, local support seems to be premised on community involvement 
throughout the permit handling process and/or community ownership. As Breukers 
and Wolsink suggest, positive relationships occur when wind power implementation 
begins locally and support is mobilised bottom up, and involving local wind energy 
projects and local ownership (2007). This is something that Spain has managed to 
achieve through its insistent local wind power policies and is also the premise of 
Denmark’s early and continued success in the implementation of wind power. There 
is also research to suggest that early and sustained community involvement in the 
decision and planning process generates local support, making the application and 
permit granting process more effective (Khan, 2003; Krohn and Damborg, 1999). 
Wolsink (2005) argues that the perception among both planners and developers 
is that the challenge primarily lies in spreading information and knowledge in order 
to encourage people to be more sympathetic to wind power development. Wolsink 
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argues for a deliberative and “fair” decision-making when it comes to issue of the 
landscape, rather than blaming the public for being unwilling to cooperate. This ties 
in with what Cowell (2007) describes as the governmental and developer solution to 
the “planning problem”, namely an even further withdrawal of participatory ele-
ments for the public in the process. 
The sanctions and actions of governing authorities and policy-makers will not 
only define the character of their position on wind power development, but also how 
they define the role of the public in the development: 
The choice of strategy for policy makers (and advocates of wind energy) will de-
pend upon how we view the qualifications that lead people to oppose particular 
developments. If we consider that their objections are misguided and should not be 
accommodated, assuming we do not wish to exclude them completely, our strategy 
must be to change their minds. If we consider that their objections should be ac-
commodated, our strategy should be to change the developments (Bell et al., 2005, 
p. 468).
If we consider the fact that the public is merely consulted in the process of wind 
power development in Sweden, one approach to explaining the resistance can be 
found in what Bell et al. (2005) describe as a “democracy deficit.” If so, a policy-re-
lated option would be to “change the underlying character of the planning process 
from confrontation to collaboration” (Bell et al., 2005, p. 467, with reference to 
Healey, 1996; 1997). Such a collaborative approach is, according to Bell et al. (2005) 
grounded in the claim that “deliberative” rather than “technical” rationality should 
be the basis for environmental decision making (cf. Owens et al., 2004):
Collaborative planning shifts the emphasis from competitive interest bargaining to 
consensus building; it recognises and includes all stakeholders; and seeks to iden-
tify diverse interests and the mechanisms of power that may work to subordinate 
some of them. The aim is public participation rather than public consultation; it 
does not aim to ‘educate’, but to create opportunities for discussion. A collaborative 
process might overcome the democratic deficit by encouraging (some of) the ‘silent 
majority’ to participate in decision-making. If the siting process involves the local 
community from the very beginning – even before a specific site is chosen – there 
may be more incentive for local people to participate (Bell et al., 2005, pp. 467-
468).
The Swedish model mostly means a consultation approach, where the public in 
various degrees are an active part. To what extent the municipalities and developers 
are “hearing but not listening” – to use the terminology of Conrad et al. (2012) – is 
hard to tell. 
 159
 Stefan Larsson  |  Law and Spatial Planning     |   
4. METHOD AND MATERIAL
The material used is drawn from three main sources that are combined in the analy-
sis: 1. A sample of court cases from southern Sweden where turbine permits have 
been appealed, both in the Land and Environment Court (LEC) and Land and 
Environment Court of Appeals (LECA – the “supreme” environmental court); 2. Interviews with a handful of key persons such as two expert judges in LEC and 
LECA, regional handling officers assessing power plant applications, and the 
wind power coordinator appointed by the government in order to facilitate the 
development in southern Sweden; 3. Legal documents such as preparatory work regarding the revision of how wind 
power is assessed and how the permits for the turbines are considered, in which 
an important legal revision was made in 2009. 
For the analysis a sample of appeal permit cases was collected from the Land and 
Environmental Court (LEC) of Växjö [Mark- och Miljödomstolen] as well as the 
Land and Environment Court of Appeal (LECA) [Mark- och Miljööverdomsto-
len]. These two courts were created 2 May 2011 in the current arrangement. There 
are five LECs in Sweden that divide the country into five jurisdictional areas and 
one LECA, which accepts a case after approval in the “supreme court” sense, after 
granting permit review. The sample of judgements from both the LEC and LECA are 
selected from decisions passed since 2 May 2011 due to the complexity that would 
follow from comparing different court systems, which would risk obscuring the 
clarity in the analysis we have pursued. Therefore, cases analysed from LEC have 
been selected from between 2 May 2011 and November 2013.2 There are 20 cases in 
the sample from LEC and nine cases in LECA of which only three received permit 
review and were tried by the appeals court, of which two are of relevance for this 
study. Given that the LEC is one of five of its type in Swedish jurisdiction and the 
LECA the only of its kind, in combination with the fact that the legal setting is the 
same for the entire country, the results from this type of qualitative analysis of the 
handlings in court can very likely be analytically generalised to speak for the case 
of Sweden (cf. Yin, 2014, on generalisation). This, of course, also depends on the 
theoretical foundation (Yin, 2014, p. 40), which will also be applied to the analysis of 
the four interviews conducted for this study in order to complement and elucidate 
the results we have received from the analysis of the other sources: 1.) Expert judge 
in LEC; 2.) Expert judge in LECA; 3.) Administrator at the county council; 4.) The 
regional “wind power coordinator” which has the role of supporting and facilitating 
wind-power development in southern Sweden and is one of four regional coordina-
tors appointed by the government. 
Apart from the appeal cases, the legal material that has been used for the 
study has primarily regarded the directives and reports concerned with the legal 
2 LEC in Växjö, that is, and the sample regards cases appealed from the area/region of Skåne. 
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revisions made during 2009. This constitutes the proposal that was drafted by the 
Environmental Process Commission (Miljöprocessutredningen) in late 2008 (SOU 
2008:86) and the subsequent governmental bill that followed in the spring of 2009 
(Prop. 2008/09:146), as well as the main directive for the wind power commission 
(Dir. 2007:94) and the supplementing directive of most interest to the wind power 
processes (Dir. 2007:184). The actual legislations are a natural part of this too, such 
as the Planning and Building Act (that was revised in May 2011, from 1987:10 to 
2010:900) and the Environmental Code (1998:808), but also of the regulation for 
economic support for wind power planning (2007:160).3 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Common topics (as inquired in RQ1) found in the argument against wind power 
permits in appeal cases are, according to the sample of appeal cases as well as the 
expert judges: 
1. Noise/disturbance/intermittent shadowing from the moving rotors; 
2. Visual aspects/landscape aesthetics; 
3. Potential impacts on fauna (in particular birds and bats); 
4. Risks of decreasing property values; 
5. Fear and feeling of uncertainty regarding a number of factors, including de-
creasing property values.
The single most common concern according to the sample of appeal cases is noise 
from wind turbines, or fear of what the noise level and type of disturbance will be 
like. It seems that a central concern regards how to clearly express the more vague 
feelings, worries and fears that many plaintiffs share regarding wind power. The 
interviews and court case analysis conducted for this study point to the fact that it is 
hard to pinpoint the actual driving-forces behind appeal and resistance. As pointed 
out by Bell et al (2005):
There may be good grounds for thinking that self-interested reasons for opposing 
a development will be ‘hidden’ behind principled arguments but we should not 
automatically assume that opponents of local developments do not genuinely hold 
a general principle of qualified support for wind energy. If we want to determi-
ne whether or not people are qualified supporters, we will (at least) need to look 
beyond their public arguments to the reasons they offer in private for opposing a 
development (Bell et al., 2005, p. 464).
Nevertheless, from the perspective of how rationalities are negotiated in court, we 
can conclude that noise is a topic often present in court cases dealing with permit 
processes, and a topic of clear interest in terms of how it expresses a battle between 
3  Förordningen (2007:160) om stöd till planeringsinsatser för vindkraft. 
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expert and lay knowledge as well as its relation to how the appeal courts treat it. First 
of all, a noise level of 40 dB(A) at the outer wall of a residential building, which is a 
recommended value or “soft norm” (Emmelin & Lerman, 2008), has become central 
to conflicts and appeals. This is confirmed by appeal cases as well as the interviews 
with both the expert judges and the environmental permit official at the county 
council. The issue of noise as well as the aesthetic concerns in appealed permit 
processes can serve as an explanatory example of how the permit process structures 
relations between “lay” and “expert roles” and how participants respond to those 
structures, as inquired in RQ2 and RQ3. The interviewed official claimed that the 
issue of noise has become more common in appeal cases. The reason for this may be 
the increased development in forest areas where local residents experience that they 
live in an especially quiet environment which would be significantly impacted. The 
environmental permit official described how some residents distrust the calculation 
methods used for concluding the levels of noise from a windmill when it reaches the 
proximity of their residence, and stated that actual measurements were questioned 
to a lesser degree. He also saw problems in how some anti-wind power lobby groups 
accepted ongoing cases for local people in court: 
Some associations will accept handling local residents’ issues, but argue the wrong 
details. They have made  their own calculations, but do not take the precautions 
defined in our decisions into consideration. These cases are dismissed directly by 
the Land and Environment court. When some associations step in, there is a risk of 
missing the actual issues of importance for local residents.
Additionally, the issue of noise is particularly interesting here, because the court 
cases reveal a constant battle around “threshold values”, what they mean, to what 
extent they are treated as guidelines or binding norms, who has made the assessment 
of the expected noise levels for the particular turbine to be erected and even how the 
models for measurement are constructed, as in a case in Tomelilla (M3665-10, LEC 
26 November, 2011) or a case from Linderödsåsen in Kristianstad, where the plain-
tiffs living in the area used a research report from Aalborg University to support 
their claims on the unreliability of noise measurements (M 1492-11, LEC 30 January 
2012). These figures, which originate from guidelines for external industrial noise 
drawn by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency in the 1970s, have become 
stricter in court praxis for wind turbines over the years. Interestingly enough, the 
expert judge in the Land and Environment court of appeal (LECA) claims there is 
exaggerated focus on threshold levels at the local level, and that there are several 
conjunctive issues to take into more holistic consideration at the appeal court level. 
Almost all of the appeals initiated by plaintiffs include aesthetic concerns as a 
reason to deny wind power permits. At the same time, the judge in the LEC, which 
is the first level of appeal after the county council decisions, states that the court 
only considers these place specific concerns to a limited extent. The same is stated 
with regards to other, more vaguely formulated fears. This can be seen as an indica-
tion that the plaintiffs need to adjust the formulation of their complaints to better 
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fit the arguments and reasoning in court. Consequently, the “landscape analysis” 
that sometimes is conducted by some municipalities can be a method to “scientize” 
aesthetic concerns and to narratively adjust them to court proceedings. Statements 
are made in a seemingly objective form concerning “what the landscape can toler-
ate” and this is often related to statements concerning perceived scale and openness 
of the landscape. How to formulate arguments, then, is through a normative but 
passive parlance in which conditions are not expressed as statements but as facts that 
are “taken-for-granted.” One case in LEC with 27 plaintiffs from an area between 
Helsingborg and Ängelholm in southern Sweden concerned an appeal of an envi-
ronmental permit for 8 wind turbines with a hub height between 80-105 m. (Case M 
1180-11, 1 March, 2012). Here, the company argued that the two wind farms to be 
combined have a “cohesive and harmonious design” and thus will not “cause imper-
missible interference on the landscape” (p. 20). The scenery and the landscape are 
“assessed as visually durable” (p. 23).4 
Another example can be taken from how the planning board in the local 
authority issued a statement in a LEC case regarding a wind turbine permit for a 
location in Trelleborg (M 1861-11, 18 November 2011, p. 3): 
The visual importance of traditional structures, which are often part of the horizon, 
is sensitive to several large vertical structures on the landscape and as such involves 
a disturbance in the substantially horizontal landscape and takes the focus away 
from the level horizon. Particularly vertical elements, unrelated to agriculture, can 
affect large areas.
This can be described as a sort of translation of aesthetic issues from being based in 
the individual spectator’s values (“in the eyes of the beholder”) to becoming a matter 
of expert assessment of a value considered to be intrinsic in the landscape.
The property value argument is common in appeal cases and relates to a con-
cern that many people have of wind power establishment in the vicinity leading to a 
decrease in value of adjacent properties. This is seen in the appeal cases. Interestingly 
enough, this is expressed by the expert judge (of the LEC) as a topic that “everyone 
addresses”, but that the court “never considers.” 
The role of birds, particularly nesting sites for raptors, and bats is strongly posi-
tioned as an argument against turbine permits. The LEC expert judge indicates this 
in his statement that “eagle owls, bats and eagles are very much taken into account.” 
This is seen, for example, in the debate on to what extent a wind turbine establish-
ment in Hallabjär, Kristiandstad, would be inappropriate due to the presence of a 
“very rare bat” – Barbastella barbastellus (Case M 2687-12, LEC 18 December 2012). 
Another example of a strategically formulated argument can be exemplified by the 
Linderödsåsen case mentioned above: 
4 ”en sammanhållen och harmonisk utformning. Att de inte har samma höjd eller utformning 
kommer därför inte medföra otillåtna störningar på landskapsbilden.” 
 
”Landskapsbilden i området bedöms däri som visuellt tålig.”
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The golden eagle is probably not nesting in the area yet, but the nearest known 
breeding site is only a few kilometres away and a new establishment of territory is 
to be expected if the area remains undisturbed (M 1492-11, LEC 30 January 2012).
Alternatively, as argued by plaintiffs in a case from Helsingborg: “[t]he golden eagle 
and the eagle owl are about to establish in the area” (Case M 1180-11, LEC 1 March 
2012). This also indicates that plaintiffs sometimes adopt or even construct argu-
ments that they may think will benefit their appeal. As put by the environmental 
permit-official at the county administration: 
[It happens] in some cases, but there are few examples of this. You suddenly find 
an eyrie. This only happens, however, in exceptional cases. What is more typical is 
noise, shadows, and effects on the landscape.
The Helsingborg/Ängelholm case mentioned above deals with the issues of noise 
and birds, among other issues (M 1180-11, 1 March, 2012). One of the plaintiff ’s 
statements highlights how expertise on birds is negotiated and challenged:
The information presented by the company regarding the impact of wind turbines 
on bird life deserves to be questioned. When the company’s hired expert Leif Nils-
son expresses his opinion on the proposed activity’s impact on twelve species of 
raptors, he chooses to reject the material available regarding raptors, while citing 
studies of a species of diving ducks (Case M 1180-11, p. 11).5
Many of the plaintiffs issued statements on the situation for birds and bats in the 
area, and many made references to a statement by some ornithological association. 
For example, one resident claimed that “[t]here are plenty of bats in the area, no 
inventory of these has been carried out, and through contacts with scientists [it has 
become clear that] the knowledge of rare species in the area has not been mapped” 
(M1180, p. 6).
The division between ”lay” and the more trusted “expert” knowledge quite 
obviously plays a significant role in how the public may participate in the wind 
development at the appeal stage (as inquired in RQ4). A closer reading of the more 
complicated cases provides further insights into the interplay between expert and 
lay statements – as with the case regarding a group station of 18 wind turbines on 
what is called the Linderödsåsen in the municipality of Kristianstad (LEC case M 
1492-11, 30 January 2012). The environmental permit was approved by the county 
council, and seven individuals living in the area appealed the permit. In this case, 
we can see the interaction between the use of expert knowledge, i.e. references to the 
specific noise measurements and general noise studies and the authoritative argu-
ments contained in the guidelines from governmental authorities (such as the Na-
5 ”Det underlag som redovisats från bolaget beträffande vindkraftverkens påverkan på fågellivet 
förtjänar att ifrågasättas. När den av Bolaget anlitade experten Leif Nilsson uttalar sig om den tänkta 
verksamhetens inverkan på tolv arter av rovfåglar väljer han att underkänna det material som finns 
tillgängligt beträffande rovfåglar samtidigt som han åberopar studier av en art dykänder”
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tional Board of Health and Welfare, Socialstyrelsen), as well as anxiety and aesthetic 
considerations. There is a dialectic relationship between the threshold levels and the 
residents’ concern for how the noise will be experienced. The residents fear that the 
quiet environment they see as characteristic of the area will be destroyed. The plain-
tiffs wish to speak in defence of an area, the area they feel is their territory, while the 
defendant (the company) argues that their rights to participation relate only to the 
immediate environment of the properties (pp. 8-9) – i.e., “the plaintiffs’ substantive 
right of action, as concerned parties” (p. 8).
6. CONCLUSIONS
One way to understand the particular results of how different types of knowledge 
are received, negotiated and formulated within the legal setting of court disputes 
over wind turbine permit-giving is to relate them to the two paradigms of gover-
nance mentioned above. If there is on the one hand an “environmental paradigm” in 
which the calculating rationality or logic is emphasised parallel to a concentration 
or centralisation of the decision-making, there may be, at least analytically, a “plan 
paradigm” on the other. The latter would then emphasise a communicative rationali-
ty, which not uncommonly is regarded as a more locally based feature. In the specific 
case of wind power, noise is mainly treated, at least at the lower instances and first 
level of appeal, as a matter of calculating rationality based in the extent the measured 
level is in compliance with the 40dB(A) “threshold.” Therefore, much argument is 
directed towards issues such as the methods of measurement and calculation and the 
importance of remaining below the 40dB(A) level. The wildlife concern is treated in 
a similar fashion, particularly with regards to eagles and bats, where the court argu-
mentation relies on expert statements from ornithological associations or external 
authorities in the field. Individuals’ fear or worries (for property value depreciation, 
health, “destruction” of the landscape etc.) are often expressed in the appeal docu-
mentation, but appear to constitute a type of value that courts cannot seriously con-
sider. This indicates that the communicative aspects of the permit appeal is at least to 
a large extent controlled by a more calculating and expert-based logic that is found 
in the “environmental paradigm.” Furthermore, the appeal in court can be described 
in terms of a juridification that entails a formalisation. As such it also functions as a 
sorting tool that defines and categorises the information, arguments and statements 
made by the concerned parties in the process (on the significance of categorisa-
tion for law and norms, see Larsson, 2013a). At best, this serves as a means to sort 
amongst formally legitimate concerns in order to arrive at a justified decision. At 
worst, the juridification merely becomes a “distortion” of social realities (as outlined 
by Teubner, 1992) that shape an authoritative decision-making process perceived as 
illegitimate. This juridification shifts the balance of power and increases the demand 
for arguments that fit with the pre-existing legal order. 
It seems that improving the permit handling process in relation to wind en-
ergy is a multi-faceted agenda. While there are bureaucratic processes that can be 
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improved to streamline and make the decision making process more effective, the 
interest of the local public also has to be addressed. This responsibility not only 
befalls the national government when setting renewable energy targets but must also 
start from the bottom through wind energy producers engaging with local commu-
nities to illustrate the likely appearance of proposed developments and to include the 
local public in the planning and siting of wind power plants (Lange and Hehl-Lange, 
2005; Klintman & Waldo, 2008; Peel and Lloyd, 2007; Wolk, 2008).
As mentioned above, there is a strand of critique in the literature on expert and 
lay knowledges in decision-making that states that the lay side often has to adjust 
to the expert modes of communication to be heard at all (Aitken, 2009; Collins & 
Evans, 2002). On a similar note, the endeavour to be considered a credible party and 
express legitimate statements in the appeal process could most likely be strength-
ened by support from an already existing organisation, such as an ornithological 
association. Similarly, the anti-wind power lobby associations seek to reach similar 
credibility on overall wind power questions, but seem to be regarded as less legiti-
mate in court than their ornithological counterparts. A component of this lack of 
legitimacy may possibly stem from the fact that they have been developed specifical-
ly as lobbying organisations against wind power, whereas the ornithological associa-
tions at the national or regional level are seen as organisations that exist irrespective 
of the wind power issue.
The results indicate that the juridification that takes place when a permit issue is 
appealed in the judiciary system supports the calculating rationality more than the 
communicative, and that the plaintiffs often attempt to adapt through the formula-
tion of their arguments. It leads to an increase in the strength of scientific or at least 
“scientized”, meaning “science-like”, language use and references to expertise.
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Abstract
At national policy level in Sweden, the importance of development of wind power 
is emphasized. However, the actual implementation is highly dependent on local 
permit giving for windmills. The legislation governing the permit giving has been 
revised in an attempt to make the local processes faster and to shift the permit 
process towards a more regional environmental process as opposed to a more plan-
based municipal process. By tradition in Sweden, the local, municipal level has had a 
strong mandate in land use planning which is often referred to as the “the municipal 
planning monopoly”, which means that there is a tension whenever a legal proposal 
seeks to diminish this “plan monopoly”. The legal investigation suggesting changes 
in the law on permit-giving stressed the need for strengthening the regional assess-
ment, which lead to a compromise called the ‘municipal veto-right’, where the re-
gional environmental permit needs a formal approval from the municipality for the 
permit process to continue. This study investigates both the legal development of the 
so-called veto-right as well as what it empirically has lead to, and how it is perceived 
by the industry as well as concerned parties. For this reason a sample of 30 regional 
permit cases has been collected, and a limited of interviews has been conducted with 
judges in appeal courts and regional handling officers assessing turbine applications. 
Results indicate that the industry sees the “veto” as leading to problematic uncer-
tainty in the process at regional level, and therefore prefer to keep the applications at 
a level that entitles them to use the municipal permit system – which is determined 
by height and number of turbines. This is a consequence directly opposite to what 
the legal commission aimed for when revising the legal system. 
KEYWORDS: WIND POWER, LAW, SPATIAL PLANNING, TIERING, MULTI LEVEL GOVERNANCE, MUNICIPAL VETO. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study represents an interdisciplinary enterprise to study a case of relevance for 
environmental policy, management and planning when it comes to issues of tiering, 
and power between different levels in environmental governance. It is here argued 
that it is of necessary for environmentally relevant planning for renewable energy 
technologies to understand more of the challenges inherent in the multi levelled 
governance of spatial planning, in this case exemplified by Swedish wind power 
development. For example, the dialogue between stakeholders is to a large extent de-
termined by the legal setting in which they operate. Within a framework of rational 
decision making a common conception of strategic decision making is one of a hier-
archical system with an increasing level of detail as one moves down to implementa-
tion and daily operation (Alexander 2000; Marks & Hooghe, 2004; Sager, 1994).
Wind power development in Sweden is interesting not least because it can serve 
as illustration of two sets of problems in environmental governance and spatial plan-
ning (Larsson, 2009; 2011b). Implementing national goals for renewable energy fac-
es both the problems of multi level governance and the special conditions imposed 
by the existence of two parallel systems of planning and permit granting, including 
demands for participation and efficiency (cf Newig & Fritsch, 2009). In Sweden, the 
obstacle to an increased reliance on wind energy is often said to be slow and com-
plicated wind power planning and permit procedures with local opposition playing 
an important role (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2003; Michanek and Söderholm, 2006; 
Åstrand and Neij, 2006). Thus, when the main Swedish legislation concerning wind 
power development was revised in 2009 it was done with the goal of making the 
processes more “efficient” from the point of view of national goals and developers 
(SOU 2008: 86; Prop. 2008/09:146). This has resulted in two different combinations 
of environmental permit granting and spatial planning of wind power deployment.
More specifically, wind power development in Sweden to a large extent relies on 
two different sets of legislation – the Planning and Building Act, PBA, and the Envi-
ronmental Code, EC. It has been argued that they codify two types of “paradigms” 
or cultures concerning what constitutes the basis for legitimate decisions (Emmelin 
& Kleven, 1999; Emmelin & Lerman, 2006; Vuorio, 2003). These have been argued 
to be of importance to understand the outcome of decision-making under these 
two sets of regulations, for example concerning issues of public participation in the 
development of the infrastructure for the third generation of mobile telephony in 
Sweden (Larsson, 2014; cf 2008). To facilitate the development of wind power, the 
Swedish Government in 2007 appointed a  committee with the mandate to investi-
gate how the permitting process for wind energy could become more efficient (dir. 
2007:184). The legal investigation had to choose between either the “municipal 
spatial planning side”, including detailed development plans and building permits, 
or the “regional environmental side”, entailing environmental permits. They chose 
the latter, motivating this stepping away from municipal decision-making power by 
referring to the municipal comprehensive planning as the appropriate means for the 
municipalities to influence the environmental permit process and thereby to control 
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wind-power development within their local jurisdictions (SOU 2008:86, p. 222). 
The proposal was heavily criticised from the perspective that it undermined the 
municipal so called planning monopoly. This lead to two compromises: One relat-
ed to larger wind mills (height over 150 metres; or group stations with mills higher 
than 120 metres; in both cases height is calculated from base to the tip of the blades 
at the highest point) where the local authorities were given what has been termed 
a ”veto” (this is not the legal term, but it has been interpreted as such, and is often 
called so in the public debate) in that they can approve or in effect deny the giving 
of the environmental permit without giving any reasons, which in practice amounts 
to a power of veto. The other was that single windmills smaller than 150 m high (but 
above 20 m) and groups of fewer than 7 mills still requires building permit from the 
municipal authorities and ‘notification’ in accordance with the Environmental Code. 
The logic of these two concessions to local authority is difficult to understand given 
that the object was to streamline permit granting to facilitate a faster development of 
wind power. Our interpretation is that there was a belief that technical and econom-
ic factors, which had hitherto caused a successive increase in size and generating 
capacity, would mean an automatic change to the new system thus making environ-
mental permit granting at the regional level the dominant route. 
1.1 Research purpose and questions
The purpose of the article is to understand more about the tension between differ-
ent administrative levels in the Swedish system of environmental governance with 
regards to wind power. The specific traits of this system to a large extent define 
the outcome of important challenges relating to environmental concerns, spatial 
planning and public participation, and the system is a complex set of intermingled 
entities such as different administrative levels, law, private and public interests, the 
top-down policy initiatives as well as industrial players in the wind power business. 
Therefore, the specific research questions are as follows: 
1. How can the Swedish wind power development be understood in terms of the 
different levels of governance, from national, to regional to local?
2. What does the so-called municipal veto mean for the Swedish wind power de-
velopment? In particular, how is the veto right perceived and conceptualized by 
involved parties such as concerned citizens and wind-power companies?
The so-called municipal veto is at the core of the challenges between local planning, 
regional environmental assessments and national policy – all of which interact to 
determine Swedish wind power development. At the same time this example can 
tell about issues of general interest when it comes to national policy-making that 
presupposes to local implementation, as well as of the role of law in spatial planning. 
The case of wind power deployment in Sweden illustrates more general questions of 
importance for governance especially concerning the relationship between regula-
tion of the implementation of national goals and the regulation of local planning. 
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2. TIERING AND MULTI LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
Within a doctrine of rationalist planning the notion of a hierarchical system of deci-
sion making with an increasing level of detail as one moves down to implementation 
and daily operation is an important assumption. This hierarchical and top-down 
model of multi level governance has long been criticised from both theoretical and 
practical points in the planning literature (Alexander 2000; for an overview see e.g. 
Allmendinger 2009), political science (a classic is Etzioni 1967), and SEA theory 
(Cherp et al. 2007). However it is a mainstay of both EU and national Swedish reg-
ulation of Environmental Assessment, which is one of the important tools of envi-
ronmental integration into spatial planning. It is often termed tiering in the Strategic 
Environmental Assessment, SEA, literature (Lee & Walsh 1992). The assumption of a 
tiered system of planning and decision-making is the historical basis for the devel-
opment of SEA and central to the relationship between the EU-directives on EIA 
and SEA respectively. Indeed, tiering has been described as a key element of SEA 
and even one of the major drivers for the development of SEA (Arts et al., 2005). 
Arts et al. (2005) defines the concept of tiering as the distinguishing between 
different levels of planning – policy, plans, programs – that are prepared consec-
utively and influence each other (cf EC, 1999, pp. 16-22). Tiering is then ”about 
how the different levels of planning relate to each other” (Arts et al. 2005, p. 2). 
The tiered system is assumed to be internally consistent, top-down and in the case 
of environmental issues based on a scientific, calculating rationality (Sager 1994, 
Emmelin & Kleven, 1999). The higher levels are assumed to set clear limits to the 
degree of freedom of lower limits using for example binding and quantitative norms 
in the form of environmental standards and thresholds (Emmelin & Lerman, 2008). 
In the development of EA this process was seen as the “foreclosure of options” of 
lower levels necessitating both a binding strategic planning and the application of 
SEA (Wathern, 1988). It can thus be argued that while the notion of vertical con-
sistency has weak theoretical foundations and highly varied practical application in 
existing planning systems it is nevertheless an important component of multi level 
governance utilising national goals and objectives and methods of management 
by objectives. While tiering is essentially an aspect of vertical relationships within 
government the concept of multi-level governance, MLG, is also of importance to 
our discussion. This stresses not only the vertical dimension of government but also 
the interdependence between governmental and non-governmental actors, which 
is the essence of “governance” (cf Appelstrand, 2007; Hajer, 2011). Governance with 
central directives, goals, or standards and threshold is by its very nature top-down 
while in theory allowing lower level choice of means of achieving objectives. Howev-
er the role of central directives, standards and norms as well as more general nation-
al and supranational goals may be to attempt to impose a measure of vertical and top 
down consistency rather than assuming it as an inherent characteristic of the system 
(Emmelin & Lerman, 2008). 
 177
 Stefan Larsson  |  Law and Spatial Planning     |   
3. THE SWEDISH SYSTEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
The Swedish system of environmental governance and spatial planning can for the 
purpose of our discussion be described as an asymmetrical, three tiered system with 
two main sets of legislation and “streams” of administration and decision-making. 
On the one hand there is the Environmental Code defining processes and substan-
tive goals of environmental governance. On the other hand, planning practice is 
codified by the Planning and Building Act. The Swedish system of government has 
three levels: national, regional and local. The regional system with a County Admin-
istrative Board is for historical reasons an arm of central government whereas the 
local level is based on decision making in an elected body, the Municipal Govern-
ment, served by branches of local administration and professionals. Within the two 
“streams” their relative importance and power is distinctly different. With Sweden’s 
entry into the EU a further level of governance was introduced. In the case of wind 
power planning this added level has several influences such as through EA direc-
tives, goals for renewable energy, etc. (Emmelin & Lerman 2006)
One aspect of the Swedish spatial planning system is of particular importance 
from the perspective of tiering and MLG. The municipality has, as already noted 
above, a monopoly on plan making and there are no higher tier spatial plans made 
at either national or regional level, which singles Sweden out in a European territo-
rial governance perspective. At the regional level there is no politically elected body 
responsible for plan making1. The regional arm of the state, the County Administra-
tive Board, does not make plans but oversees municipal plan making, especially with 
regards to legality, national interests and sector interests. (cf COMMIN)2
In this paper it is the multi level governance aspect and the relationships 
between the levels in the two “legal/administrative streams” that is in focus rather 
than the paradigmatic struggle between them. While the focus here is on the vertical 
aspect of MLG it is important to note also the horizontal interaction between the 
environmental permit system and planning (Dühr et al, 2010). It is in this respect 
important to note that not only are the relationships between levels in the system 
different in the two streams but they are also based on different models of gover-
nance rooted in different paradigms and professional cultures (Emmelin & Kleven 
1999; Emmelin 2000). The paradigmatic struggles of different professional cultures, 
norms and legal administrative “streams” fits well into the concept of MLG which 
challenges “the hierarchy fallacy” (Emmelin in press) i.e. simplistic notions of tiering 
and emphasizes that authority is gradually dispersing across sectors and levels (Dühr 
et al, p. 98). While the concept has been criticised as being “more a metaphor than 
theory” (Rosamond, 2000, p. 11) and “lacking in a set of testable hypotheses” (Jor-
1 There is a long-standing debate on the regional organisation and representation in Sweden. As a 
test case two regions, Skåne and V Götaland, were created from former counties and have elected 
“parliaments”. The discussion here of organisation refers to the rest of Sweden where more or less 
loose regional organisations based on the municipalities exist and the County Administrative Board 
is the regional administration. The reform of the regional structure has entered a state of limbo after 
a proposal by a commission on regional organisation. 
2 &20PRQ0,1GVFDSHVLVD(8¿QDQFHGSURMHFWFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHVSDWLDOGHYHORSPHQWLQWKH
Baltic. 
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dan, 2001, p. 201) nevertheless it has proved useful in understanding environmental 
policy (Dühr et al, 2010; Naujėkaitė, 2011) and is relevant as a characteristic of the 
structure that we describe. 
3.1 Regulating the relationship of the levels
In June 2007 The Environmental Process Commission was appointed with the 
mission to facilitate, coordinate and otherwise make efficient the administration and 
judicial review of property cases and matters under the Environmental Code and 
the Planning and Building Act, PBA (Dir. 2007:94). In addition, according to the 
supplementing directive (Dir. 2007:184), given on December 20, 2007, the commit-
tee should also consider the need for amendments related to renewable energy, water 
activities, and national interests under Chapter 3 PBA, environmental impact assess-
ments, and coordination and consultation in the review procedure. The Commission 
was to propose necessary amendments to the Environmental Code, the Planning 
and Building Act and other relevant statutes. According to the directive, the overall 
purpose of the mission was to “[m]ake more efficient the environmental assessment, 
i.e. to make the trial more quick and easy, without bypassing rule of law, health and 
environmental protection requirements. In this context, a starting point is that the 
processing time should be kept as short as possible without hindering the ability 
to meet the environmental objectives or override the public’s right to transparency 
and participation” (dir. 2007:184 Supplement Directive for environmental process 
investigation, p. 3).
Furthermore, the directive says that the “[p]roposals must involve the coordi-
nated management of trial processes and enable a more transparent and temporally 
shorter and more efficient processing, while the trial is to remain diligent and in 
accordance with the rule of law” (2007, p. 7). A clear emphasis was in the directive 
made on efficiency, both in terms of reducing any parallel processing but also by 
coordinating handling between agencies. Before August 2009 the permit processes 
for wind power demanded permits from both of the main bodies of law, the PBA 
and the EC, which lead to a need to chose which one was to be given preference. The 
proposal (SOU 2008:86) and the subsequent governmental bill (2008/09:146) chose 
the regional and environmental path, emphasizing that the comprehensive plan3 
would be the municipalities’ most important instrument for taking part in the wind 
power development. 
This meant that the local municipalities would to some extent, loose their 
power over the planning of this particular development, which their representatives 
were quick to point out. Many commentators to the proposal, including the Swed-
ish Association of Local Authorities and Regions, which is the national association 
representing all the municipalities, did not share the commission’s assessment that 
it is enough that the examination of large wind power installations be made  under 
the Environmental Code. They claimed that the proposal involved an unacceptable 
restriction of the municipal plan monopoly (2008/09:146, p. 39). 
3 The comprehensive plan is a mandatory plan covering the entire area of the municipality; it is 
however not legally binding.
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It is worth noting that in the report from the Environmental Process Com-
mission drafting the preparatory bill there was no proposal to compensate for the 
restrictions on the right of municipalities to decide on land use. The committee 
claimed that municipal control over the siting of wind farms would largely be 
unchanged since the municipal position would continue to be taken into account 
through the comprehensive plan, and by the municipality’s position as a strong 
referral organization.
The subsequent governmental bill expressed a different assessment of the 
impact on local self-government. It was claimed that the removal of requirements 
for building permits and detailed development plans would be compensated with 
a municipal veto power “[t]o some extent satisfy respondents’ submissions on this 
part and ensuring a high level of municipal influence over the use of land and water” 
(Prop. 2008/09: 146, p. 40). This was the only reason given for introducing what 
amounts to a municipal power of veto. Despite the introduction of the veto, it meant 
a restriction on local autonomy with regards to planning. The restriction was in the 
bill however claimed to be necessary with regards to meeting the goals set in the use 
of renewable energy, making it very urgent that the trials in the wind power process-
es becomes more efficient and simple (Prop. 2008/09: 146, p. 49). 
4. METHOD AND MATERIALS
The method for this study is a combination of: 1.) traditional analysis of the legal 
documents formulating the Swedish system for environmental governance with 
regards to wind power, and a mostly qualitative analysis and discursive exemplifica-
tion, along the lines of the literature sociological approach of Burke (Asplund 1979), 
2.) Analysis of sample of wind power processes, including consultation documents 
and 3.) Interviews with a handful of key persons such as two expert judges in re-
spectively the Land and Environment Court (LEC) and the Land and Environment 
Court of Appeals (LECA – the “supreme” environmental court), regional handling 
officers assessing turbine applications, and the wind power coordinator appointed by 
the government in order to facilitate the development in Southern Sweden. 
The sample consists of 30 wind power processes in the county of Skåne, which 
is one out of 21 counties in Sweden, and the county that during 2011 had the second 
most installed effect of wind power and number of wind power turbines of all the 
Swedish counties (Statens Energimyndighet, 2011, p. 12). The permit process ma-
terial consists of applications from developers, letters from the public, consultation 
documents, appeal documents etc., including information on height, number of 
turbines, dates, locations etc. In this study, the type of data that has been of the most 
interest regards the written documentation from the consultation processes in the 
permit handling, which here is analysed qualitatively in order to detect concerned 
individuals’ attitudes towards the municipality and the veto process, and more. Legal 
sources such as preparatory bills and public legal investigations have been used in 
order to depict and analyse the legal development of relevance within the scope of 
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the study. In addition, secondary sources and other relevant studies have been taken 
into account when applicable.
The legal material has already been mentioned and consists of the explicit legal 
regulations such as the Planning and Building Act (that was revised in May 2011, 
from 1987:10 to 2010:900) and the Environmental Code (1998:808), but also of the 
regulation for economic support for wind power planning (2007:160)4, the main 
directive for the wind power commission (Dir. 2007:94) and the supplementing 
directive of most interest to the wind power processes (Dir. 2007:184). Further, 
the most important sources for studying the intentions behind the legal revisions 
implemented in August 2009 which can stand for the manifest intentions of the law, 
consists of the proposal that was drafted by the Environmental Process Commission 
(Miljöprocessutredningen) in late 2008 (SOU 2008:86) and the subsequent govern-
mental bill that followed in the spring of 2009 (Prop. 2008/09:146). 
5. RESULTS
The legal revisions have been already accounted for in the narrative of this article 
and may be summed up with two brief concepts: increased efficiency, understood 
mainly in terms of speed. The preparatory work has emphasized the importance of 
shortening time from application to decision. This focus on time aspects in plan-
ning and decision-making is of interest from a wider planning perspective, which 
we return to in the analysis below. Further, the “municipal veto” that emerged in the 
governmental bill but was not included in the preceding proposal from the wind 
power commission is of great interest in terms of power structures and who controls 
the spatial development. 
5.1 Veto, efficiency and timing
There have been anecdotal cases in the press regarding cases where the munici-
palities’ answers have arrived late in the permit process, presumably adding to the 
aspects of uncertainty in the planning. It is simply hard for the applicants to make 
decisions over investments if the negative decisions arrive at a very late stage in the 
process. 
The County administration of Skåne, which is the sample region in our study, 
sent a letter to the Swedish Ministry of Environment regarding the municipal veto in 
2010. According to this letter the municipalities tend to produce their own back-
ground material for their decisions regarding the permits applied for. Furthermore, 
the municipalities sometimes add conditions as a complement to the delivered 
opinion, which is not an action prescribed in the law. The County Administration 
asks for a clarification of the rules regarding what the municipalities may or may not 
do, and demands that the time frames for the municipal decisions should be more 
clearly specified. In 2012 the Swedish Energy Agency [Energimyndigheten] issued 
4  Förordningen (2007:160) om stöd till planeringsinsatser för vindkraft. 
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a report including the “veto issue” (Statens Energimyndighet, 2012). The report 
comments upon the so-called municipal veto as problematic in relation to wind 
power development, arguably because it “has meant that the permit process in many 
cases has been extended, because it has taken a long time before the local authority 
has answered. In some cases, the municipal answer has taken over one year” (Statens 
Energimyndighet, 2012, p. 23). The long delay – as argued in the Energy Agency 
report – from the municipal side in these cases is caused by the municipalities being 
in a process of complementing the comprehensive plan with a specific supplement 
on wind power. The municipalities have in these cases wanted to finish the com-
prehensive plan process before answering the county administrations regarding 
wind power projects (2012, p. 23). This is in the report taken as an indication that 
the answers will not be as delayed in the future. According to our regional sample 
of permit processes in Skåne, the majority of questions are however asked by the 
County administration within one or two months from when the permit application 
arrives (10 cases – in only 2 cases has the municipality not answered within approx. 
3 months, and one with the information about veto missing). This indicates that the 
municipal involvement occurs fairly early in the process.
5.2 The veto as perceived by concerned citizens
In the consultations that are organised at regional level as a part of the permit han-
dling process there is in our sample a lot of material on citizens’ views on the munic-
ipalities’ role. Often, it is democratic concerns that are spoken about in the consul-
tations, as an issue directed towards the municipalities rather than at the companies 
that seek to establish wind power.5 It seems that the municipality and its represen-
tatives often are targeted in the comments even if the process formally is tied to the 
regional level and the local planning is not the most central aspect controlling the 
actual wind power establishment.
Another issue often addressed is a fear that the wind power establishment will 
lead to a depreciation of property values,6 which is a rather common concern report-
ed in the literature (Agterbosch et al., 2007). Much has been written on local opposi-
tion to wind turbines and wind farms (Devine-Wright, 2005; Petrova 2013; Wolsink 
2005), including for Swedish circumstances (Ek, 2005). 
5.3 The veto as perceived by wind-power companies
The “veto” rule that was introduced as a compromise to satisfy the advocates for 
municipal influence in wind power issues, and the restrictions that is neverthe-
less meant for local self-government was issued because it was claimed to be “very 
important position to the handling of wind power cases simpler and more efficient“ 
(Prop. 2008/09: 146, p. 49). Several stakeholders have however voiced concerns 
over the veto compromise. It has, according to a pro-wind power NGO lead to “a 
5 As in Eslöv-Hörby/Söderto-Mossarp (extensive protest list), Hässleholm Ignaberga-Attarp, 
Kristianstad Maltesholm, Sjöbo-Hårderup-Alestad, Sjöbo-Klamby. 
6 As in Eslöv Örtofta, Sjöbo-Klamby, Ystad- Eriksfält/Örum. 
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completely unpredictable permit process” (Svensk Vindenergi, 2010, p. 2), and the 
Swedish Energy Agency [Energimyndigheten] in a report from 2012 stated that the 
municipal answers sometimes are unclear or even missing, leading to a delay in the 
permit handling processes (Statens Energimyndighet, 2012, p. 23). The Svensk Vin-
denergi report states, “at least 380 planned turbines …have already been stopped by 
the veto” (Svensk Vindenergi, 2010, p. 2). The problem, as they see it, lies in that:
A municipality that has a negative attitude towards wind power, is hesitant or 
uninterested, may simply fail to address the case and thus in practice prohibit the 
installation. The municipality does not even have to justify its position in any way 
(2010, p. 2)
Of particular interest for this study is the fact that 16 of 21 of the wind power devel-
opers think that, all in all, it has become more difficult to get permission for wind 
power turbines after the legal revisions in August 2009. Only 2 out of 21 think it has 
become easier (ibid p. 11-12). 
The informants confirm that many wind power companies prefer the municipal 
permit option. The expert judge in the Land and Environment Court of Appeals 
stated that the ”regulation leads to a large number of wind turbines that are 149 m 
high, i.e. below the limit set for the regional environmental trial”. That is, the opera-
tors prefer the municipal trial before the regional environmental trial that includes 
the veto regulation. The regional handling official, representing the receiver of envi-
ronmental permit applications at regional level, also confirms this. 
The pro-wind energy NGO also demands that the municipal veto ought to be 
removed, which they wish to diminish to something they express as that the munici-
pal opinion should ”carry weight” and it should clarify the municipal position on the 
wind-power project. The NGO wishes for the return of the municipal building per-
mit, if the veto cannot be remodelled. This is a clear critique of the path chosen by 
the Environmental Process Commission and the amendment to the process (Svensk 
Vindenergi, 2010, pp. 2-3). 
6. ANALYSIS – LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE AND OUTCOMES OF LAW
The following section addresses the two specific research questions outlined in the 
introduction of the article before a briefer section making suggestions on alternative 
approaches. 
6.1 Levels of governance in the Swedish wind power development
The tiering of the Swedish system creates an interesting imbalance. This is because 
what we call the ”two streams of administration” operating according to different 
logics. Moving the focus of the processes of wind power permit handling from the 
governance of the local planning system to the environmental government system 
has most likely caused changes in principle of how wind power is seen in a wider 
context.
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The planning system operates with a hierarchy of local plans from the compre-
hensive, indicative plans covering the entire territory of the municipality, to binding 
detailed development plans and building permits. The object of this tiered system 
is to produce a spatial pattern of land use that is seen as desirable from several 
perspectives. In a building permit process the municipal planning system is thus 
not only considering the rights of those formal stakeholders defined by economic 
interest and property directly involved but also how the individual wind power plant 
or farm fits into a system and vision of development of the area and the municipality. 
In the comprehensive planning, especially the wind power supplementary plans, the 
municipality can thus weigh technical suitability for wind power generation against 
projections of future growth, conservation and visual landscape impacts and fuzzy 
concepts such as sustainable development as interpreted by the municipality. The 
tiering at higher levels is however, as pointed out, weak. The national wind power 
development interest and goals are manifest in the designated areas of national inter-
est, which the Swedish Energy Agency has defined on wind power potential alone. 
No regional spatial planning exists in Sweden. As noted by Haughton et al (2010) 
local planning authorities in other countries find it very easy to ignore the wider 
context in which they operate. The regional administration’s role in spatial planning 
is in Sweden only to oversee if and how the municipality takes this sectorial, national 
interest into account in the comprehensive plan.
The lowest level of the environmental permit system is the regional arm of gov-
ernment. However the extent to which regional aspects of environment or renewable 
energy is considered seems negligible in our cases. The environmental management 
side basically tests the permissibility of any given application against formal criteria 
such as noise and disturbance from moving shadows and amenity loss. It is basically 
concerned with weighing the rights and interests of the applicant against the rights 
and interests of the affected property owners in the vicinity. 
The Swedish system of environmental governance, also in the case of wind 
power, is complex and relates to a number of levels, but also to the industrial initia-
tives as well as citizen attitudes and conceptions. The legal revision made in 2009 
was substantial, and has been criticised for being too legally dogmatic, that is, basing 
proposals not on systematic knowledge of for example why people appeal wind 
power permits, but on a combination of anecdotal evidence, of the type we have 
quoted above, and legal cases and assumptions made on detailed intra-legal reflec-
tions (Larsson, 2009; 2011b; Larsson and Emmelin, 2009). As a consequence, the 
legal framework was changed without any reliable assurance that the revisions would 
actually fulfil their purpose. The proposal suggested a handling process utilising a 
regionally based environmental judgment rather than the municipal planning ap-
proach, which has to be seen in the light of Sweden’s strong local planning tradition. 
This explains much of the critique that the proposal received and the political com-
promise, which means that the municipalities lost much of the planning responsibil-
ities a right remained to approve or disapprove large-scale wind power localisations 
within the municipality, even though the actual process was placed at another level 
and in another “decision stream”. 
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6.2 The so-called municipal veto
This article deals with issues of hierarchy in the decision-making over wind pow-
er planning and permit handling in Sweden. One of the most important issues of 
interest in this context is the relationship between the regional level and the local, 
municipal level. There are several reasons for this, but the fact that most permit 
handling is done at the regional level while the municipality has to agree or disagree 
to the decision, without giving any reasons, often referred to as the “municipal veto”, 
forms a setting of interest here. It expresses some sort of compromise between the 
powers at different levels in the environmental permit system and the planning 
system, leading to empirical outcomes decisive for wind power development in 
Sweden. An inherent problem with present policy objectives is that they are not 
based on any assessment at the local level of what can reasonably be achieved within 
the framework of the planning system. It is clear from the legislative history of the 
revision that the starting point of the reform was not to consider first the realism of 
an objective in relation to the preferences in the system – which poses problems of 
tiering. The stated purpose of these changes was to streamline wind power develop-
ment by eliminating parallel trials, not ostensibly to reduce the municipal influence 
in questions regarding the use of municipal land. 
The object of switching the permit process away from municipal spatial plan-
ning was to create a process that was more efficient by abolishing double permit 
processes in the hope of speeding up the granting of permits (Prop. 2008/09:146). 
The introduction of the “municipal veto” would from this perspective seem counter-
productive. If the trend towards larger wind mills does not continue, then the split at 
a height of 150 m would also be counterproductive since the parallel permit process-
es will continue to be common.
From the perspective of effectiveness the situation is complex. Whether the 
parallel process is seen as producing more or less legitimate decisions will depend on 
stakeholder perspectives. However with respect to weighing of interests, the environ-
mental permit system and the spatial planning system differ in basic logic as noted 
above. If there is a difference in the actual outcomes depends both on the quality of 
comprehensive planning and the degree to which the environmental permit system 
takes municipal plans into consideration. 
6.3 Suggestions for legal and administrative reform
In our analysis a functional multi-level governance (MLG) system for wind power 
would assume a tiered planning system with a regional planning level rather than 
the present regional state agency overseeing the municipal level. Furthermore it 
would assume a higher average quality of spatial planning and a horizontal integra-
tion of planning and the environmental permit system than we can see at present. 
An alternative to the present uneasy double command system would be to hand 
back the permit giving to the planning system and ensure an efficient and effective 
appeals system. This would however seem to run contrary to the present narrow 
focus on efficiency measured simply as time from application to decision. Or as 
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noted for the Canadian permit system7: the trend is towards a system that can “get 
quickly to yes”. This is an expression of sector interests and private developers pri-
orities combined with an unrealistic view of the quality of their planning as shown 
for example for infrastructure (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003) or the naive belief that good 
intentions preclude unwanted or unexpected side effects making environmental as-
sessment unnecessary (Emmelin in press). It hardly provides for an effective assess-
ment and permit system from a wider environmental perspective. As noted by Sager 
(2001) one important role of a permit system is to put a brake on speed-blinded 
sector authorities and entrepreneurs. 
7. CONCLUSIONS
The legal preparatory works for the legal changes in the Swedish wind power permit 
process speak clearly about the manifest functions that the revisions are intended 
for. The changes wrought in the planning and permit processes for wind power are 
specific to the Swedish context but illustrate more general issues in multi level gov-
ernance. They must however also be seen within a framework of pressures to make 
planning and permit processes more efficient which is a component of the planning 
debate on the political agenda in most European countries (Zonneveld & Evers, 
2014). 
The results indicate that different parties perceive the municipal veto differently. 
Interestingly enough, the concerned citizens tend to want municipalities to take a 
bigger role in the process, even when the process is mainly located at the regional 
level. The Wind-power companies tend to regard the veto as an instrument increas-
ing uncertainty and makes it harder to foresee the outcome of the permit processes. 
Wind power, as with many national policies that have clear local environmental and 
spatial implications when implemented, is in essence a different issue at the different 
levels. People may agree upon the need for renewable energy as a general, abstract 
goal, but not necessarily agree that the actual wind turbines should affect their local 
landscape. In addition, the results indicate that the industry sees the “veto” as lead-
ing to problematic uncertainty in the process at regional level, and therefore prefer 
to keep the applications at a level that entitles them to use the municipal handling 
system – which is determined by height and number of turbines – which is a con-
sequence opposite to what the legal commission aimed for when revising the legal 
system.
The so-called municipal veto seems to us to be an unfortunate compromise 
between two systems. Tentatively we would favour a planning system as a first order 
system with the environmental permit system as the first recourse for appeal. We 
base this on the normative standpoint that a planned development rather than an ad 
how permit and actor based system would be preferable but being very aware of the 
actual shortcomings of the spatial planning system including the lack of a regional 
spatial arena.
7 %UDP1REOH6HPLQDUDW6ZHGLVK(,$FHQWUH6/88SSVDOD. 
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